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In recent years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, which are firms 
actions that go above and beyond the interests of the firm to further the social good, have 
become common practice. While extant literature on CSR largely investigates the 
consequences of CSR activities, only a few studies identify the determinants of CSR. This 
dissertation extends a growing literature on the determinants of CSR by exploring the 
impact of corporate governance on CSR activities in three related essays. 
The first essay investigates the impact of family control on CSR performance. 
Using newly collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in 
nine East Asian economies, we find that family control is associated with lower CSR 
performance, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis of family control. The negative 
relationship between family control and CSR is robust to alternative CSR measures, 
alternative estimation methods, and a different definition of family firms, as well as to 
endogeneity tests, subsample tests, comparisons with other large shareholders, and 
comparisons with family firms from other countries. In additional analyses, we find that 
CSR underperformance is more pronounced in family firms with greater agency problems 
and in countries with weaker institutions. These findings contribute to understanding the 
determinants of CSR and highlight the importance of corporate governance and the 
institutional environment in improving CSR performance of family-controlled firms.
The second essay assesses the CSR performance of newly privatized firms (NPFs) 
to understand the social impact of privatization. Using data of NPFs from 41 countries over 
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the 2002-2010 period, we find strong evidence that NPFs have better CSR performance 
than other publicly listed firms. Controlling for firm-level and country-level variables, state 
ownership has a negative impact on CSR performance, while foreign and employee 
ownership have positive impacts on CSR performance in NPFs. We also find that country-
level institutions play a moderating role in the relationship between ownership structure 
and CSR performance in NPFs. In additional analyses, we find that CSR performance helps 
to improve the financial performance of NPFs. Specifically, NPFs with residual state 
ownership and better CSR performance exhibit higher valuation and lower equity financing 
costs. 
The third essay investigates the dynamics of cross-listing and CSR. Using a sample 
of 11,594 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002-2011, we find 
that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than non-cross-listed domestic firms. 
This result is robust to endogeneity and different types of cross-listing. We also find that 
CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) the U.S. 
market. The positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is stronger for firms from 
countries with weaker institutions and for firms in industries with high litigation risk. 
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Defined as corporate social or environmental behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirements of the relevant markets or economies (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 
2012), corporate social responsibility (CSR) has inevitably become important and 
mainstream business practice nowadays and has raised a substantial interest in academic 
circles as well. From the practitioner point of view, a recent survey (2014) by a consulting 
firm EPG shows that U.S. and UK companies in the Fortune Global 500 spent over $15.2 
billion a year on CSR. In the same vein, 93 percent of the world’s largest 250 companies 
now report their CSR investments, either in standalone reports or as part of their annual 
financial reports (KPMG, 2013). From the academic point of view, the impact of social 
and environmental practice on firm value is still inconclusive, although most evidence 
points to a positive relation (see Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009 for meta-
analyses).  
While extant literature on CSR largely investigates the consequences of CSR 
activities, only a few studies identify the determinants of CSR. This dissertation extends a 
growing literature on the determinants of CSR by exploring the impact of corporate 
governance on CSR activities in three related essays. The first and second essays examine 
the CSR performance from the internal corporate governance aspects. Specifically, the first 
one investigates how family control influences CSR performance. The second one assesses 
how ownership change in privatized firms impacts CSR performance. The third essay, from 
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external corporate governance aspects, looks at the CSR performance of foreign firms 
cross-listed in U.S. markets and examines how cross-listing changes the CSR performance. 
The first essay in Chapter 2 investigates the impact of family control on CSR 
performance. A large ownership stake may create agency conflicts between controlling 
families and minority shareholders if controlling families can use their voting rights to 
divert firm resources from CSR projects to other projects that benefit themselves. This 
expropriation view suggests that family firms have lower CSR performance than non-
family firms. However, family firms have greater reputation concerns than non-family 
firms (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2011), which may lead family firms to 
invest more in CSR activities. Family firms’ longer horizon (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005) may further lead family firms to invest more in CSR to help support long-term 
relationships with stakeholders. The reputation/long-term horizon view thus suggests that 
family firms have higher CSR performance than non-family firms. 
In this essay, we find support for the expropriation view of family firms. In 
particular, we find a significantly negative impact of family control on CSR after 
controlling for firm, industry, and country characteristics. This negative relationship is 
robust to separately examining the components of our primary CSR measure, as well as to 
endogeneity tests, sample composition tests, alternative estimation methods, alternative 
definition of family firms, comparisons with other large shareholders, and comparisons 
with family firms from other countries. To shed further light on our main finding, we first 
examine whether the CSR underperformance of family firms is more pronounced in firms 
with greater agency problems as indicated by proxies for firms’ agency costs, ownership 
structure, and board structure. The results show that family firms underperform on CSR 
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when they have greater agency problems, when monitoring by outside shareholders is less 
effective, or when monitoring by board members is less efficient. These findings are 
consistent with the expropriation view and support our main results. Next, we investigate 
whether country-level institutions affect families’ incentives to invest in CSR. We find that 
family firms are less likely to invest in CSR in countries with low freedom of the press, 
more political connections, and weaker investor protection. Thus, while family firms have 
more incentives to augment their reputation through CSR activities, a weak institutional 
environment may reduce these incentives. Differences in institutional environment might 
also explain why family firms perform differently on CSR in the U.S. and East Asia.  
This essay contributes to the literature on the determinants of CSR, the literature on 
the impact of family control, and the literature on the impact of country-level institutions. 
With respect to the first line of research, we highlight the importance of understanding 
ownership structure when studying the determinants of CSR. We further show that in East 
Asia, only the family ownership structure has a significant impact on CSR. With respect to 
the second line of research, we confirm prior evidence on the expropriation effects of 
family control in East Asia and suggest that lower CSR performance could be one 
consequence of expropriation. With respect to the third line of research, we show that 
country-level institutions may alter controlling families’ incentives to invest in CSR. 
The second essay, in Chapter 3, investigates the impact of privatization on CSR 
performance. The privatization setting is interesting in that it allows examining CSR 
adoption/ change around a change in the objective function of the firm rather than resulting 
from global or domestic forces as is often done in the literature. In addition, it allows 
exploiting the particular post divestiture ownership structure to test the link between 
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government ownership, foreign and employee ownership on CSR performance. Using a 
large sample of 10,502 firm-year observations from 41 countries over the period 2002-
2010, we find that CSR is significantly higher for NPFs in comparison to other matching 
publicly listed firms. This finding is robust to addressing endogeneity through propensity 
score matching, and confirms our main hypothesis that NPFs either adopt CSR as an 
investment strategy to increase competitiveness with privately-owned companies, or are 
coerced to do so by the government that transfers the cost of CSR to private owners. To 
disentangle these two explanations, we compare partially and fully privatized firms and 
observe that partially privatized firms have significantly higher CSR performance, which 
supports the conjecture that CSR activities are likely to be forced upon the firms by the 
government, for reputation gains and because CSR costs can be transferred to the new 
owners.  
In a second step, we examine the impact of ownership structure and country-level 
institutions on CSR performance of NPFs. We find that state ownership (alternatively 
captured by state control or political connections) is negatively associated with CSR 
performance in NPFs, while foreign ownership and employee ownership are positively 
associated with CSR performance. Country-level institutions play a moderating role in the 
relationship between ownership structure and CSR performance. Finally, we investigate 
the firm-level outcomes of CSR activities in NPFs. We find that CSR performance helps 
to mitigate the negative impact of state ownership on firm financial performance in NPFs. 
More specifically, better CSR performance in NPFs with state residual ownership yields 
higher firm value and lower equity financing costs. 
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This essay contributes to the privatization literature by examining the social impact 
of privatization. To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess the social responsibility 
of NPFs. SOEs do not typically engage in the additional costs of CSR, and therefore the 
reform could be used to transfer the cost of CSR to private investors. Or, alternatively, CSR 
awareness becomes part of corporate decision-making of NPFs since they are under private 
ownership and seek profit and value maximization. We find support for this hypothesis by 
showing that NPFs have better performance on social dimensions. Also, this essay 
contributes to the literature on determinants of CSR. Specifically, we link this corporate 
decision to a macroeconomic policy that is politically driven. We show that CSR is 
dependent on political will and therefore government support and political institutions are 
important determinants of CSR activities. Finally, our essay is related to corporate finance 
literature because it examines the impact of CSR on firm financial performance in NPFs. 
We find that better CSR performance helps to mitigate the adverse effect of state ownership 
on firm performance. 
The third essay, in Chapter 4, investigates the impact of cross-listing on firms’ 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Using 11,594 firm-year observations 
from 54 economies over the period 2002-2011, this essay studies the dynamics of cross-
listing and CSR. Consistent with the positive view of CSR, we find that cross-listing is 
positively associated with CSR performance. This positive relation holds for endogeneity, 
both components of CSR performance, namely, environmental performance and social 
performance, and for all four ADR program types. To further mitigate the self-selection 
concern, we look into the change of CSR performance within cross-listed firms and find 
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that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) the U.S. 
market.  
To deepen our analysis, we next examine several factors likely to condition the 
relation between cross-listing and CSR. We first investigate the effect of home country 
institutions on the CSR performance of cross-listed firms. We find that the positive impact 
of cross-listing on CSR performance is larger for firms from countries with weaker 
institutions. This result is consistent with the bonding theory of cross-listing, holding that 
firms from countries with weak institutions benefit more from cross-listing in the U.S. 
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). We also investigate the 
effect of cross-listing in venues other than the U.S. and find no significant impact of these 
cross-listings on CSR performance, suggesting that U.S. markets subject cross-listed firms 
to a relatively stronger regulatory and monitoring environment (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2009). To directly test the litigation risk explanation, we investigate the CSR performance 
of cross-listed foreign firms that operate in industries with higher litigation risk. We find 
that cross-listed firms in high litigation risk industries are more likely to invest in CSR, in 
line with our argument that cross-listed firms may use CSR to reduce their exposure to 
litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance are 
valued more by investors. 
This essay contributes to different strands of literatures on cross-listing, CSR, and 
the impact of country-level institutions. With respect to the first line of research, we provide 
the first study to our knowledge to assess the social responsibility of cross-listed firms. We 
find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than their peers. We thus add to 
this line of literature by showing that not only financial performance but also social 
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performance can be improved by cross-listing. With respect to the second line of research, 
we provide support for the positive view of CSR. We show that improved corporate 
governance increases CSR performance, and that investors value CSR investments in 
cross-listed firms. With respect to the third line of research, we show that changes in the 
institutional environment may also influence firms’ CSR performance. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the core findings of Chapter 2, 3, and 4 and discusses the 




FAMILY CONTROL AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
2.1. Introduction 
In recent years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, which are firm actions that 
go above and beyond the interests of the firm to further the social good (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001), have become common practice. For example, a 2013 survey by KPMG 
reveals that 93% of Fortune Global 250 firms report investment in CSR activities, either in 
standalone reports or as part of their annual financial reports. Extant literature on CSR 
largely investigates the consequences of CSR activities, documenting the effect of CSR on 
firm value (e.g., Fatemi, Fooladi, and Tehranian, 2015), abnormal stock returns (e.g., 
Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 2013), idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009), financial 
distress (e.g., Goss, 2009), the cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and 
Mishra, 2011), access to finance (e.g., Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014), and merger 
performance (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). Prior studies identify only a few determinants 
of CSR, however, including regulations (Dawkins and Lewis, 2003) and national 
institutions (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) at the country level, and board structure (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999), CEO characteristics (Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan, 2006), and 
political affiliation (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014) at the firm level. In this essay we 
investigate the extent to which ownership structure and, in particular, family control drives
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 CSR performance and the role of corporate governance and country-level institutions in 
influencing families’ incentives to invest in CSR1. 
According to agency theory, family-controlled firms should have fewer agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers than non-family-controlled firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), as the large ownership stakes of controlling families imply strong 
monitoring of management (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). But family control can create 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, because 
controlling shareholders could expropriate minority shareholders to pursue private benefits 
(e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Bae, 
Kang, and Kim, 2002). In the context of CSR, controlling families can use their dominant 
voting rights to divert resources from CSR activities to other projects. The expropriation 
view thus suggests that CSR performance is lower for family firms than non-family firms.  
However, family firms’ reputation concerns and long-term horizons suggest higher 
CSR performance for family firms. Family firms have greater reputation concerns than 
non-family firms because reputation affects not only firm performance but also the family’s 
name (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger, Sieger, and Halter, 2011), and a favorable 
family name is an important socioemotional goal of family firms (Berrone et al., 2010; 
Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Thus, to increase the firm’s and, in turn, the family’s 
reputation, family firms may engage more in CSR activities. Also, because the 
                                                          
1  While an abundant literature examines the impact of family control on firms’ investment decisions 
(Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2012; Masulis, Pham, and Zein, 2011), investment-cash flow sensitivity 
(Pindado, Requejo, and Torre, 2011; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), cost of equity capital (Attig, Guedhami, 
and Mishra, 2008), cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, Reeb, 2003), corporate disclosure (Ali, Chen, and 
Radhakrishnan, 2007), earnings quality (Wang, 2006), firm productivity (Barth, Gulbrandsen, and Schønea, 
2005), firm leverage and corporate diversification (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b), and corporate performance 
(Andres, 2008; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; among others), 
to our knowledge there is little evidence on the impact of family control on CSR. 
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concentrated ownership stake of family firms induces a long-term horizon (Stein, 1988), 
family firms are more likely to invest in long-term relationships with other stakeholders 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) through greater participation in CSR activities. 
Because expropriation effects and reputation/horizon effects may operate on family 
firms’ decisions at the same time, the net effect on CSR performance is an empirical 
question. Prior studies using U.S. data find a positive impact of family control on CSR 
performance (Berrone et al., 2010; Block and Wagner, 2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006), in 
line with the reputation/horizon view. However, it is not clear that the positive relation 
between family control and CSR should generalize outside the U.S., where institutions are 
less protective of minority shareholders and hence the incentives for expropriation are 
stronger2. 
To shed light on this question, in this study we empirically examine the effect of 
family ownership on CSR performance in East Asia, which is an ideal setting for this 
analysis for three reasons. First, family control is the dominant ownership form in East 
Asia (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000), with nearly half of publicly traded firms 
controlled by families in 2008 (Carney and Child, 2013). Second, prior studies of the effect 
of family control on financial performance find opposite results for the U.S. and East Asia 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Third, 
controlling families in East Asian family firms typically have excess control through 
pyramidal ownership structures or cross-holdings (Claessens et al., 2002), and thus have 
greater incentive and ability to expropriate minority shareholders.  
                                                          
2 Anderson and Reeb (2003a), and Villalonga and Amit (2006) both find that family firms in U.S.outperform 
than nonfamily firms, but Claessens et al.(2002) use data in eight East Asian economies and find a negative 
impact of family control on firm value. 
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We obtain information on firm ownership from Carney and Child’s (2013) newly 
collected data set on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East 
Asian economies: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Information on firms’ CSR performance comes from 
ASSET4 data compiled by Thomson Reuters. The resulting sample comprises 1,719 firm-
year observations for nine East Asian economies between 2002 and 2011. 
Using the above sample, we first explore whether family-controlled firms have 
better CSR performance than other firms. To do so we construct three proxies for family 
control, namely, FAM_DUM, FAM_CONT and FAM_MAN. We find that family firms 
have significantly lower CSR performance than non-family firms, CSR decreases with the 
extent of family control, and CSR is significantly lower for family firms in which a member 
of the controlling family is also the CEO, Chairman of the Board, or Vice Chairman of the 
Board. These results support the expropriation hypothesis. When we separately examine 
the two components of CSR performance, namely, environmental performance and social 
performance, we find that the negative impact of family control continues to hold for both 
components.  
One can argue that the lower CSR performance of family firms is due to some 
fundamental difference between family and non-family firms. Further, it is possible that 
unobserved determinants of CSR performance explain the lower CSR performance of 
family firms. To address these endogeneity concerns, we employ two-stage least square 
(2SLS) approach, Heckman selection estimation procedure, and propensity score matching 
(PSM) procedure. The results consistently support our main finding that family firms are 
associated with lower CSR performance. Another concern is that the lower CSR 
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performance of family-controlled firms is driven by a specific group of firms or a certain 
period. To address this possibility we re-run our analysis using weighted least squares, 
giving countries and years with more observations less weight, we exclude financial firms, 
and we separately examine the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our main results 
continue to hold. Moreover, our results are robust to the use of alternative estimation 
methods, alternative definition of family firms, comparisons with other large shareholders, 
and comparisons with family firms from other countries. 
To further evaluate the expropriation hypothesis, we examine whether the CSR 
underperformance of family firms is more pronounced in firms that have greater potential 
agency problems, as indicated by proxies for firms’ agency costs, ownership structure, and 
board structure. The results show that CSR performance is lower for family firms that have 
greater agency costs, less monitoring from outside shareholders, and less efficient boards. 
We also investigate how country-level institutions affect families’ incentives to invest in 
CSR. We find that family firms are less likely to invest in CSR in countries with lower 
freedom of the press, more political connections, and weaker investor protection. Thus, 
while family firms have more incentives to enhance their reputation through investment in 
CSR activities, a weak institutional environment may reduce these incentives. Different 
institutional environments can also explain why family firms’ CSR performance differs 
between the U.S. and East Asia.  
This essay contributes to the literature on the determinants of CSR by showing how 
CSR performance is influenced by ownership type. Previous studies on the relation 
between ownership structure and CSR generally focus on a single country and find mixed 
results across settings (e.g., Bartkus, Morris, and Seifert, 2002; Ghazali, 2007; Barnea and 
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Rubin, 2010; Oh, Chang, and Martynov, 2011; Berrone et al., 2010; Block and Wagner, 
2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Our study, based on Carney and Child’s (2013) newly 
collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East 
Asian economies, provides cross-country evidence on the relation between family 
ownership and CSR performance. Using a cross-country setting, we are better able to 
identify the influence of family control on CSR and understand the role of corporate 
governance and the institutional environment in improving CSR performance of family-
controlled firms, hence offering an explanation for the mixed findings in previous 
literature.  
This essay also contributes to the literature on family firms by providing evidence 
on how family firms’ behavior affects CSR performance. Dyer and Whetten (2006), 
Berrone et al. (2010), and Block and Wagner (2014) document a positive impact of family 
control on CSR performance in the U.S., while we find a negative impact using data from 
nine East Asia economies. This result suggests that controlling families tend to expropriate 
minority shareholders in environments with greater agency conflicts and weaker 
institutions.  
Finally, this essay contributes to a large literature on the role of country-level 
institutions. Previous studies document how country-level institutions impact variation in 
CSR performance across countries (e.g., Jamali, Zanhour, and Keshishian, 2009; Jackson 
and Apostolakou, 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). We extend this literature by showing 




The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data and variables, and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents results of univariate tests, regression 
analysis, and robustness tests. Section 5 presents results of additional analyses. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the essay. 
 
2.2. Family Control and Corporate Social Responsibility 
2.2.1. The Expropriation View 
According to agency theory, family-controlled firms should have fewer agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers than non-family firms (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), as the large ownership stakes of controlling families imply greater incentives to 
monitor managers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). However, family control can lead to 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, as 
controlling shareholders have strong incentives to pursue private benefits by expropriating 
minority shareholders: unlike other types of large shareholders (e.g., the state, a widely 
held firm, or a financial institution), controlling families usually hold large ownership 
stakes in a single firm for several generations and a family member often serves as CEO or 
Chairman of the Board (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
A large body of literature documents expropriation of minority shareholders in 
family firms. For instance, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) report that family firms’ 
preference for dividends leads to lower investment in physical capital and Anderson et al. 
(2012) show that family firms invest less in R&D. Further, Bertrand et al. (2002) and Bae 
et al. (2002) find direct evidence of tunneling in Indian family business groups and Korean 
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family-controlled pyramids (chaebols), respectively. These behaviors lead to lower returns 
for family firms. Indeed, empirical studies show that family firms underperform non-family 
firms in East Asia (Claessens et al., 2002), Canada (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000), 
and Sweden (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003), among others, and using a sample of 35 
countries Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) find that family firms underperformed during 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
With regard to CSR performance, prior work suggests that controlling shareholders 
are associated with lower CSR performance. For example, Bartkus et al. (2002) find that 
blockholders limit corporate philanthropy for a sample of 66 U.S. companies, and Ghazali 
(2007) shows that Malaysian companies with a high level of director ownership disclose 
significantly less CSR information. Using a CSR rating data set that classifies the largest 
3,000 U.S. corporations as socially responsible or irresponsible, Barnea and Rubin (2010) 
find that on average insider ownership is negatively related to a firm’s CSR rating. 
Similarly, Oh et al. (2011) find that managerial ownership is negatively associated with a 
firm’s CSR rating in Korean firms, and Dam and Scholtens (2013) find that ownership 
concentration is significantly negatively related to CSR performance in a sample of 700 
European firms.  
In sum, the above discussion suggests that controlling families have more 
incentives to divert firm resources, including investment in CSR activities, by 
expropriating minority shareholders, which leads to underperformance of family firms. The 
expropriation view thus suggests that family firms realize lower CSR performance than 
non-family firms. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: CSR performance is lower for family firms than non-family firms. 
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2.2.2. The Reputation and Long-Term Horizon View 
While the expropriation view suggests that controlling families have incentives to 
divert firm resources and thereby invest less in CSR, the reputation concerns and long-term 
horizon of family-controlled firms suggest an alternative perspective. Firms invest in CSR 
activities to enhance their reputation with stakeholders (Albert and Whetten, 1985; 
Whetten and Mackey, 2002). Reputation is particularly important to family firms, because 
it affects not only firm performance but also the family’s name (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; 
Zellweger et al., 2011). Family owners and managers who view their firm as an extension 
of themselves may fear that a poor firm reputation will hurt their family and themselves 
(Ward, 1987; Kets de Vries, 1994; Post, 1993; Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Further, because 
controlling families are often interested in passing the firm on to the next generation 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), in addition to financial goals family firms may pursue a 
number of nonfinancial goals (Zellweger et al., 2013), of which a favorable reputation is 
an important socioemotional goal (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003; Berrone et al., 2010; 
Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013), This argument thus suggests that family firms are more 
likely than other firms to invest in CSR to increase the firm’s and in turn the family’s 
reputation.  
Family firms also enjoy a longer horizon than non-family firms. While managers 
of widely held firms have incentives to pursue short-term performance at the expense of 
long-run value to enhance their reputation in the labor market (Narayanan, 1985), family-
controlled firms’ concentrated ownership increases incentives to monitor management, 
which decreases managerial myopia (Stein, 1988). Further, James (1999) suggests that the 
long-term horizon of family firms results in more efficient investment, as it allows firms to 
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maximize wealth over the long run and invest in long-term relationships with stakeholders 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). This argument suggests that family firms are more 
likely than other firms to invest in CSR to maximize long-term value (Jensen, 2002; 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). In line with this perspective, using U.S. data Dyer and Whetten 
(2006) find that family firms are more socially responsible than non-family firms, Berrone 
et al. (2010) find that family-controlled firms have better environmental performance than 
non-family firms, and Block and Wagner (2014) show that while family ownership is 
negatively associated with community-related CSR performance, it is positively associated 
with diversity-, employee-, environment-, and product-related aspects of CSR.  
In sum, the above discussion suggests that the reputation concerns and longer 
horizon of family firms lead them to invest more in CSR than non-family firms. This view 
thus implies higher CSR performance for family firms, which leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CSR performance is higher for family firms than non-family firms. 
 
2.3. Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
2.3.1. Sample 
To construct our sample we begin by collecting data from several sources (see 
Appendix A). We obtain ownership data for publicly traded firms in nine East Asian 
economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) from Carney and Child (2013). This data set identifies firms’ 
ultimate controlling shareholders as well as their ultimate cash flow (ownership) and voting 
(control) rights as of 2008, and also provides information on the presence of multiple large 
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shareholders (up to five) and their control stakes. We obtain CSR data from Thomson 
Reuters’ ASSET4, which provides environmental, social, and governance information on 
over 3,400 firms worldwide as of 2002. This information is collected from publicly 
available sources (e.g., annual reports, NGO websites, CSR reports) and updated biweekly. 
Finally, we obtain firm-level financial data from the Compustat Global database.  
Next, we hand-match the ownership dataset with the financial data. We then merge 
the resulting dataset with the CSR data. After omitting firms with insufficient financial data 
to construct the regression variables, the final sample comprises 1,719 observations from 
nine economies over the 2002-2011 period.  
2.3.1. Variables 
2.3.1.1. CSR  
Following Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), we construct our primary measure of a 
firm’s CSR performance, CSR, as the average of the firm’s environmental and social 
performance scores. A firm’s environmental performance score captures the company’s 
impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and water, and is 
based on the firm’s energy use, CO2 emissions, waste recycling, etc. A firm’s social 
performance score measures the company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers, and society and is based on factors such as employee turnover, 
injury rate, training hours, percentage of female employees, and amount donated to 
charitable organizations. In robustness tests we also examine a firm’s environmental 
performance (ENVIRONMENT) and social performance (SOCIAL) separately. 
2.3.1.2. Family Control 
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To capture family control, we construct three proxies: FAM_DUM, FAM_CONT, 
and FAM_MAN. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003a), FAM_DUM is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, 0 otherwise. Carney and Child (2013) 
identify the largest shareholder at the 10% and 20% thresholds. We use the 10% threshold 
in our main analysis and the 20% threshold in robustness tests. FAM_CONT, which also 
comes from Anderson and Reeb (2003a), is the percentage of voting rights held by the 
controlling family shareholder. In addition to these two proxies, we construct FAM_MAN, 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the controlling family is also the CEO, Chairman 
of the Board, or Vice Chairman of the Board.  
It should be noted that our results are not likely to be influenced by the use of one-
year cross-sectional observations on family firms, as firm ownership structure is “sticky”. 
In the context of East Asia, Carney and Child (2013) map ownership changes of the largest 
corporations and find that family control remains the most common form of ownership. 
They conclude that firm ownership type is likely to change only where major political 
changes occur. For the purpose of our study, we do not observe any major political or 
institutional change over our sample period. We therefore expect cross-sectional variation 
in our three family control variables to reflect heterogeneity in CSR policy across our 
sample firms. 
2.3.1.3. Firm-level Control Variables 
We include a number of firm-level variables to control for various factors that may 
affect CSR performance. In particular, we control for: SIZE, the natural logarithm of total 
assets; AGE, firm age, measured as the fiscal year minus the year of establishment; MTB, 
the market-to- book ratio; LEV, the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA, return on assets, 
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measured as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets; and RDS, the 
ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. To mitigate the impact of 
outliers, we winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1% and 99% levels. In addition to these 
firm-level variables, we control for country, industry, and year effects in all of our 
regressions. 
2.3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 summarizes our sample composition by industry, country, and year. The 
full sample comprises 1,719 observations representing 335 unique firms over the 2002-
2011 period. More than one-fourth of the sample firms are family firms. Using the Fama–
French (1997) 12-industry classification, family firms are diversified across industries, 
with Consumer Nondurables having the highest percentage of family firms (55%) and 
Utilities having the lowest (15.79%). Among the nine East Asian economies, family firms 
dominate in the Philippines (83.33%) and South Korea (57.45%), whereas only 10.48% 
and 15.79% of firms are family firms in Japan and Taiwan, respectively. The percentage 
of family firms is relatively stable over time starting in 2004; it is lower in 2002 and 2003. 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for and correlations between key regression 
variables. In Panel A, we see that CSR ranges between 97.570 and 6.690, with an average 
of 56.044 and a standard deviation of 29.614. These results suggest that there is 
considerable variation in CSR performance. The mean of FAM_DUM is 0.234, which 
implies that 23.4% of observations correspond to family firms. The mean of FAM_MAN 
is 0.166, which suggests that 16.6% of observations correspond to family firms in which a 
family member is also the CEO, Chairman of the Board, or Vice Chairman of the Board. 
In Panel B, we find that consistent with Hypothesis 2, all three measures of family control 
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(FAM_DUM, FAM_CONT, and FAM_MAN) are negatively related to our proxies for CSR 
performance (CSR, ENVIRONMENT, and SOCIAL), implying that family-controlled firms 
tend to have lower CSR performance. The correlation coefficients between key variables 
of interest are low, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to affect our regression 
results. 
 
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Univariate Analysis 
In Table 2.3, we conduct univariate tests of differences in means between family 
and non-family firms. The average CSR is 45.475 for family firms, compared to 59.280 for 
non-family firms, with the difference significant at the 1% level. Similarly, family firms 
have significantly lower ENVIRONMENT and SOCIAL than non-family firms. These 
results confirm the preliminary evidence in Table 2.2 that family firms tend to have lower 
CSR performance. However, this analysis does not control for other variables that could 
affect CSR. We thus conduct multivariate analysis next. 
2.4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
To shed further light on the impact of family control on CSR performance, we run 
the following specification: 
CSR=a0+a1FAMILY+a2Controls+a3Fixed effects +e,                    (1) 
where CSR is one of the three CSR proxies (CSR, ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL), 
FAMILY is one of the three measures of family control (FAM_DUM, FAM_CONT, 
FAM_MAN), Controls is a vector that contains the firm-specific control variables (SIZE, 
AGE, MTB, LEV, ROA, RDS), and Fixed effects is a vector that includes the year, industry, 
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and country fixed effects. In all regressions, we follow Petersen (2009) and cluster standard 
errors by firm and year. 
The regression results for specification (1) are reported in Tables 4 and 5. In Table 
2.4, the dependent variable is CSR, which is the average of a firm’s environmental 
performance and social performance scores. In Column 1, we report results based on 
FAM_DUM, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a family. The 
estimated coefficient on FAM_DUM is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that in line with the expropriation view (Hypothesis 2), family-controlled firms 
underperform on CSR compared with non-family firms. This result is also economically 
significant: the coefficient on FAM_DUM is -9.138, which together with the mean CSR of 
56.044 (Table 2.2, Panel A) implies that on average CSR performance is 16.3% lower 
(from 56.044 to 46.906) for family firms than non-family firms. Turning to the control 
variables, the results show that firm size, age, and return on assets are positively associated 
with CSR performance.  
In Column 2, we report results based on FAM_CONT, which captures the ultimate 
control rights of family firms. We document a negative and significant coefficient on 
FAM_CONT. This result complements the finding in Column 1 by showing that an increase 
in controlling families’ control rights is associated with a decrease in CSR performance. In 
terms of economic significance, increasing family control by one standard deviation 
decreases CSR performance by 7.3% (from 56.044 to 51.967). 
In Column 3 we employ our third measure of family control, FAM_MAN, which is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if a controlling family member is the CEO, Chairman of the 
Board, or Vice Chairman of the Board. The impact of FAM_MAN on CSR is again negative 
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and significant. Economically, a manager that is a member of the controlling family is 
associated with 15.4% lower CSR performance (from 56.044 to 47.398). Thus, while a 
family manager may imply lower shareholder-manager conflicts (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), here we see that controlling shareholder-minority 
shareholder conflicts arise, in line with the expropriation view.  
In Table 2.5, we separately examine the effect of family control on the two 
components of our primary measure of CSR performance, namely, environmental 
performance (ENVIRONMENT) and social performance (SOCIAL). Except for the effect 
of FAM_MAN on SOCIAL, the estimated coefficients are all negative and significant, 
consistent with our findings using CSR. Berrone et al. (2010) find that family-controlled 
firms have better environmental performance in the U.S. Our results suggest that in East 
Asia, family control leads to worse environmental performance.  
In sum, our multivariate analysis on the relation between family control and CSR 
performance shows that unlike papers that investigate family control and CSR using U.S. 
data (Berrone et al., 2010; Block and Wagner, 2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006), family 
firms in East Asia realize lower CSR performance than non-family firms, which is in line 
with the negative (i.e., expropriation) view of family firms.  
2.4.3. Robustness Tests 
In this subsection, we test the robustness of our main findings. First, we address 
possible endogeneity of family ownership. Second, we check whether our results are 
influenced by sample composition. Third, we employ alternative methods to estimate the 
standard errors. Fourth, we examine whether the results are influenced by our definition of 
family firms. Fifth, we investigate whether our results are driven by outperformance of 
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firms controlled by other large shareholders. Finally, we compare the CSR performance of 
family firms from East Asia with that of family firms from the U.S. and Western Europe. 
2.4.3.1. Endogeneity  
Our main evidence in Table 2.4 suggests that family control has a negative impact 
on CSR performance. However, family control and CSR performance are likely to be 
affected by the same firm characteristics. To the extent that firm ownership is 
systematically related to differences in firm characteristics, the impact of family control on 
CSR could result from these differences. Our research design helps mitigate concerns about 
omitted heterogeneity by using year, industry, and country fixed effects, but the possibility 
remains that some omitted variables affect both family control and CSR. It is also possible 
that our evidence is driven by reserve causality. For example, a family might maintain a 
higher stake in a socially irresponsible firm because it is less attractive to outside investors. 
We address these endogeneity concerns using three approaches. The results are reported in 
Table 2.6.  
First, we employ two-stage least square (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, we use 
a probit model to regress the family dummy variable of interest on the full set of control 
variables from our main specification and an instrumental variable of family firm. Prior 
literature suggests that family ownership is related to risk aversion (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Klasa, 2007) and therefore families are more likely to sell their stakes in more 
volatile industries. Thus we use industry-level return volatility (VOLATILITY) to 
instrument family firms. The result of first stage is presented in Column 1 of Table 2.6. 
The F-test in the first stage is positive and significant (11.603), suggesting that the 
instrumental variable is significantly positively related to FAM_DUM. In the second stage, 
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we regress CSR on the predicted FAM_DUM, and control variables. The result (Column 2 
of Table 2.6) confirms that family firms are associated with lower CSR performance. 
Second, we utilize Heckman selection estimation procedure. The first stage of Heckman 
model is the same with 2SLS. After estimating the first-stage model, we then regress CSR 
on the inverse Mills’ ratio (λ) estimated from the first stage, the predicted FAM_DUM, and 
control variables. The result, reported in Column 3 of Table 2.6, indicates that our main 
results still hold. 
The third approach we use is the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure 
proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We start by estimating propensity scores in a 
Probit model, where the dependent variable is FAM_DUM and the explanatory variables 
are as shown in Table 2.4. We match each family firm with a non-family firm that has the 
closest score to that of the family firm. Then we conduct the regression analysis using the 
PSM sample (Column 4 of Table 2.6), we find that the impact of FAM_DUM on CSR 
remains significantly negative. Thus, even when non-family firms have similar 
characteristics as family firms, family firms continue to have a negative impact on CSR 
performance. In sum, the results of our endogeneity tests consistently support the main 
results in Table 2.4, suggesting that endogeneity does not affect our main findings. 
2.4.3.2. Sample Composition 
 Another concern is that underperformance of family-controlled firms is driven by 
a specific group of firms or a certain period. To address this concern, we conduct subsample 
analysis using all three measures of family control. The results are reported in Table 2.7. 
We begin by exploring whether the inclusion of firms with multiple large shareholders 
(MLS) affects our main findings. Prior literature shows that MLS provide more effective 
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monitoring and hence improve firm performance (Attig, El Ghoul, and Guedhami, 2009; 
Laeven and Levine, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The first row in Table 2.7 reports 
results after excluding firms without MLS. Our main findings remain unchanged.  
We next examine whether the inclusion of financial firms influences our results, as 
financial firms’ investment behavior is shaped by different regulatory environments across 
countries. The second row of Table 2.7 reports results after excluding financial firms from 
the analysis. We continue to document a negative and significant effect of family control 
on CSR performance. 
Recall from Table 2.1 that some countries account for nearly 30% of the sample 
firms (e.g., Japan), while others account for less than 5% (e.g., Philippines). Also, some 
years are associated with more than 15% of the sample observations (e.g., 2010) while 
others have only 10% (e.g., 2002 and 2003). To further assess whether sample composition 
is driving our main evidence, we re-estimate our models using weighted regressions, where 
countries and years with more observations are given less weight. The results in the third 
row of Table 2.7 confirm our main evidence. 
In our last set of sample composition tests, we examine whether the recent financial 
crisis impacts our results. Prior literature suggests that family-controlled firms reduce 
investment more than other firms during financial crises (Lins et al., 2013) and invest more 
during normal business conditions (Masulis et al., 2011). To examine the effect of the 
financial crisis, we re-run our main analysis separately for the pre-crisis period (2002-
2007), the crisis period (2008-2009), and the post-crisis period (2010-2011). The results 
are presented in rows 4 to 6 of Table 2.7, respectively, and show that each of the three 
measures of family control loads significantly negatively on CSR performance in all three 
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sub-periods. In sum, the tests above consistently suggest that our main results are not driven 
by sample composition effects. 
2.4.3.3. Alternative Estimation Methods 
In all other regressions reported in the essay, we use two-way clustering by firm 
and year. In Table 2.8, we report results for the three measures of family control under 
alternative methods of estimating the standard errors: OLS, clustering by firm, Newey-
West, Generalized Least Squares (GLS), Fama-MacBeth, and Prais-Winsten. The 
coefficients remain negative and significant, consistent with our main findings.  
2.4.3.4. Alternative Definition of Family Firms—20% Threshold 
As previously explained in Section 2, in our main analysis the measures of family 
control are based on an ownership threshold of 10%. To test the sensitivity of our results 
to the threshold used to define family control, in Table 2.9 we use a 20% threshold, which 
means that the large shareholders’ voting rights are all greater than 20%; recall that Carney 
and Child (2013) identify ultimate owners at the 10% and 20% thresholds. The results, 
reported in Table 2.9, are similar to our main evidence: FAM_DUM_20, FAM_CONT_20, 
and FAM_MAN_20 are significantly negatively associated with CSR performance. 
2.4.3.5. Other Large Shareholder and CSR 
The results so far indicate that family firms in East Asia have lower CSR 
performance than nonfamily firms. However, the results could be potentially driven by 
higher CSR performance of firms controlled by other large shareholders. For example, 
state-owned firms are theoretically viewed as policy tools to cure market failure and to 
maximize social welfare (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987), and therefore are expected to 
have better CSR performance than other firms. Institutional investors may also have a 
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positive impact on CSR performance (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 
1999). 
To investigate this possibility, we first examine the impacts of two other types of 
large shareholders: state (STATE) and widely-held firms (WIDELY-HELD). STATE is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a state or foreign government, while 
WIDELY_HELD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a widely held 
company or financial institution. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.10 report results on the effect 
of different types of ownership on CSR performance. We find that neither STATE nor 
WIDELY_HELD has a significant impact on CSR performance. In Column 4 of Table 2.10, 
we include FAM_DUM, STATE, and WIDELY_HELD in the regression simultaneously. 
Only family ownership loads with a significantly negative sign, which is again in line with 
our main results. These results imply that neither state nor a widely-held firm as the largest 
shareholder has a direct impact on firms CSR performance. 
To further compare family firms’ CSR performance relative to other types of 
controlling owners, we use propensity score matching (PSM) procedure outlined above. 
We first match each family firm with a state-owned firm using a propensity score matching 
procedure. The propensity scores are estimated in a Probit model, where the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable equals one if a firm is a family firm and zero if a firm is a 
state-owned firm and the explanatory variables are as in Table 2.4. We match each family 
firm with a state-owned firm that has the closest score to that of the family firm. Then we 
conduct regression analysis using the matched sample (Column 5 of Table 2.10), and we 
find that the negative impact of family firms is still significant. This result suggests that, 
compared with state-owned firms that have similar characteristics, family firms have lower 
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CSR performance. We repeated this procedure for family firms versus firms which the 
largest shareholder is a widely-held firm (Column 6 of Table 2.10), and for family firms 
versus firms with dispersed ownership (Column 7 of Table 2.10). Family firms continue to 
show lower CSR performance than their counter-factual firms. All these results confirm 
that family firms in East Asia underperform on CSR than other firms and the evidence is 
not driven by one certain type of counter-factual firms. 
4.3.6. CSR Performance of East Asian Family Firms versus Family Firms from the U.S. 
and Western Europe: A Propensity Score Analysis 
Our main evidence of a negative relationship between family control and CSR 
performance for East Asian corporations contrasts with evidence from the U.S. One 
potential explanation is that East Asian family firms are fundamentally different from U.S. 
family firms. To address this possibility, we implement a propensity score matching to 
control for variation in the characteristics of East Asian and U.S. family firms. We obtain 
U.S. family firms data from Andersen and Reeb (2003a). We match each East Asian family 
firm with a U.S. family firm with similar characteristics (SIZE, AGE, MTB, LEV, ROA, 
RDS). We next re-estimate our main regression using the matched sample as a strategy to 
better control for differences in family firms characteristic across East Asia and the U.S. 
The results reported in Column 1 of Table 2.11 suggest that East Asian family firms show 
significantly lower CSR performance than U.S. family firms. In Column 2 of Table 2.11, 
we repeat the same analysis to compare the CSR performance of family firms in East Asia 
and Western Europe. We obtain data on family firms in Western Europe from Faccio and 
Lang (2002). The results based on propensity score–matched samples suggest a 
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significantly lower CSR performance of East Asian family firms compared with their peers 
in Western Europe. 
 
2.5. Additional Analyses 
2.5.1. The Role of Corporate Governance 
Our main finding, namely, that family firms in East Asia are associated with lower 
CSR performance than non-family firms, is consistent with the expropriation view. To shed 
further light on this result, we examine whether the CSR underperformance of family firms 
is more pronounced in firms with weak corporate governance. Prior literature suggests that 
corporate governance is positively related to corporate social responsibility (Ferrell, Liang 
and Renneboog, 2014; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). We assess firm-level corporate governance 
using measures of firms’ potential agency costs, ownership structure, and board structure. 
2.5.1.1. Agency Costs 
To capture firms’ agency costs, we follow Lins et al. (2013) and use two measures: 
free cash flow defined as (EBITDA-Capital expenditures)/Assets and cash holdings 
defined as the ratio of cash to total assets. More cash is expected to lead to higher agency 
costs, as it can provide controlling families more opportunity to divert resources to projects 
that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, if the expropriation 
hypothesis holds, the CSR underperformance of family firms should be more pronounced 
in firms with more free cash flow and cash holdings. To test this conjecture, in Columns 1 
to 4 of Table 2.12 we split the sample by the median free cash flow and median cash 
holdings. Consistent with the expropriation view, we find that the coefficient on 
FAM_DUM is significantly negative only for the subsample of firms with higher agency 
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costs3.  For the subsample of firms with lower agency costs, the differences between family 
firms and other firms are not significant. 
2.5.1.2. Ownership Structure 
As we discuss above, prior work shows that multiple large shareholders (MLS) 
provide more effective monitoring. The presence of MLS should thus prevent controlling 
families from expropriating minority shareholders and in turn improve CSR performance. 
To test this conjecture we employ two proxies for the monitoring role of MLS: the presence 
of MLS (MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS) and the dispersion of voting rights 
among the five largest shareholders (DISPERSION OF CONTROL). MULTIPLE LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has a second controlling 
shareholder and 0 otherwise. DISPERSION OF CONTROL is the adjusted Herfindhal 
index of the difference in voting rights between the five largest shareholders: (1/ (Cont1-
Cont2)2 + (Cont2-Cont3)2 + (Cont3-Cont4)2 + (Cont4-Cont5)2). The more voting rights, 
the lower the concentration of ownership, which means that MLS have more incentives to 
monitor management. In Columns 5 to 8 of Table 2.12, we split the sample according to 
MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS and DISPERSION OF CONTROL45, Consistent 
with our expectations, family firms underperform relative to other firms only in the 
subsamples with no or low monitoring of MLS.  
2.5.1.3. Board Structure 
                                                          
3 For brevity, in Tables 12 and 13 we only report the coefficients on FAMILY_DUMMY. The results for 
FAMILY_CONTROL and FAMILY_MANAGER are similar. 
4 When splitting subsamples by MULTIPLE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS, we exclude widely held firms that 
do not have controlling owners. 
5 We try other proxies for MLS, such as the voting rights of the second-largest shareholder, the ratio of the 
voting rights of the second-largest shareholder to the voting rights of the controlling owner, the number of 
MLS beyond the controlling owner, and the ratio of the voting rights of the largest four shareholders to the 
voting rights of the controlling owner. The results are the same as those reported above. 
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Firms can also improve corporate governance and mitigate agency problems 
through an efficient board of directors. If the expropriation view holds, the CSR 
underperformance of family firms should be more pronounced for firms with less efficient 
boards. To capture board efficiency, we employ board size and board expertise.  
Although larger boards can potentially offer better advice (Dalton et al., 1999), they 
may be less efficient because of increased communication and coordination problems 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Prior work finds a negative relationship between 
board size and firm value (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998). More 
recently, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find that the optimal board size is eight for 
simple firms or 12 for complex firms. Accordingly, we proxy for board size using 
ASSET4’s BOARD SIZE, which is defined as the total number of board members in excess 
of ten or below eight. A lower score for BOARD SIZE reflects more board members above 
or below the optimal board size and therefore less board efficiency. In Columns 9 and 10 
of Table 2.12, the results of subsamples split by BOARD SIZE are consistent with the 
expectation that CSR underperformance of family firms is more pronounced among firms 
with a large or small board size. 
More financial experts on the board may also lead to better monitoring (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004). To measure board financial expertise, we use ASSET4’s 
BOARD EXPERTISE, which is the percentage of board members who have either an 
industry specific background or a strong financial background. Higher score implies 
greater board effectiveness. Consistent with our conjecture, CSR underperformance of 
family firms is more pronounced among firms with few board members with financial 
expertise (Columns 11 to 12 of Table 2.12).  
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In sum, Table 2.12 results suggest that family firms tend to underperform on CSR 
when they have greater agency problems and less effective monitoring from either outside 
shareholders or board members. In contrast, family firms with better corporate governance 
do not underperform on CSR compared to non-family firms. These results are consistent 
with the expropriation view and support our main results. 
2.5.2. The Role of Country-Level Institutions 
While studies using U.S. data find a positive relationship between family control 
and CSR performance (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Berrone et al., 2010), our results based 
on East Asian data find the opposite. Why does the effect of family firms on CSR 
performance vary across countries? One explanation could be differences in institutional 
environment. While family firms have stronger reputation and long-term horizon 
incentives to invest in CSR than other firms, the institutional environment can impact these 
incentives Indeed, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that country-level institutions 
significantly affect firms’ CSR performance. In this section, we examine whether 
institutions influence the relationship we document above between family control and CSR 
performance.  
2.5.2.1. Media Freedom 
Prior literature suggests that the media affect corporate governance outcomes 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2002, 2004) and corporate fraud (Miller, 2006; Dyck, Morse, and 
Zingales, 2010). A robust and independent media could increase the reputation and legal 
costs of diverting firm resources to consume private benefits (Dyck, Volchkova, and 
Zingales, 2008), and hence may deter controlling families from expropriating minority 
shareholders. But if the media can be easily influenced by lobbying or political pressure, 
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controlling families are less likely to be punished for expropriation. We therefore expect 
family firms to invest less in CSR in countries with lower freedom of the press. To test this 
conjecture, we use PRESS FREEDOM, which comes from Freedom House and assesses 
the degree of print, broadcast, and internet independence. PRESS FREEDOM ranges from 
0 (most free) to 100 (least free). We adjust this index so that higher scores indicate more 
media independence. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.13, we split sample firms by the 
median PRESS FREEDOM. The results are consistent with our expectation that CSR 
underperformance of family firms is more significant in countries with low media 
Independence.  
2.5.2.2. Political Connections 
A firm is defined as politically connected if one of the company’s large 
shareholders or top directors is a member of parliament, a minister, or the chief of state, or 
is “closely related” to a top politician (Faccio, 2006). Firms can benefit from political 
connections through, for example, higher tariffs on competitors’ products, reduced 
regulatory requirements, or valuable government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 
2009). Politically connected firms are also more likely to be bailed out, to pay lower taxes, 
and have a lower cost of capital (Faccio, 2006, 2010; Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2011; 
Boubakri et al., 2012). We posit that in countries where political connections are prevalent, 
family firms have less incentive to invest in CSR because they can benefit more by 
establishing political connections. To test this conjecture, in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.13 
we conduct subsample tests based on political connections. We use political connection 
data from Faccio (2006). POLITICAL CONNECTIONS is defined as the percentage of 
firms in a country that are connected with a minister or a member of parliament, or that 
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have a close relationship with a politician (p. 373)6.  The subsample results show that in 
countries with more political connections, family firms invest less in CSR compared to 
non-family firms. In countries with fewer political connections, however, family firms 
show no significant difference on CSR performance. 
2.5.2.3. Investor Protection 
In countries with a relatively weak investor protection, controlling families are 
more likely to expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). We thus expect 
family firms to invest less in CSR activities in countries with a weak investor protection. 
To measure investor protection, we follow Bae and Goyal (2009) to employ an index 
aggregating three indices: corruption, risk of repudiation, and risk of expropriation. This 
index reflects the extent to which a country’s legal system and institutions protect private 
property and enforce all contracts. Data source is International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). According to ICRG, the corruption index is “an assessment of corruption within 
the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: 
it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government 
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political 
process.” Risk of Repudiation “addresses the possibility that foreign businesses, 
contractors, and consultants face the risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of 
a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down due to an income drop, budget cutbacks, 
indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government economic and 
                                                          
6 Other political connection definitions (% of politically connected listed firms in a country, and connected 
firms as a % of market capitalization) give the same results. 
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social priorities.” Risk of Expropriation evaluates the risk "outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization" of property. In Columns 5 to 6 of Table 2.13, subsample tests using this 
index indicate that CSR underperformance of family firms concentrate only in countries 
with weaker investor protection. 
In sum, family firms are less likely to invest in CSR in countries with low freedom 
of the press, more political connections, and weaker investor protection. In countries with 
better institutions, we do not find evidence of significant differences on CSR between 
family firms and non-family firms. Thus, while family firms have stronger incentives to 
increase their reputation through CSR investment, a weak institutional environment may 
reduce these incentives. Differences in institutional environment may also explain why 
family firms perform differently on CSR in the U.S. and East Asia.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Motivated by the scarce evidence on the CSR activities of family firms outside the 
U.S., this essay examines the relationship between family control and CSR by employing 
new ownership structure data and updated CSR data from nine East Asian economies. 
A large ownership stake may create agency conflicts between controlling families 
and minority shareholders if controlling families can use their voting rights to divert firm 
resources from CSR projects to other projects that benefit themselves. This expropriation 
view suggests that family firms have lower CSR performance than non-family firms. 
However, family firms have greater reputation concerns than non-family firms (Dyer and 
Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2011), which may lead family firms to invest more in CSR 
activities. Family firms’ longer horizon (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) may further 
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lead family firms to invest more in CSR to help support long-term relationships with 
stakeholders. The reputation/long-term horizon view thus suggests that family firms have 
higher CSR performance than non-family firms. 
In this essay, we find support for the expropriation view of family firms. In 
particular, we find a significantly negative impact of family control on CSR after 
controlling for firm, industry, and country characteristics. This negative relationship is 
robust to separately examining the components of our primary CSR measure, as well as to 
endogeneity tests, sample composition tests, alternative estimation methods, alternative 
definition of family firms, comparisons with other large shareholders, and comparisons 
with family firms from other countries.  
To shed further light on our main finding, we first examine whether the CSR 
underperformance of family firms is more pronounced in firms with greater agency 
problems as indicated by proxies for firms’ agency costs, ownership structure, and board 
structure. The results show that family firms underperform on CSR when they have greater 
agency problems, when monitoring by outside shareholders is less effective, or when 
monitoring by board members is less efficient. These findings are consistent with the 
expropriation view and support our main results. Next, we investigate whether country-
level institutions affect families’ incentives to invest in CSR. We find that family firms are 
less likely to invest in CSR in countries with low freedom of the press, more political 
connections, and weaker investor protection. Thus, while family firms have more 
incentives to augment their reputation through CSR activities, a weak institutional 
environment may reduce these incentives. Differences in institutional environment might 
also explain why family firms perform differently on CSR in the U.S. and East Asia.  
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Overall, this essay contributes to the literature on the determinants of CSR, the 
literature on the impact of family control, and the literature on the impact of country-level 
institutions. With respect to the first line of research, we highlight the importance of 
understanding ownership structure when studying the determinants of CSR. We further 
show that in East Asia, only the family ownership structure has a significant impact on 
CSR. With respect to the second line of research, we confirm prior evidence on the 
expropriation effects of family control in East Asia and suggest that lower CSR 
performance could be one consequence of expropriation. With respect to the third line of 
research, we show that country-level institutions may alter controlling families’ incentives 




Table 2.1 Sample Composition 
 










Full Sample 335 94 28.06% 1719 403 23.44% 
By Industry             
Business Equipment 40 11 27.50% 199 57 28.64% 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
9 3 33.33% 46 4 8.70% 
Consumer Durables 18 4 22.22% 127 21 16.54% 
Consumer Nondurables 20 11 55.00% 86 34 39.53% 
Finance 78 22 28.21% 369 115 31.17% 
Healthcare 11 2 18.18% 80 14 17.50% 
Manufacturing 33 9 27.27% 171 28 16.37% 
Energy 18 3 16.67% 75 6 8.00% 
Telephone and Television 
Transmission 
22 5 22.73% 110 24 21.82% 
Utilities 19 3 15.79% 120 17 14.17% 
Wholesale, Retail, and 
Some Services 
13 4 30.77% 71 19 26.76% 
Other 54 17 31.48% 265 64 24.15% 
By Country             
Hong Kong 36 15 41.67% 219 111 50.68% 
Indonesia 17 6 35.29% 41 14 34.15% 
Japan 124 13 10.48% 963 101 10.49% 
Malaysia 27 12 44.44% 65 26 40.00% 
Philippines 6 5 83.33% 12 10 83.33% 
Singapore 25 6 24.00% 161 39 24.22% 
South Korea 47 27 57.45% 130 78 60.00% 
Taiwan 38 6 15.79% 87 13 14.94% 
Thailand 15 4 26.67% 41 11 26.83% 
By Year             
2002 20 2 10.00% 20 2 10.00% 
2003 21 2 9.52% 21 2 9.52% 
2004 126 30 23.81% 126 30 23.81% 
2005 165 35 21.21% 165 35 21.21% 
2006 168 35 20.83% 168 35 20.83% 
2007 183 37 20.22% 183 37 20.22% 
2008 229 52 22.71% 229 52 22.71% 
2009 269 69 25.65% 269 69 25.65% 
2010 326 91 27.91% 326 91 27.91% 
2011 212 50 23.58% 212 50 23.58% 
This table presents the sample distribution by industry (Fama–French 12 Industry Groups), country, and 




Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CSR  56.044 29.614 6.690 26.275 59.690 85.115 97.570 
ENVIRONMENT 59.242 32.370 9.070 24.190 69.180 91.150 97.170 
SOCIAL 52.845 31.189 3.380 21.880 54.540 83.780 98.260 
FAM_DUM 0.234 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FAM_CONT 7.711 16.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 
FAM_MAN 0.166 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 9.584 1.393 5.749 8.647 9.560 10.384 14.794 
AGE 3.803 0.847 0.000 3.434 3.989 4.369 5.823 
MTB 1.477 0.744 0.810 1.039 1.206 1.605 5.072 
LEV 0.157 0.140 0.000 0.032 0.128 0.240 0.539 
ROA 0.050 0.054 -0.069 0.013 0.038 0.075 0.240 






Panel B Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CSR (1) 1.000            
ENVIRONMENT (2) 0.934*** 1.000           
SOCIAL (3) 0.929*** 0.737*** 1.000          
FAM_DUM (4) -0.198*** -0.242*** -0.124*** 1.000         
FAM_CONT (5) -0.241*** -0.287*** -0.159*** 0.862*** 1.000        
FAM_MAN (6) -0.205*** -0.236*** -0.143*** 0.807*** 0.734*** 1.000       
SIZE (7) 0.274*** 0.258*** 0.252*** -0.149*** -0.177*** -0.130*** 1.000      
AGE (8) 0.201*** 0.244*** 0.127*** -0.020 -0.013 -0.080*** 0.142*** 1.000     
MTB (9) -0.136*** -0.169*** -0.083*** 0.109*** 0.095*** 0.063** -0.522*** -0.266*** 1.000    
LEV (10) 0.040 0.081*** -0.007 -0.031 -0.022 0.010 0.150*** 0.037 -0.230*** 1.000   
ROA (11) -0.106*** -0.153*** -0.043 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.151*** -0.492*** -0.272*** 0.731*** -0.288*** 1.000  
RDS (12) 0.221*** 0.231*** 0.179*** -0.105*** -0.041 -0.114*** -0.089*** 0.272*** 0.025 -0.234*** 0.022 1.000 
This table reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients (Panel B) for the regression variables. The full sample is composed of 1,719 
observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix A. The superscript 





Table 2.3 Univariate Tests: Family Firms versus Non-Family Firms 
 Family Firms Non-Family Firms Differences 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD Mean(t-statistics) 
CSR 403  45.475  30.760  1316  59.280  28.492  -8.351*** 
ENVIRONMENT 403  45.107  33.203  1316  63.571  30.853  -10.322*** 
SOCIAL 403  45.842  31.147  1316  54.990  30.898  -5.191*** 
SIZE 403  9.208  1.264  1316  9.698  1.411  -6.250*** 
AGE 403  3.772  0.678  1316  3.812  0.893  -0.826 
MTB 403  1.623  0.942  1316  1.433  0.665  4.523*** 
LEV 403  0.149  0.127  1316  0.159  0.143  -1.272 
ROA 403  0.067  0.058  1316  0.044  0.051  7.688*** 
RDS 403  0.011  0.030  1316  0.020  0.036  -4.356*** 
This table reports the results of univariate tests for differences between family firms and non-family firms. 
The sample is composed of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-
2011. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix A. The superscript asterisks 





Table 2.4 Family and CSR: Main Evidence 
 (1) (2) (3) 
FAM_DUM -9.138***   
 (-2.697)   
FAM_CONT  -0.252***  
  (-3.436)  
FAM_MAN   -8.646** 
   (-2.169) 
SIZE 9.121*** 8.880*** 9.103*** 
 (7.790) (7.461) (7.758) 
AGE 5.987*** 5.762*** 5.571*** 
 (3.875) (3.706) (3.590) 
MTB -0.192 -0.503 -0.500 
 (-0.104) (-0.265) (-0.264) 
LEV 8.388 9.024 9.064 
 (0.786) (0.846) (0.850) 
ROA 45.437** 47.254** 46.462** 
 (2.158) (2.199) (2.155) 
RDS 71.319 87.698 77.649 
 (1.331) (1.644) (1.409) 
Constant -48.828*** -46.033*** -48.027*** 
 (-3.226) (-2.981) (-3.012) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 1,719 1,719 
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.360 0.355 
This table reports regressions of CSR performance on family control variables. The sample is composed 
of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent 
variable is CSR, the overall CSR performance of a firm, equal to the average of environmental performance 
and social performance. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix A. All 
regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by 
firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical 





Table 2.5 Family and CSR: Components of CSR 
 DV: ENVIRONMENT DV: SOCIAL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FAM_DUM -12.192***   -6.085*   
 (-3.229)   (-1.779)   
FAM_CONT  -0.339***   -0.165**  
  (-4.065)   (-2.137)  
FAM_MAN   -11.686***   -5.607 
   (-2.608)   (-1.445) 
SIZE 7.689*** 7.361*** 7.659*** 10.553*** 10.400*** 10.547*** 
 (5.804) (5.461) (5.724) (8.979) (8.729) (8.999) 
AGE 6.648*** 6.352*** 6.096*** 5.326*** 5.172*** 5.046*** 
 (3.938) (3.750) (3.594) (3.115) (3.015) (2.960) 
MTB -2.081 -2.500 -2.497 1.698 1.493 1.496 
 (-1.045) (-1.221) (-1.223) (0.873) (0.749) (0.754) 
LEV 16.664 17.555 17.628 0.112 0.493 0.501 
 (1.388) (1.469) (1.464) (0.010) (0.044) (0.045) 
ROA 55.050** 57.567** 56.536** 35.824 36.942 36.388 
 (2.219) (2.283) (2.208) (1.419) (1.444) (1.437) 
RDS 44.296 66.306 52.792 98.343 109.090* 102.505* 
 (0.840) (1.335) (0.966) (1.634) (1.784) (1.680) 
Constant -26.946 -23.126 -25.782 -70.709*** -68.939*** -70.272*** 
 (-1.605) (-1.342) (-1.445) (-4.492) (-4.340) (-4.322) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 
Adjusted R2 0.395 0.398 0.389 0.284 0.284 0.282 
This table reports regressions of CSR components on family control variables. The sample is composed 
of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent 
variable of Columns 1-3 is ENVIRONMENT, the environmental performance. The dependent variable of 
Columns 4-6 is SOCIAL, the social performance. Definitions and data sources for the variables are 
provided in Appendix A. All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks 





Table 2.6 Family and CSR: Endogeneity 
 Probit 2SLS Heckman PSM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FAM_DUM  -68.475*** -48.140** -9.397*** 
  (-13.425) (-2.130) (-2.738) 
SIZE -0.136*** -1.877** 5.109*** 8.908*** 
 (-3.999) (-2.273) (3.790) (6.171) 
AGE 0.211*** 21.018*** 7.695*** 9.110*** 
 (3.928) (14.814) (3.447) (5.467) 
ROA 0.862 110.307*** 96.035*** 41.070* 
 (0.770) (6.560) (4.011) (1.747) 
LEV 0.274 38.269*** 19.501* 12.218 
 (0.967) (7.289) (1.805) (1.007) 
MTB 0.120 7.705*** 0.745 2.855* 
 (1.457) (5.146) (0.336) (1.654) 
RDS 1.264 185.486*** 162.277*** 66.033 
 (1.092) (8.468) (3.146) (1.049) 
VOLATILITY -22.215***    
 (-3.082)    
λ   20.936  
   (1.565)  
Constant -0.166 -83.745*** -22.877 -34.558* 
 (-0.305) (-9.614) (-1.319) (-1.750) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 1,719 1,719 806 
Adjusted R2/R2 0.197 0.268 0.226 0.350 
First-stage F-test 11.603  (p<0.001)    
This table reports results of two-stage least square (2SLS) approach, Heckman selection estimation 
procedure, and propensity score matching (PSM) procedure. The sample is composed of 1,719 firm-year 
observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. VOLATILITY is the median return 
volatility in each industry. λ is the inverse Mills ratio produced by in the Heckman model. Definitions and 
data sources for other variables are provided in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by 
firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical 





Table 2.7 Family and CSR: Robustness Tests of Sample Composition and Period 
 N FAM_DUM FAM_CONT FAM_MAN 
Without Multiple Large Shareholders 1,582 -10.789*** -0.288*** -9.207** 
  (-2.685) (-3.690) (-1.985) 
Without Financial Firms 1,350 -9.319** -0.204** -10.555** 
 (-2.378) (-2.277) (-2.482) 
Weighted Least Squares 1,719 -9.125*** -0.209*** -10.992*** 
 (-4.371) (-4.614) (-4.358) 
Before Crisis (2002-2007) 683 -13.629*** -0.305*** -12.684** 
 (-2.935) (-3.066) (-2.089) 
During Crisis (2008-2009) 498 -5.879** -0.192** -6.388* 
 (-2.176) (-2.566) (-1.944) 
After Crisis (2010-2011) 538 -8.242*** -0.263*** -8.880** 
 (-3.659) (-4.017) (-2.580) 
This table reports regression coefficients of CSR performance on family control variables to different 
sample composition and period. The dependent variable is CSR. All regressions include SIZE, AGE, MTB, 
LEV, ROA, RDS, year, industry, and country fixed effects. Definitions and data sources for the variables 
are provided in Appendix A. Weighted least squares regressions use the firm numbers in each country-
year group as the weight. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in 
parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 





Table 2.8 Family and CSR: Alternative Estimation Methods 
 N FAM_DUM FAM_CONT FAM_MAN 
OLS 1,719 -9.138*** -0.252*** -8.646*** 
  (-5.505) (-6.697) (-4.377) 
Firm Clustered 1,719 -9.138** -0.252*** -8.646** 
  (-2.542) (-3.220) (-2.037) 
Newey-West 1,719 -9.138*** -0.252*** -8.646*** 
  (-4.279) (-5.233) (-3.421) 
GLS 1,719 -7.889** -0.207*** -7.979** 
  (-2.490) (-2.814) (-2.144) 
Fama-MacBeth 1,719 -23.425** -0.629** -22.493** 
  (-2.505) (-2.493) (-2.347) 
Prais-Winsten 1,719 -7.844*** -0.209*** -7.961** 
  (-2.603) (-2.706) (-2.384) 
This table reports regression coefficients of CSR performance on family control variables by using 
alternative estimation methods. The sample is composed of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 
unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent variable is CSR. All regressions include SIZE, 
AGE, MTB, LEV, ROA, RDS, year, industry, and country fixed effects. Definitions and data sources for 
the variables are provided in Appendix A. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are 
reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 





Table 2.9 Family and CSR: Alternative Definition of Family Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) 
FAM_DUM_20 -6.742*   
 (-1.869)   
FAM_CONT_20  -0.231***  
  (-3.763)  
FAM_MAN_20   -8.102* 
   (-1.886) 
SIZE 9.927*** 9.865*** 9.893*** 
 (8.937) (9.136) (8.974) 
AGE 4.678*** 4.749*** 4.530*** 
 (3.240) (3.319) (3.164) 
MTB 0.492 0.381 0.494 
 (0.271) (0.209) (0.273) 
LEV 9.505 9.165 10.251 
 (0.956) (0.934) (1.031) 
ROA 37.212* 38.653* 37.159* 
 (1.733) (1.790) (1.716) 
RDS 114.967** 127.299*** 119.518*** 
 (2.545) (2.871) (2.629) 
Constant -44.225*** -43.062*** -44.358*** 
 (-3.022) (-3.020) (-2.928) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,063 2,063 2,063 
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.390 0.384 
This table reports regressions of CSR performance on family control variables by using alternative 
definition of family firms (20% threshold). The sample is composed of 2,063 firm-year observations 
representing 384 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent variable is CSR, the overall CSR 
performance of a firm, equal to the average of environmental performance and social performance. 
FAM_DUM_20 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder (voting rights over 20%) is a 
family, 0 otherwise. FAM_CONT_20 is the percentage of voting rights shares held by the controlling 
family. FAM_MAN_20 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the controlling family is also the CEO, the Board 
Chairman, or Vice-Chairman, 0 otherwise. Definitions and data sources for other variables are provided 
in Appendix A. All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and 







Table 2.10 Other Large Shareholders and CSR  
          PSM 
      
Family versus  
State 
Family versus  
Widely Held 
Family versus  
Dispersed Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FAM_DUM -9.138***   -7.873** -9.860** -9.585* -8.397* 
 (-2.697)   (-1.992) (-2.329) (-1.892) (-1.933) 
STATE  5.33  1.522    
  -1.516  -0.378    
WIDELY_HELD   5.189 3.89    
   -1.335 -0.913    
SIZE 9.121*** 9.190*** 9.875*** 9.398*** 6.553*** 7.669*** 10.531*** 
 -7.79 -7.669 -8.214 -7.748 -4.009 -3.215 -5.202 
AGE 5.987*** 5.969*** 5.670*** 6.273*** 6.192*** 5.024* 9.441*** 
 -3.875 -3.692 -3.506 -3.834 -2.783 -1.713 -2.717 
MTB -0.192 -0.399 -0.09 -0.115 1.656 2.092 0.473 
 (-0.104) (-0.203) (-0.046) (-0.062) -0.742 -0.866 -0.198 
LEV 8.388 5.954 8.369 10.254 5.273 -15.357 0.999 
 -0.786 -0.555 -0.748 -0.934 -0.4 (-0.609) -0.054 
ROA 45.437** 42.703** 44.773** 49.333** 53.137* -49.876 -5.187 
 -2.158 -2.02 -2.254 -2.348 -1.816 (-1.425) (-0.195) 
RDS 71.319 69.463 76.447 71.64 -8.473 141.076 2.897 
 -1.331 -1.253 -1.398 -1.351 (-0.100) -1.515 -0.04 
Constant -48.828*** -55.952*** -59.833*** -54.913*** -47.620* -32.616 -83.383*** 
 (-3.226) (-3.724) (-3.752) (-3.364) (-1.796) (-1.197) (-3.315) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 770 536 628 
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.349 0.349 0.359 0.308 0.388 0.448 
This table reports regressions of CSR performance on family control variables. The sample is composed of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique 
firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent variable is CSR. STATE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is the state or a foreign 
government. WIDELY_HELD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a widely-held company or a widely-held financial institution. 
Definitions and data sources for other variables are provided in Appendix A. All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Table 2.11 Family and CSR: Comparisons with Family Firms from Other Countries 
 
East Asian Family Firms 
Versus U.S. Family Firms 
East Asian Family Firms 
Versus Western European 
Family Firms 
 (1) (2) 
FAMILY_EA -12.487** -21.408*** 
 (-2.098) (-6.025) 
SIZE 8.766*** 8.691*** 
 (5.657) (6.265) 
AGE -2.463 9.086 
 (-0.484) (1.295) 
MTB 1.095 0.108 
 (0.447) (0.055) 
LEV -1.151 10.911 
 (-0.078) (0.957) 
ROA 26.061 31.794* 
 (1.027) (1.672) 
RDS 83.649 114.117 
 (1.545) (1.533) 
Constant -54.638** -35.484* 
 (-2.058) (-1.789) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 746 734 
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.384 
This table reports regressions comparing the CSR performance of East Asian family firms versus family 
firms from the U.S. and Western Europe using propensity score–matched samples. In Column 1, each East 
Asian family firm is matched with a U.S. family firm. In Column 2, each East Asian family firm is matched 
with a Western European family firm. The dependent variable is CSR. FAMILY_EA is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm is a family firm from East Asia. Definitions and data sources for other variables 
are provided in Appendix A. All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. The superscript asterisks 






Table 2.12 Family and CSR: the Role of Corporate Governance 
 Agency Costs Ownership Structure 
 DISPERSION OF CONTROL BOARD SIZE BOARD EXPERTISE 
 High Low High Low High Low 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
FAM_DUM -12.800*** -6.057 -9.472** -7.955 -3.825 -9.188** 
 (-3.044) (-1.298) (-2.107) (-1.296) (-0.391) (-2.088) 
SIZE 13.928*** 9.495*** 14.597*** 8.999*** 7.761*** 8.484*** 
 (9.200) (5.141) (9.812) (5.062) (3.524) (5.205) 
AGE 4.341* 7.703*** 5.527** 8.263*** 10.942* 3.264* 
 (1.661) (3.392) (2.193) (3.102) (1.957) (1.808) 
MTB 1.727 -1.404 4.788* 0.291 0.806 0.394 
 (0.793) (-0.303) (1.850) (0.087) (0.262) (0.173) 
LEV 11.012 -40.649** 11.041 -31.113 -19.069 5.908 
 (0.818) (-2.169) (0.790) (-1.524) (-1.371) (0.468) 
ROA 19.015 0.243 -35.866 85.492** -17.868 83.937*** 
 (0.636) (0.006) (-1.102) (2.134) (-0.526) (2.958) 
RDS 57.132 21.524 35.657 165.607** 560.236* 57.765 
 (1.021) (0.278) (0.642) (2.004) (1.836) (0.879) 
Constant -90.272*** -49.868*** -64.143*** -42.637 -55.943*** -52.775** 
 (-3.960) (-2.813) (-3.034) (-1.580) (-2.699) (-1.973) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 671 672 675 675 137 925 









 Ownership Structure Board Structure 
 DISPERSION OF CONTROL BOARD SIZE BOARD EXPERTISE 
 High Low High Low High Low 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
FAM_DUM -7.929 -12.878*** -7.542 -10.079** -6.329 -9.285** 
 (-1.604) (-3.179) (-1.577) (-2.331) (-1.601) (-2.355) 
SIZE 12.043*** 7.335*** 7.659*** 10.396*** 10.130*** 7.090*** 
 (7.327) (4.446) (5.048) (8.369) (7.085) (3.980) 
AGE 7.181** 4.586** 4.135** 8.835*** 8.617*** 5.035*** 
 (2.132) (2.514) (2.229) (4.689) (4.334) (2.673) 
MTB -5.400** 3.468* -0.205 -1.990 1.219 -2.509 
 (-2.039) (1.758) (-0.088) (-0.916) (0.425) (-1.181) 
LEV -0.133 6.486 0.939 17.763 17.772 -19.086 
 (-0.007) (0.505) (0.078) (1.198) (1.276) (-1.408) 
ROA 17.561 56.521** 44.671** 62.551** 61.651** 45.571 
 (0.437) (2.018) (1.971) (2.442) (2.130) (1.470) 
RDS 59.893 62.787 81.911 39.269 -5.655 51.662 
 (0.978) (0.748) (1.454) (0.592) (-0.089) (0.607) 
Constant -47.725** -33.845 -68.715*** -50.597*** -115.701*** -6.972 
 (-2.194) (-1.385) (-3.713) (-2.798) (-5.236) (-0.260) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 854 865 833 886 556 557 
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.352 0.354 0.412 0.390 0.327 
This table reports regressions of CSR performance on family firms in split samples by whether firms have high or low agency problems. The sample is composed 
of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent variable is CSR, the overall CSR performance of a 
firm, equal to the average of environmental performance and social performance. Definitions and data sources for other variables are provided in Appendix A. 
All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. The 







Table 2.13 Family and CSR: the Role of Institutional Environment 
 PRESS FREEDOM POLITICAL CONNECTIONS INVESTOR PROTECTION 
 High Low High Low High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FAM_DUM -9.628 -7.326** -7.135* -9.349 -8.644 -10.501*** 
 (-1.428) (-1.982) (-1.816) (-1.425) (-1.600) (-2.734) 
SIZE 10.127*** 8.203*** 7.435*** 10.114*** 8.402*** 8.949*** 
 (5.523) (5.466) (4.509) (5.578) (6.113) (5.113) 
AGE 4.336* 6.273*** 5.956*** 4.579* 5.347** 7.028*** 
 (1.660) (3.799) (3.495) (1.763) (2.390) (4.269) 
MTB -4.259 3.131 2.949 -3.862 -3.081 0.799 
 (-1.340) (1.362) (1.118) (-1.233) (-1.175) (0.372) 
LEV -0.242 5.652 5.459 0.315 13.457 -17.396 
 (-0.014) (0.488) (0.416) (0.018) (0.979) (-1.484) 
ROA -28.646 51.988** 51.492* -33.565 26.293 73.014*** 
 (-0.626) (2.441) (1.930) (-0.774) (0.803) (3.673) 
RDS 15.319 52.169 -70.744 8.845 60.006 -3.723 
 (0.183) (0.887) (-0.843) (0.121) (0.891) (-0.057) 
Constant -22.395 -65.824*** -80.705*** -60.580*** -42.185** -51.636*** 
 (-1.242) (-3.267) (-3.664) (-3.049) (-2.431) (-2.595) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 857 862 756 963 1,185 534 
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.322 0.307 0.413 0.363 0.389 
This table reports regressions of CSR performance on family firms in split samples by whether firms in a strong or weak institutional environment. The sample 
is composed of 1,719 firm-year observations representing 335 unique firms over the period 2002-2011. The dependent variable is CSR, the overall CSR 
performance of a firm, equal to the average of environmental performance and social performance. PRESS FREEDOM is adjusted score of Freedom House’s 
Freedom of the Press index. Higher score indicates more media independence. The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom. 
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS is percentage of firms connected with a minister or a member of parliament, or a close relationship. INVESTOR PROTECTION is 
an index aggregating three indices: corruption, risk of contract repudiation, and risk of expropriation. Definitions and data sources for other variables are provided 
in Appendix A. All regressions include year, industry, and country fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in 




IS PRIVATIZATION SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE? 
3.1. Introduction 
Privatization, the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
assets to private economic agents (Megginson and Netter, 2001), has been the subject of 
renewed interest following the recent financial crisis amid extensive government 
participation in firms in need of support. Previous privatization studies shed light on both 
the determinants of privatization 7  and the post-privatization performance of newly 
privatized firms (NPFs).8 However, the literature on the effects of privatization generally 
focuses on such effects in relation to specific stakeholders in NPFs –shareholders (domestic 
and foreign), creditors, and the state as a residual owner – rather than taking a broader 
social welfare perspective. This is surprising given 1) privatization is widely perceived to 
be costly to society as a whole9, 2) former SOEs are often viewed as policy tools used to 
achieve political and/or social objectives and hence are first and foremost social enterprises, 
                                                          
7 These include legal and political institutions, economic conditions, and capital market conditions (e.g., 
Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco, 2004; Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2005a; Boubakri et al., 2007; 
Megginson et al., 2004). 
8  Post-privatization performance is evaluated in terms of profitability, leverage, dividends, corporate 
governance, cost of debt and equity, risk-taking, and investment efficiency (e.g., Borisova and Megginson, 
2011; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2005a, 2005b; Boubakri, Cosset, and 
Saffar, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh, 
1994). 
9 For example, privatization may lead to a decrease in employment (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2005; 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997), a decrease in income distribution (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003), and an increase 
in poverty (Bayliss, 2002). Accordingly, demonstrations and protests against privatization reforms have 
recently occurred in Thailand, Mexico, Pakistan, Italy, and Greece. 
 
55 
and 3) the state, the ultimate owner of these firms, is theoretically the guardian of social 
welfare. In this essay we aim to fill this void in the literature by assessing the social 
performance of NPFs.10 Our approach is to compare the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) performance of NPFs after privatization to that of their listed peers.  
CSR refers to a firm’s commitment to various stakeholders such as shareholders, 
employees, customers, the environment, and the broader community. 11 Prior evidence 
shows that higher firm-level CSR performance, which is typically based on measures of 
their environmental performance (e.g., energy use, CO2 emissions, water recycling, waste 
recycling) and social performance (e.g., injury rate, training hours, women employees, 
donations), is associated with larger abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 
2014), lower idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009), lower probability of financial 
distress (e.g., Goss, 2009), lower cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011), and better 
access to finance (e.g., Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014).12 However, these studies 
focus on publicly traded companies – no prior study to date provides evidence on the CSR 
performance of NPFs. By examining the CSR activities of privatized firms, we shed light 
                                                          
10 As a case in point, Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 382) raise important questions in their survey on 
privatization stating the following: Do most such programs actually cost SOE worker jobs? Are there gender-
specific impacts relating to the total commercialization of state-owned enterprises, as might happen if 
privatization caused SOEs to shut down child care or other social services? Are worker training/retraining 
programs effective methods of dealing with worker redundancies, or should governments emphasize lump-
sum severance packages when lay-offs are required? Do privatization programs create more jobs economy-
wide than they destroy? These questions are not only vitally important to policy-makers, they are inherently 
interesting in their own right. 
11 See European Commission (EC): 2002, Green Book: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility. 
12  This literature further suggests that CSR results in higher firm valuations by mitigating asymmetric 
information between firms and investors, since high CSR firms disclose more transparent and reliable 
information (Kim, Park and Wier, 2012), by inducing more analyst coverage and lower analyst forecast error 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012), and by decreasing agency problems, since it leads managers to focus less on short-
term gains in line with stockholders’ interests and more on long-term profit-maximization in line with the 
interests of additional stakeholders (e.g., employees, consumers, suppliers, shareholders) (Freeman, 1984). 
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on the link between the government (as residual owner) and social responsibility, and we 
contribute to the debate on the costs and benefits of privatization, and in particular, on 
whether its high perceived social cost is justified.  
We begin our analysis by testing two alternative hypotheses on NPFs’ CSR 
activities. Our main hypothesis predicts that NPFs have higher CSR performance than their 
peers. Because CSR activities enhance firm value (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2014; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003), former SOEs may engage in more CSR activities 
following privatization to avoid being at a competitive disadvantage compared to other 
listed firms. In addition, because CSR activities are reputation-increasing, governments 
may use their residual ownership to pressure NPFs to pursue CSR activities to promote and 
build their credibility, and to signal the firm’s commitment to various stakeholders, 
reducing potential opposition to privatization.13 Our alternative hypothesis predicts that 
NPFs do not have higher CSR performance than their peers. The shareholder theory of 
CSR, first put forward by Friedman (1970), holds that the sole social responsibility of a 
corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders. Under this view, CSR investment 
represents a misuse of resources that should be spent on positive NPV projects or returned 
to shareholders14, and thus NPFs’ managers will care less about supporting CSR investment 
than about pursuing profit-maximizing opportunities. In addition, because CSR is likely to 
increase NPFs’ public scrutiny, shareholders of NPFs may argue against CSR investment, 
                                                          
13 One feature of privatization programs is the prevalence of partial (rather than full) divestitures around the 
world, a direct implication of which is that the government remains a residual owner in NPFs (Bortolotti and 
Faccio, 2009; Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2005b; Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2009; Megginson, 
Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994). As such, whether through direct or indirect control mechanisms, the 
government can still affect the performance, value, and strategy of the firms. 
14  Indeed, Friedman (1970) even argues that the existence of CSR activities signals agency problems, 
whereby managers use CSR to support their own careers instead of maximizing returns to shareholders. 
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especially in the case of large NPFs operating in potentially environmentally sensitive 
industries.15 In this case, the CSR performance of NPFs should be indistinguishable from 
that of other listed firms. 
To test the above predictions, we follow Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar (2009) and 
Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013) and employ a sample of 506 privatized firms -- the 
largest sample of privatized firms to date – as well as Thomson Reuters ASSET4 data on 
CSR performance. The merged sample comprises 10,502 firm-year observations from 41 
countries over the period 2002-2010. Consistent with our main hypothesis, we find that 
NPFs have statistically significantly higher CSR performance than their peers. This effect 
is also economically significant: on average, privatized firms observe 8.9% higher CSR 
performance than other listed firms. Within the subsample of NPFs, we observe higher 
CSR performance in partial privatizations compared to full privatizations, where the state 
is no longer involved. This result suggests that governments use their residual ownership 
to pressure NPFs to invest in CSR to extract reputational benefits and to mitigate concerns 
about the welfare effects of the privatization program.  
One concern with the above analysis is potential endogeneity of privatization 
decisions. For example, as Megginson and Netter (2001) note, governments may privatize 
the healthiest firms to make privatization “look good”. Similarly, data may be more readily 
available for better-performing firms in more developed countries. To address this concern, 
we use propensity score matching to generate matching firms that are not privatized but 
have similar characteristics as the privatized firms in our sample. We continue to find that 
privatized firms have better CSR performance than their peers.  
                                                          
15 We examine industry effects on the link between privatization and CSR in additional analysis. 
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After comparing the CSR performance of NPFs to that of other listed firms, we 
focus attention on our sample of NPFs and examine the impact of both post-privatization 
ownership structure (as a proxy for firm-level corporate governance) and country-level 
institutions (as a proxy for country-level corporate governance) on CSR. We consider three 
types of owners studied in the privatization literature, namely, the state, foreign investors, 
and employees. This investigation is motivated by prior evidence that CSR performance is 
associated with firms’ ownership structure (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Dam and Scholtens, 
2012; Oh, Chang, and Martynov, 2011). In the privatization context, NPFs are likely to 
invest more in CSR when they have less residual state ownership and higher foreign and 
employee ownership stakes. Turning to the role of country-level governance, the 
privatization literature suggests that the institutional environment conditions the 
performance outcomes of different types of owners in NPFs (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Borisova et al., 2012; Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Guedhami, 
Pittman, and Saffar, 2009). For example, foreign ownership is associated with higher 
investment efficiency in weaker institutional environments (Chen et al., 2014), and 
government ownership is negatively (positively) related to governance quality in civil law 
(common law) countries (Borisova et al., 2012). Given evidence that firm-level governance 
and country-level institutions can substitute for each other, we investigate whether the 
relationship between CSR and ownership structure is moderated by the quality of 
prevailing country-level institutions.  
The results show that, in line with our expectations, state ownership (as proxied by 
state control and political connections) is negatively associated with CSR performance, 
while foreign and employee ownership are positively associated with CSR performance. 
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We also find that country-level institutions play a moderating role in the relationship 
between ownership structure and CSR performance, suggesting that the external corporate 
governance exerted by country-level institutions performs an important role in constraining 
governments from distorting the objectives of NPFs.  
In a third set of tests, we examine how the interaction between ownership structure 
and CSR affects firm-level outcomes, in particular, the financial performance of NPFs as 
measured by firm value and the cost of equity financing. Prior literature shows that residual 
government ownership leads to a relatively higher cost of equity and debt (Ben-Nasr, 
Boubakri, and Cosset, 2012; Borisova and Megginson, 2011).16 If CSR is a positive signal 
of firm quality, then the adverse effects of government ownership on firm value should 
decrease as NPFs engage in more CSR, leading investors to require a lower premium (i.e., 
cost of equity) and in turn driving valuations up. 
The results of this analysis suggest that CSR performance mitigates the negative 
impact of state residual ownership on the financial performance of NPFs. Specifically, 
higher CSR performance decreases the negative impact of state ownership on the cost of 
equity, suggesting that the cost of state ownership in NPFs decreases with CSR investment 
by sending a positive signal to investors. 
This essay contributes to the privatization literature by examining the social impact 
of privatization. To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess the CSR performance of 
NPFs. We conjecture that in contrast to SOEs, which do not typically take on the costs 
associated with CSR activities, privatization creates incentives for NPFs to invest in CSR. 
                                                          
16 Borisova and Megginson (2011) in particular show that while, on average, credit spreads increase with 
government ownership, they are relatively lower for fully privatized firms where the government’s ownership 
share is zero. 
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We find support for this hypothesis by showing that NPFs have higher CSR performance 
than their peers. This essay also contributes to the literature on the determinants of CSR by 
linking CSR to a macroeconomic policy that is politically driven, namely, privatization. In 
this sense, CSR investment in NPRs may be dependent on political will and government 
support, as suggested by the finding that CSR performance is higher in NPFs with state 
residual ownership. Finally, our essay contributes to the corporate finance literature by 
providing evidence on the impact of CSR on NPFs’ financial performance. We find that 
higher CSR performance in NPFs is associated with higher firm value and lower equity 
financing costs, suggesting that CSR helps mitigate the agency costs and information 
asymmetry associated with residual state ownership (e.g., Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 
2013; Chen et al., 2014; Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009). 
 Our findings have important implications for managers and policy makers. First, 
extending prior evidence that the privatization of state-owned firms is beneficial on 
economic grounds (see Megginson and Netter (2001) for a literature review), we show that 
it is also beneficial from a social perspective. Specifically, we find that NPFs have higher 
CSR performance than other publicly listed firms. This result should alleviate concerns 
that, after private owners take control of former SEOs, the exclusive goal of NPFs will be 
to maximize shareholders’ profits with little regard for other firm stakeholders. We also 
show that residual state ownership has a social cost, as NPFs’ CSR performance is 
negatively related to residual state ownership. This result implies that partial privatizations 
dampen the social benefits of privatization reform. However, foreign ownership is 
positively related to NPFs’ CSR performance, and effective country-level institutions can 
mitigate the negative effect of residual state ownership on CSR performance. The 
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implication for policy makers is that openness to foreign investors in NPFs and strong 
corporate governance institutions can help NPFs benefit from CSR investment, which 
should be reflected in turn in their financial performance. While questions about the 
redistribution effects of privatization are beyond the scope of this essay, our results suggest 
that increased CSR investment following privatization results in social welfare-enhancing 
gains. 
The reminder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data and variables, and provides 
descriptive statistics for our sample. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. Section 5 
concludes the essay. 
 
3.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
3.2.1. Privatization and CSR  
3.2.1.1. State-owned Enterprises and Social Performance 
Classic public finance assumes that SOEs are social enterprises that serve to cure a 
market failure (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Shapiro and Willig, 1990) that private firms 
fail to address. Under this view, welfare-maximizing SOEs may be expected to engage in 
more CSR activities than their private counterparts. In reality, however, SOEs are used by 
the government officials that manage them to achieve political goals (Shleifer, 1998). 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) show, for instance, that governments often 
suboptimally locate SOEs in remote regions, employ too many people, or subsidize prices, 
to help politicians win political support among voters rather than improve social welfare.17  
                                                          
17 In many countries, state-owned oil companies are identified as a main source of pollution (Victor et al., 
2011). A case in point is described in an article in the New York Times (March 21, 2013,) relating to China’s 
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To reduce the inefficiency of SOEs, privatization reforms that transfer control and 
cash flow rights from governments to private investors have occurred worldwide over the 
past three decades.18 Such changes in ownership are accompanied by a change in firm focus 
from pursuing political goals to profit maximization. Prior studies show that after 
government divestiture, performance improves significantly (Megginson, Nash, and 
Randenborgh, 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D'souza and Megginson, 1999; Dewenter 
and Malatesta, 2001) 19 . Below we develop hypotheses on the consequences of such 
reorganization for CSR performance in particular. 
3.2.1.2. NPFs and CSR 
Extant empirical evidence shows that better CSR performance leads to larger 
abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 2014), lower idiosyncratic risk (e.g., 
Lee and Faff, 2009), less likelihood of financial distress (e.g., Goss, 2009), lower cost of 
capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011), and improved access to external finance (e.g., Cheng, 
Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014). Thus, the new private owners in NPFs may aggressively 
engage in CSR activities to increase the newly privatized firm’s competitive position vis-
à-vis other publicly listed firms. 
Another reason NPFs may invest more in CSR activities stems from their 
ownership structure. It is often the case that the government remains a residual owner in 
                                                          
deep environmental problems. The article states that the country is still struggling to solve its pollution 
problems partly because “state-owned power companies have been similarly resistant. The companies 
regularly ignore government orders to upgrade coal-burning electricity plants, according to ministry data. 
And as with the oil companies, the power companies exert an outsize influence over environmental policy 
debates. 
18 Besides improving efficiency, there are other objectives of privatization: raising revenue for the state, 
reducing government interference in the economy, promoting wider ownership, increasing competition in the 
market, subjecting SOEs to market discipline, and developing a national capital market (Price Waterhouse, 
1989 a, b; Megginson and Netter, 2001). 




NPFs. As a stakeholder, the government has incentives to pressure NPFs to engage in CSR 
activities. Privatization reform is fiercely opposed by those who view it as beneficial to 
politically connected investors and detrimental to employees, other investors, and society 
as a whole. This opposition, which is supported by evidence of job loss (Chong and López-
de-Silanes, 2005; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997) and increased poverty (Birdsall and 
Nellis, 2003; Bayliss, 2002) after divestiture, sometimes manifests in unrest. 20  The 
government may thus be interested in enhancing its reputation as being committed to 
market-oriented reforms that benefit society. One way to do so, and thereby mitigate 
concerns about social welfare following the reform, is to pressure NPFs to invest in CSR 
activities that increase social welfare. This is particularly likely to be the case when the 
government can transfer the costs of such activities to the firm’s new private investors.  
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that NPFs aggressively engage in CSR 
activities and hence exhibit higher CSR performance than their peers.  
Hypothesis 1a: NPFs have higher CSR performance than other publicly listed firms. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that NPFs do not exhibit higher CSR performance 
than other publicly listed firms. This conjecture derives from the shareholder theory of CSR 
of Friedman (1970). According to this view of CSR, the firm’s sole social responsibility is 
to generate profits for its shareholders and thus corporate resources should be spent on 
value-enhancing projects rather than on CSR activities, which only benefit managers. 
Given that the focus of a firm’s shareholders is to maximize profits, this theory suggests 
                                                          
20 Sinn and Weichenrieder (1997) report that after six years of transition in Central and Eastern European 
countries, selling state assets to foreigners is often seen as selling the “family silver”, which leads to 
resentment. For example, before Russia restricted the share of assets that can be purchased by foreigners, the 
local press claimed that foreigners were “robbing Russia”, and the Polish trade union criticized foreign 
investors of introducing a “slave system”. 
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that NPFs are less likely to make significant CSR investments. In addition, because CSR 
is likely to increase public scrutiny and monitoring, shareholders of NPFs may argue 
against investing in CSR activities, especially in the case of large NPFs operating in 
potentially environmentally harmful industries.  
In summary, an alternative to Hypothesis 1a predicts that there is no difference in 
CSR performance between NPFs and other publicly listed companies: 
Hypothesis 1b: There is no difference in CSR performance between NPFs and other 
publicly listed firms. 
3.2.2 Ownership Structure, Country-Level Institutions, and CSR in NPFs 
In most NPFs, owners comprise the state as residual owner, foreign and local 
investors, and employees (Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2005b). 21 Since different 
types of owners have different incentives, a NPF’s organizational structure is likely to 
affect its CSR performance.  
With respect to state ownership, the privatization literature shows that performance 
improvements following the divesture of SOEs are less pronounced and even disappear 
when governments retain a stake in NPFs (e.g., Borisova et al., 2012; Boubakri and Cosset, 
1998; Chen et al., 2014; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson, Nash, and van 
Randenborgh, 1994). According to these studies, the negative impact of government 
ownership stems from the conflicting interests of the state versus other firm owners: while 
the latter seek to maximize performance and in turn profits, state officials typically have a 
political agenda that might lead them to make suboptimal decisions from shareholders’ 
perspective. For instance, government officials may locate firms in regions where doing 
                                                          
21 Using a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over the period 1980-2001, Boubakri, Cosset, 
and Guedhami (2005b) find that non-government ownership increases over time following privatization.  
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boosts employment and in turn their own political support. Thus, while firms that are 
privatized take on a profit-maximization orientation, residual ownership by the government 
leads to conflicting objectives that can distort investment decisions, including those related 
to CSR activities.  
With respect to CSR, the government’s cost of investing in CSR can be transferred 
to new shareholders in NPFs, that is, as state ownership in a firm decreases, CSR 
investment costs to the government decrease. In this case the government is likely to 
pressure firms to invest in CSR activities, as by doing so it can receive the reputational 
benefits without having to bear the full costs of CSR investment. We thus expect that higher 
residual government ownership in NPFs to be negatively related to CSR performance.  
In contrast, we expect foreign ownership to be associated with higher CSR 
performance. Foreign investors’ capital, monitoring practices, investment efficiency, and 
transparency (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Gillan and Starks, 2003; 
Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009; Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset, 2012; Chen et al., 
2014) can help former SOEs restructure. The literature finds some evidence of a positive 
link between firm internationalization and CSR ratings (Attig et al., 2014; Brammer, 
Pavelin, and Porter, 2009; Strike, Gao, and Bansal, 2006) as well as between foreign 
ownership and CSR ratings (Oh, Chang, and Martynov, 2011). In the case of NPFs, foreign 
investors may have incentives to engage in CSR activities not only to enhance firm value, 
but also to signal they are not tunneling “national treasures” out of the firm’s country. 
Accordingly, we expect foreign ownership in NPFs to be positively related to CSR 
performance.  
With respect to employee ownership, most sales of SOEs involve a tranche of 
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ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plans).22 By allowing for employee ownership in 
NPFs, governments aim to mitigate opposition to the reform.23 Empirical evidence on the 
effect of employee ownership on corporate performance in NPFs is scarce. A few notable 
exceptions are Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997), who show that employee ownership is 
associated with increased value in Slovenia, and Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005b), 
who find for a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries that employee ownership 
in NPFs is positively related to firm performance.24 These results suggest that enhanced 
worker incentives align their interests with those of shareholders, and hence lead to better 
productivity and performance, in NPFs. Focusing on CSR, employees constitute a major 
firm stakeholder, and hence feel more committed to their company when it invests in CSR 
initiatives. Thus, when given an ownership share in the company, employees are likely to 
push for CSR investment that will benefit them not only as employees but also as investors 
(since CSR increases firm reputation and in turn value). We therefore expect employee 
ownership in NPFs to be positively related to CSR performance. 
The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: State (foreign/employee) ownership negatively (positively/positively) 
affects the CSR performance of NPFs. 
In addition to a firm’s ownership structure, country-level institutions affect 
corporate governance (La Porta et al., 2000). In this essay we examine whether country-
                                                          
22 For example, countries as diverse as France, the UK, Egypt, Nigeria, Argentina, and Pakistan have made 
ESOPs a key element of their privatization programs. 
23 Employee ownership can help ensure the political viability of privatization, and reduce resistance to 
privatization by employees (Lee, 1991). Employee ownership may also signal that renationalization would 
be politically difficult (Luders, 1991). 
24 Similarly, Djankov (1999) finds a non-monotonic relation between employee ownership and productivity 
(positive at low (below 10%) and high ownership stakes (above 30%), negative at intermediate levels) in a 
sample of six newly independent countries (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhstan). 
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level institutions also affect the relationship between ownership structure and CSR 
performance in NPFs. Borisova et al. (2012) suggest that in countries with better investor 
protection, state ownership is more likely to be associated with firm and market support in 
times of crisis. Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar (2009) further argue that government 
ownership is related to poor corporate governance incentives in countries with weak 
institutions, where government predation is more likely to occur (Durnev and Fauver, 2009) 
and investors’ rights are less likely to be protected. These studies suggest that adverse 
effects of government ownership are mitigated in countries with a stronger institutional 
environment. Similarly, the literature shows that foreign institutions play a more important 
role in corporate governance and investment efficiency in countries with weaker 
institutions (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014). Based on these studies, we expect 
the relationship between ownership structure and CSR performance in NPFs to be 
moderated by the quality of a country’s institutions. More formally: 
Hypothesis 3: The negative (positive/positive) effect of state (foreign/employee) 
ownership on the CSR performance of NPFs is moderated by country-level institutions. 
3.2.3. Financial Outcomes of CSR in NPFs 
To further our understanding of the link between NPFs’ ownership structure and 
CSR, we examine the effect on firm-level financial outcomes. In particular, we examine 
how the relation between residual state (foreign/employee) ownership and CSR affects firm 
valuation and the cost of equity capital.  
As previously discussed, the privatization literature finds ample evidence of an 
adverse effect of residual government ownership in NPFs. Shleifer (1998), for example, 
suggests that while new investors seek to maximize profits, residual government owners 
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use NPFs to pursue political objectives, which reduces firm performance and value 
(Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami, 2005a, b). Prior research also documents a negative 
effect of residual government ownership on earnings quality (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and 
Cosset, 2015), transparency (Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009), and the cost of equity 
and debt (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset, 2012; Borisova and Megginson, 2011). Also as 
previously discussed, foreign investors positively affect firm performance, as they provide 
managerial expertise, improve monitoring, and require greater transparency, and thus help 
a restructuring firm increase value. Although no evidence exists to our knowledge on the 
impact of employee ownership on NPFs’ performance, we expect to it to result in higher 
productivity and in turn value since ownership rights align workers’ interests with those of 
shareholders. Following similar reasoning, investors are expected to require a higher cost 
of capital from NPFs with high residual state ownership, but not for foreign or employee 
ownership. 
Turning to the CSR literature, CSR performance is positively associated with 
stronger internal corporate governance (Jo and Harjoto, 2011), a lower likelihood of 
financial distress (e.g., Goss, 2009), increased access to financial capital (e.g., Cheng, 
Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014), and higher abnormal returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 
2014). These results suggest that firm valuation is positively related to CSR performance. 
El Ghoul et al. (2011) provide direct evidence that CSR lowers the cost of capital. 
Combining these two lines of argument, we expect CSR to mitigate the negative 
effect of government ownership on NPFs’ valuation and cost of capital, that is, we expect 
high CSR performance to decrease the costs of residual state ownership in NPFs that are 
reflected in a lower valuation and higher cost of equity capital. Conversely, high CSR 
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performance is expected to amplify the positive effects of foreign and employee ownership 
on NPFs’ valuation and cost of equity. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The negative (positive/positive) effect of state (foreign/employee) 
ownership on NPFs’ valuation and cost of equity is mitigated (amplified) by high CSR 
performance. 
 
3.3. Sample and Summary Statistics 
3.3.1. Sample Selection 
To construct our sample, we begin by collecting data from several sources (see 
Appendix C). We obtain data on privatized firms from Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar 
(2009) and Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
largest sample of privatized firms collected to date. Next, we hand-match the privatization 
dataset with firm-level financial data obtained from the Compustat Global database. We 
then merge the resulting dataset with CSR data obtained from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
which provides objective and transparent information on environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors and analytical tools for professional investors. This information 
is collected from publicly available sources (e.g., annual reports, NGO websites, and CSR 
reports) and is updated biweekly. To construct the regression variables, we drop firms with 
insufficient financial data. We also drop countries and industries without privatized firms. 
The final sample contains 10,502 observations from 41 economies over the 2002-2010 
period.  
3.3.2. Key Variables  
CSR variables. Following Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), we construct our primary 
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measure of a firm’s CSR performance, CSR, as the average of its environmental 
performance (EP) and social performance (SP) scores. A firm’s environmental 
performance score captures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land, and water, and is based on its energy use, CO2 emissions, waste 
recycling, and similar factors. A firm’s social performance score measures the company’s 
capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society as a whole 
and is based on factors such as employee turnover, injury rate, training hours, percentage 
of women employees, and amount donated to charitable organizations.  
Privatization and ownership variables. We use the dummy variable PRIVATIZED 
to indicate whether a firm is privatized. To capture state ownership in NPFs, we construct 
three proxies: STATE, the percentage of shares in a NPF held by the government, 
CONTROL; a dummy variable equal to 1 for privatized firms in which the state retains 
majority control (i.e., more than 50% of the firm’s shares) following privatization and 0 
otherwise; and CONNECTED, a dummy variable equal to 1 for politically connected firms 
and 0 otherwise.25 In addition to state ownership, we also construct proxies for foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN) and employee ownership (EMPLOYEES), where FOREIGN and 
EMPLOYEES are the percentage of shares held by foreign investors and employees, 
respectively. 
Firm-level control variables. Following prior studies (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; 
Attig et al., 2014), we include a number of firm-level variables to control for various factors 
that may affect CSR performance. In particular, we control for: SIZE, the natural logarithm 
                                                          
25 We obtain data on political connections from Faccio (2006). A firm is recorded as politically connected if 
“at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting shares) or one of its 
top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, 
or is closely related to a top politician or party” (p. 369). 
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of total assets; AGE, firm age measured as the fiscal year minus the listed year; LEV, the 
ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA, return on assets measured as the ratio of net income 
before extraordinary items to total assets; and RDS, the ratio of research and development 
expenses to total sales. To mitigate the impact of outliers, we winsorize all firm-level 
variables at the 1% and 99% levels. In addition to these firm-level variables, we control for 
country, industry, and year fixed effects in all of our regressions. 
3.3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 summarizes our sample composition by country, industry, and year in 
Panels A to C, respectively. The full sample of 10,502 observations represents 2,075 unique 
firms over the period 2002-2010. Of these firms, 175 are privatized. In Panel A we see that 
privatized firms dominate the sample in Kazakhstan (100%), the Czech Republic (66.67%), 
Egypt (66.67%), and Hungary (66.67%). In contrast, several countries have few privatized 
firms, such as Japan (0.76%), Australia (1.51%), Hong Kong (1.79%), and Switzerland 
(1.85%). Using the Fama-French (1997) 12-industry classification in Panel B, we see that 
privatized firms appear to be diversified across industries, with Utilities having the highest 
percentage of privatized firms (31.25%) and Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services having 
the lowest (1.21%). In Panel C we find that the percentage of privatized firms is relatively 
stable over time, except for fewer observations in 2010. 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and a correlation matrix (Panel B) 
for our key regression variables. In Panel A, we see that CSR ranges between 97.780 and 
6.480, with an average of 55.465 and a standard deviation of 29.045, suggesting that there 
is considerable variation in CSR performance across sample firms. The mean value for 
PRIVATIZED is 0.074, which implies that 7.4% of sample observations correspond to 
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privatized firms. In Panel B, we find that PRIVATIZED is positively related to our proxies 
for CSR performance (CSR, EP, and SP), providing preliminary evidence that privatized 
firms tend to have higher CSR performance. The correlation coefficients between the key 
explanatory variables are low, indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to affect our 
regression results. 
In Table 3.3, we conduct univariate tests of differences in means between NPFs and 
other publicly listed firms. The average CSR is 67.365 for privatized firms, compared to 
55.589 for other publicly listed firms, with the difference significant at the 1% level. 
Similarly, privatized firms have significantly higher environmental and social performance 
than other firms. These results confirm the preliminary evidence in Table 3.2 that privatized 
firms tend to have higher CSR performance. However, this result does not control for other 
variables that could affect CSR. We further investigate such effects using multivariate 
analysis in the next section. 
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
3.4.1. CSR Performance of NPFs: Main Evidence 
To shed further light on the impact of privatization on CSR performance, we start 
by examining the following specification: 
CSR=a0+a1 PRIVATIZED+a2 Controls+a3 Fixed effects +e,          (1) 
where CSR is one of the three CSR proxies (CSR, EP, SP), PRIVATIZED is our 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm is privatized, Controls is a vector that contains 
the firm-specific control variables (SIZE, AGE, LEV, ROA, RDS), and Fixed effects is a 
vector that includes country, year, and industry fixed effects. Following Petersen (2009), 
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all of the regressions in this analysis cluster standard errors by firm and year. 
Table 3.4 presents our main evidence on the relation between privatization and CSR 
performance. In Column 1, the dependent variable is CSR, which is the average of a firm’s 
environmental and social performance scores. The coefficient on PRIVATIZED is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that in line with Hypothesis 1a, privatized firms 
outperform other publicly listed firms in terms of CSR performance. This result is 
economically significant as well: given a mean CSR of 56.465 (Table 3.2, Panel A), the 
coefficient on PRIVATIZED of 5.012 implies that on average privatized firms have 8.9% 
greater CSR performance (from 56.465 to 61.477) than their peers. Turning to the control 
variables, the results show that firm size, age, ROA, and R&D investment are positively 
associated with CSR performance. 
In Columns 2 and 3 we use environmental and social performance, respectively, as 
the dependent variable and again document a positive and significant coefficient on 
PRIVATIZED. These results complement the finding in Column 1 by showing that 
privatized firms are associated with higher environmental and social performance. In terms 
of economic significance, privatized firms observe 9.7% higher environmental 
performance (from 57.672 to 63.286) 8.0% higher social performance (from 55.257 to 
59.667) than peer firms. In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.4, we repeat the analyses in Columns 
1 to 3 controlling only for year and industry fixed effects, since using 41 country fixed 
effects reduces degrees of freedom. The results are similar to those in Columns 1 to 3. 
In sum, consistent with our main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a), our results show that 
privatized firms have better CSR performance than other publicly listed firms, both when 
we consider a firm’s overall CSR performance and when we separately consider the 
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environmental and social dimensions of CSR performance.  
If privatization is systematically related to differences in firm characteristics, the 
effect of privatization that we document above may be due at least in part to differences in 
firm characteristics. In our main regression analysis in Table 3.4, we control for variables 
such as size, age, leverage, ROA, and R&D investment to try to distinguish the effects of 
firm-specific characteristics from the effect of privatization. However, our results may be 
biased to the extent that privatization and these firm characteristics are endogenously 
determined. Megginson and Netter (2001), for instance, argue that governments may 
privatize the healthiest SOEs to make privatization “look good”. It is therefore crucial that 
we properly account for such differences in our analyses.  
In Table 3.3, we compare characteristics of privatized firms and other publicly listed 
firms. Privatized firms are larger and younger, and they have lower R&D investment, 
higher leverage, and higher ROA. To assess whether these differences influence our results, 
we use propensity score matching (PSM) to match each privatized firm with a control firm 
that has similar characteristics but is not privatized.  
We first estimate propensity scores using a Probit model where the dependent 
variable is PRIVATIZED and the explanatory variables are as in Table 3.4, and match each 
privatized firm with another firm that has the closest score to the privatized firm. Panel A 
of Table 3.5.1 reports the results. The difference in CSR between privatized firms and 
matched control firms is positive and significant (t-statistic is 3.550). Next, in Panel B we 
compare characteristics of privatized firms and matched firms. The differences between 
privatized firms and matched firms are no longer significant, but NPFs still outperform on 
CSR performance. In Panel C we rerun the regression analysis using privatized firms and 
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matched firms. Similar to our main evidence in Table 3.4, the coefficients on PRIVATIZED 
are still positive and significant. All of these findings confirm the main results in Table 3.4, 
mitigating concerns that differences in firm characteristics may be the source of privatized 
firms’ outperformance on CSR. 
In Table 3.5.2, we rerun the tests in Table 3.5.1 using propensity scores based on an 
alternative Probit model in which we employ firm size and industry as explanatory 
variables (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006). Since many privatized firms are large 
and monopolistic in one country, using too many explanatory variables may not give the 
best match for each privatized firm. The results are similar those to Table 3.5.1 and again 
support our main results. 
3.4.2. Ownership Structure, Country-level Institutions, and CSR in NPFs 
In this section, we extend our analysis to examine whether ownership structure and 
country-level institutions influence NPFs’ CSR performance. To do so, we use the 
following specification: 
CSR=b0+b1 OWNERSHIP+b2 INSTITUTIONS 
+b3 INSTITUTIONS* OWNERSHIP+b4 Controls+b5 Fixed effects +e,      (2) 
where CSR is CSR, OWNERSHIP is one of our state, foreign, or employee 
ownership measures, INSTITUTIONS is a vector that contains country-level proxies for the 
institutional environment (discussed below), Controls is a vector that contains the usual 
firm-level control variables (SIZE, AGE, LEV, ROA, RDS), and Fixed effects is a vector that 
includes year and industry fixed effects. As before, the regressions in this analysis cluster 
standard errors by firm and year. 
Our country-level proxies for the institutional environment are RULE OF LAW, 
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CORRUPTION, COMPETITION, STOCK MARKET, INDIVIDUALISM, and PRESS. The 
first of these measures, RULE OF LAW, comes from Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) and captures the perceived quality of contract enforcement, property rights, policing, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. We expect a county’s 
regulatory quality to directly influence NPFs’ CSR performance (Campbell, 2007; Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2012). CORRUPTION also comes form WGI and captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) 
show that firms are less likely to act in a socially responsible way in countries with higher 
corruption. Our third measure, COMPETITION, comes from World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY) and captures whether the legislative system prevents unfair competition. 
A moderate degree of competition may induce firms to increase their CSR investment in 
an effort to increase their reputation, while intensive competition may lead firms to focus 
on increasing profits to help ensure their survival (Campbell, 2007). Next, STOCK 
MARKET, which also comes from WCY, captures the extent to which stock markets 
provide firms adequate financial capital. In countries with more developed stock markets, 
firms are less likely to be financially constrained and hence more likely to be socially 
responsible (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Our fifth measure, INDIVIDUALISM, is 
Hofstede’s (2001) individualism index, which captures the extent to which a country 
prefers a loosely knit social framework whereby individuals are expected to take care of 
themselves and their immediate families. CSR performance is expected to be higher in 
individualistic countries where firms are more likely to pursue CSR activities to meet 
stakeholders’ expectations (Matten and Moon, 2008; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Finally, 
PRESS comes from Freedom House and captures the degree of print, broadcast, and 
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internet freedom in a country. If the media lacks freedom and can be easily influenced by 
lobbying or political pressure, firms are less likely to be punished for unethical behavior or 
rewarded for socially responsible behavior and hence are less likely to engage in CSR 
activities. Except for INDIVIDUALISM, higher scores on the proxies for institutional 
quality imply a higher quality institutional environment. 
In the first three panels of Table 3.6, we examine the effect of state ownership and 
country-level institutional quality on the CSR performance of NPFs. Panel A presents 
regression results using state ownership, the six institutional variables, and interactions 
between state ownership and the institutional variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient on STATE is significantly negative, suggesting state ownership has a negative 
impact on CSR performance in NPFs. Further, consistent with Hypothesis 3, the coefficient 
on INSTITUTIONS * STATE is consistently significantly positive, suggesting that high 
quality country-level institutions moderate the negative relationship between state 
ownership and CSR. Panels B and C repeat these regressions using CONTROL and 
CONNECTED, respectively, rather than STATE. Similar to Panel A, the coefficients on 
CONTROL and CONNECTED are significantly negative, and the coefficients on 
INSTITUTIONS * CONTROL and INSTITUTIONS * CONNECTED are significantly 
positive. These results continue to suggest that the adverse effect of government ownership 
is mitigated by a higher quality institutional environment. 
Panel D of Table 3.6 presents results from regressing CSR performance on foreign 
ownership, the institutional variables, and interactions between foreign ownership and the 
institutional variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that the coefficient on 
FOREIGN is significantly positive, suggesting that foreign investors have a positive impact 
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on the CSR performance of NPFs. The coefficient on the interaction INSTITUTIONS * 
FOREIGN is consistently significantly negative, suggesting that high quality country-level 
institutions also moderate the relationship between foreign ownership and CSR. 
Panel E of Table 3.6 presents results from regressing CSR performance on 
employee ownership, the institutional variables, and interactions between employee 
ownership and the institutional variables. Across all proxies for institutional quality except 
INDIVIDUALISM, we find that the coefficient on EMPLOYEES is significantly positive, 
suggesting that employee ownership has a positive effect on the CSR performance of NPFs. 
The coefficient on the interaction INSTITUTIONS * EMPLOYEES is consistently 
significantly negative, suggesting that country-level institutions moderate the relationship 
between employee ownership and CSR.  
In summary, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results in this section show that state 
ownership has a negative impact on CSR performance in NPFs, while foreign and 
employee ownership exhibit a positive association with CSR performance. In addition, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, the relationship between ownership structure and CSR 
performance in NPFs is moderated by the quality of country-level institutions. These 
findings support prior literature suggesting that internal (i.e., firm-level) corporate 
governance and external (i.e., country-level) governance institutions complement each 
other. More importantly for our purposes, effective country-level institutions reduce the 
negative effect of residual state ownership on CSR performance in privatized firms. 
3.4.3. Financial Outcomes of CSR in NPFs 
The analysis above suggests that NPFs are more likely to engage in CSR activities 
than peer firms. This finding raises questions about why NPFs are willing to invest more 
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in CSR activities than other firms. Prior research suggests that firms with better CSR 
performance observe better financial performance, as CSR helps reduce agency costs and 
information asymmetry (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014; Ferrell, Liang, and 
Renneboog, 2014). Prior work further suggests that state (foreign) ownership in NPFs is 
associated with lower (higher) post-privatization financial performance, as state (foreign) 
ownership reflects weaker (stronger) corporate governance and in turn more (less) 
information asymmetry (e.g., Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; 
Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009). In this section we empirically examine the effect of 
post-privatization ownership structure and CSR performance on NPFs’ financial 
performance using the following specification: 
PERF=c0+c1 OWNERSHIP+c2 PCSR 
+c3 OWNERSHIP * PCSR +c4 Controls+c5 Fixed effects +e,        (3) 
where PERF is firm value as measured by market-to book ratio (MTB) or the cost 
of equity capital (COE), OWNERSHIP is one of our state, foreign, or employee ownership 
measures, PCSR is predicted CSR performance, Controls is a vector of the usual firm-
specific control variables (SIZE, AGE, LEV, ROA, RDS), and Fixed effects is a vector that 
contains year and industry fixed effects. In this analysis, we cluster standard errors by firm 
and year. 
In Panel A of Table 3.7, we first examine the impact of CSR and ownership 
structure on firm value (MTB). Following Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar (2014), we 
implement a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we predict CSR 
performance for each firm-year observation using model 1 in Table 3.4. In the second stage, 
we regress MTB on an NPF’s predicted CSR performance (PCSR), OWNERSHIP, and the 
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interaction OWNERSHIP * PCSR. The results show that the coefficient on the interaction 
between state ownership (STATE, CONTROL, and CONNECTED) and PCSR is positive 
and significant. The coefficient on EMPLOYEES * PCSR is also significantly positive, 
while the coefficient on FOREIGN * PCSR is not significant. These results suggest that 
state ownership and employee ownership are valued at a premium in NPFs with higher 
CSR performance.  
Recent research suggests that higher CSR scores are also associated with a lower 
cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). Accordingly, in Panel 
B of Table 3.7 we extend the above analysis by looking at the effect of CSR and ownership 
structure on NPFs’ cost of equity capital (COE). Following prior studies (e.g., Hail and 
Leuz, 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2011), we construct COE as the average of four implied cost 
of equity capital measures: KGLS of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), KCT of Claus 
and Thomas (2001), KOJN of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and KMPEG of Easton 
(2004). Appendix B provides details on the construction of these four measures. The results 
show that the coefficient on the interaction between state ownership (STATE, CONTROL, 
and CONNECTED) and PCSR is negative and significant, while the coefficients on 
EMPLOYEES * PCSR and FOREIGN * PCSR are not significant, suggesting that NPFs 
with residual state ownership that have higher CSR performance observe lower equity 
financing costs. 
The results in this section support evidence in the privatization literature that state 
ownership is associated with lower financial performance (lower firm value and higher cost 
of capital), but also show that under high CSR performance, the negative impact of residual 
state ownership on NPFs’ financial performance is reduced. 
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3.4.4. Additional Analyses 
 In this section, we conduct additional tests to shed further light on our findings and 
to address potential concerns about our analysis. 
3.4.4.1. Social Performance of NPFs: Components  
Our main results shows that NPFs outperform other publicly listed firms in terms 
of both environmental performance and social performance. However, compared to the 
environmental performance dimension of CSR, the social performance dimension 
encompasses a wider range of factors, including commitment to employees, responsibility 
to consumers, and contributions to the community. When we separately examine NPFs 
social performance along these sub-dimensions 26 , we find that privatized firms have 
superior performance in the areas of community, employment quality, and product 
responsibility, implying that privatized firms show greater commitment to their consumers, 
employees, and the community. The results are presented in Table 3.8. 
3.4.4.2. Fully versus Partially Privatized Firms 
In Section 2, we argue that NPFs may invest more in CSR activities than their peers 
to improve their competitiveness and in turn increase profitability or to improve their 
reputation and in turn signal the firm’s commitment to stakeholders. To disentangle these 
potential explanations, in Table 3.9, Panel A we split the sample into full and partial 
privatizations and compare the CSR performance of the two subsamples in univariate 
analysis. We find that partial privatizations outperform full privatizations. The difference 
is significant at the 1% level, implying that if the government is involved in privatized 
firms’ decision-making, they will be pressured to engage in CSR activities to help the 
                                                          
26 Definitions of each component of social performance are provided in Appendix C. 
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government achieve its reputational objectives. When we limit attention to partially 
privatized firms, we find that those firms in which the state retains majority control (i.e., 
an ownership share greater than 50%) have lower CSR performance, which suggests that 
governments are more likely to engage in CSR activities when they can transfer the costs 
of these activities to the firm’s new outside shareholders. When we next compare fully 
privatized firms and other publicly traded firms, we find that NPFs still exhibit higher CSR 
performance than peer firms. Multivariate analysis in Panel C confirms the results of the 
univariate tests, with a positive and significant coefficient on PARTIAL PRIVATIZED. 
3.4.4.3. Industry Effects 
Prior literature suggests that the value of CSR activities is conditioned by industry 
characteristics. In particular, CSR is more valuable for firms in industries with high 
consumer sensitivity (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010), but is less valuable for 
firms in industries with a poor reputation (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014). In this section we 
examine whether these industry characteristics affect the CSR performance of NPFs. 
We first consider consumer sensitivity. Consumer satisfaction is positively 
associated with CSR investment, which enhances a firm’s reputation (Brown and Dacin, 
1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). Further, CSR is more 
important for firms that provide goods and services to individuals than for firms whose 
major customers are corporations and governments (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 
2010). We therefore expect NPFs to engage in more CSR activities when they are in 
industries with high consumer sensitivity. To test this conjecture, we follow Lev, Petrovits, 
and Radhakrishnan (2010) and classify as high consumer-sensitivity industries the 
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consumer goods and financial services industries27. We then separately examine the impact 
of privatization on high and low consumer-sensitivity industries. The results are reported 
in the first two columns of Table 3.10. We find that only those NPFs in high consumer-
sensitivity industries outperform other publicly listed firms. There is no significant 
difference between NPFs in low consumer-sensitivity industries and other publicly listed 
firms. 
We next consider the role of a negative industry reputation. For firms operating in 
an industry with a negative environmental or social image (e.g., chemicals, tobacco, or 
gaming), CSR engagement may be perceived as “blood money” (Godfrey, Merrill, and 
Hansen, 2009). Accordingly, CSR investment is less likely to increase firm value for these 
firms (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014). We therefore expect NPFs in industries with a negative 
reputation to invest less in CSR activities. To test this prediction, we first identify pollution-
intensive stocks and “sin” stocks. Following Mani and Wheeler (1998) we define pollution-
intensive stocks as firms in the iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial chemicals, 
petroleum refineries, nonmetallic mineral production, and pulp and paper industries28, and 
following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) we define sin stocks as firms in the alcohol, 
tobacco, and gaming industries29. We then conduct our regression analysis on the pollution-
intensive and sin stock subsamples. The results are presented in Columns 3 to 6 of Table 
3.10. We find that for NPFs in pollution-intensive or sin industries, CSR performance is 
                                                          
27 Consumer goods: SIC 0000–0999, 2000–2399, 2500–2599, 2700–2799, 2830–2869, 3000–3219, 3420–
3429, 3523, 3600–3669, 3700–3719, 3751, 3850–3879, 3880–3999, 4813, 4830–4899, 5000–5079, 5090–
5099, 5130–5159, 5220–5999, 7000–7299, 7400–9999; Finance: SIC 6000-6999. 
28 Iron and steel = SIC 331, 332; nonferrous metals = SIC 333-336; industrial chemicals = SIC 281, 286; 
petroleum refineries = SIC 291-299; nonmetallic mineral production = SIC 324, 325, 327-329; and pulp and 
paper = SIC 261-263. 
29 Alcohol = SIC 2100-2199; tobacco = SIC 2080-2085; and gaming = NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 
713290, 72112, 721120.  
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indistinguishable from that of other publicly listed firms. Thus, the result that NPFs have 
higher CSR performance than peer firms concentrates among NPFs operating in “clean” 
industries. 
In sum, the evidence in this section suggests that the CSR performance of NPFs is 
conditioned by certain industry characteristics. In particular, the results show that NPFs 
will engage in CSR activities only when doing so can enhance their reputation and in turn 
firm value. 
3.4.4.4. Endogeneity 
In Section 4.1 we attempt to address endogeneity arising from selection bias by 
using the PSM approach. Here, we further address endogeneity concerns by using two-
stage least squares (2SLS) and the Heckman (1979) sample selection model.  
We first employ the 2SLS approach. In the first stage, we specify a Probit model of 
the probability of privatization as a function of firm and country characteristics. Because 
privatization is influenced by whether the country is ruled by a left-wing government 
(Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009), we use left power (LEFT 
POWER) as an instrumental variable. The model also includes all the firm-level control 
variables and fixed effects employed above in our main regression. The first-stage 
regression results are reported in Column 1 of Table 3.11. The coefficient on LEFT 
POWER is significantly positively related to privatization, indicating that it is not a weak 
instrument. In the second stage, we regress CSR performance on predicted privatization 
and the usual set of control variables. The second-stage regression results, reported in 
Column 2 of Table 3.11, confirm that privatized firms have better CSR performance than 
other publicly listed firms. 
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 We next use the Heckman sample selection model. Similar to the 2SLS model, in 
the first stage of the Heckman model we use the estimated privatization probabilities to 
measure the inverse Mills’ ratio (λ), which is a correction for self-selection. Then, in the 
second stage, we regress CSR performance on the estimated privatization probabilities, the 
inverse Mills’ ratio, and the control variables. The results of the Heckman model are 
presented in Column 3 of Table 3.11. We continue to observe that privatized firms have 
better CSR performance than other publicly listed firms. In sum, we consistently find that 
NPFs’ higher CSR performance is robust to endogeneity concerns. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this essay, we investigate the CSR performance of privatized firms. Using a large 
sample of 10,502 firm-year observations from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010, we 
find that CSR performance is significantly higher for NPFs in comparison to other publicly 
listed firms. This finding, which is robust to addressing endogeneity concerns, is consistent 
with NPFs investing heavily in CSR either to increase their competitiveness and in turn 
profitability or to increase their reputation and in turn signal the newly privatized firm’s 
commitment to stakeholders. To disentangle these explanations, we compare partially and 
fully privatized firms and find that partially privatized firms have significantly higher CSR 
performance, which suggests that CSR investment is pushed by governments interested in 
the reputation benefits of CSR, particularly when they can transfer the costs of CSR 
investment to the firm’s new owners.  
We also examine the impact of ownership structure and country-level institutions 
on the CSR performance of NPFs. We find that state ownership (as captured by the state’s 
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percentage ownership share, a majority control dummy, and a politically connected dummy) 
is negatively associated with CSR performance in NPFs, while foreign ownership and 
employee ownership are positively associated with CSR performance. However, strong 
country-level institutions moderate the effect of ownership structure on CSR performance.  
Finally, we investigate the firm-level outcomes of NPFs’ CSR activities. We find 
that high CSR performance helps mitigate the negative impact of state ownership on firm 
financial performance in NPFs. More specifically, NPFs with state residual ownership that 
have higher CSR performance observe higher firm value and lower equity financing. 
This essay contributes to the privatization literature by showing that NPFs have 
higher CSR performance than other publicly listed firms. In addition, it allows to exploit 
the particular post-divestiture ownership structure to test the link between government, 
foreign, and employee ownership on CSR performance. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to assess the CSR performance of NPFs. This essay also contributes to the literature 
on the determinants of CSR by linking CSR to a macroeconomic policy that is politically 
driven, namely, privatization. We show that CSR is dependent on political will and 
therefore government support is an important determinant of CSR activities. We also link 
CSR to firm ownership structure, as opposed to only macro (global or domestic) forces as 
is more common in the literature. Finally, our essay contributes to the corporate finance 
literature by providing evidence on the impact of CSR on firm financial performance in 
NPFs. We find that higher CSR performance helps mitigate the adverse effect of state 
ownership on firm performance.  
While we provide strong evidence on the effect of privatization on CSR, there are 
limits to this study that arise from the nature of the data that we use. In short, the present 
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study provides cross-country evidence on state ownership and CSR in NPFs. With more 
data on state ownership, future research could examine how changes in state ownership 
affect CSR. Additionally, given the prevalence of state acquisitions around the world, it 















Full Sample 2,075 175 8.43% 10,502 781 7.44% 
Panel A: By Country 
Australia 265 4 1.51% 816 30 3.68% 
Austria 19 6 31.58% 132 40 30.30% 
Belgium 24 1 4.17% 175 6 3.43% 
Brazil 44 4 9.09% 116 8 6.90% 
China 40 14 35.00% 94 28 29.79% 
Colombia 2 1 50.00% 5 2 40.00% 
Czech Republic 3 2 66.67% 10 5 50.00% 
Egypt 3 2 66.67% 6 3 50.00% 
Finland 26 6 23.08% 189 33 17.46% 
France 86 15 17.44% 600 87 14.50% 
Germany 70 9 12.86% 473 47 9.94% 
Greece 20 6 30.00% 129 38 29.46% 
Hong Kong 56 1 1.79% 264 4 1.52% 
Hungary 3 2 66.67% 8 3 37.50% 
India 41 8 19.51% 100 16 16.00% 
Indonesia 18 7 38.89% 35 10 28.57% 
Ireland 17 1 5.88% 115 8 6.96% 
Israel 13 5 38.46% 26 6 23.08% 
Italy 47 12 25.53% 316 79 25.00% 
Japan 394 3 0.76% 2,476 24 0.97% 
Kazakhstan 1 1 100.00% 2 1 50.00% 
Korea 59 4 6.78% 141 10 7.09% 
Malaysia 36 2 5.56% 62 4 6.45% 
Mexico 18 1 5.56% 59 2 3.39% 
Morocco 2 1 50.00% 7 2 28.57% 
Netherlands 39 1 2.56% 257 5 1.95% 
New Zealand 10 4 40.00% 60 24 40.00% 
Norway 19 3 15.79% 142 21 14.79% 
Philippines 11 1 9.09% 18 1 5.56% 
Poland 18 3 16.67% 35 6 17.14% 
Portugal 12 6 50.00% 89 35 39.33% 
Russia 28 1 3.57% 30 2 6.67% 
Singapore 42 6 14.29% 235 32 13.62% 
South Africa 39 2 5.13% 69 5 7.25% 
Spain 49 8 16.33% 335 46 13.73% 
Sweden 48 3 6.25% 361 21 5.82% 
Switzerland 54 1 1.85% 351 8 2.28% 
Taiwan 49 2 4.08% 103 4 3.88% 
Thailand 16 1 6.25% 32 3 9.38% 
Turkey 17 4 23.53% 46 8 17.39% 




Panel B: By Industry 
Business Equipment 167 3 1.80% 820 19 2.32% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 93 3 3.23% 507 6 1.18% 
Consumer Durables 68 2 2.94% 403 10 2.48% 
Consumer NonDurables 131 7 5.34% 725 40 5.52% 
Energy 119 16 13.45% 462 73 15.80% 
Finance 458 33 7.21% 2,295 116 5.05% 
Manufacturing 260 20 7.69% 1,499 92 6.14% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 106 29 27.36% 501 133 26.55% 
Utilities 96 30 31.25% 444 127 28.60% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 165 2 1.21% 898 10 1.11% 
Other 412 30 7.28% 1,948 155 7.96% 
Panel C: By Year 
2002 405 48 11.85% 405 48 11.85% 
2003 411 50 12.17% 411 50 12.17% 
2004 913 70 7.67% 913 70 7.67% 
2005 1,205 91 7.55% 1,205 91 7.55% 
2006 1,223 95 7.77% 1,223 95 7.77% 
2007 1,292 107 8.28% 1,292 107 8.28% 
2008 1,442 146 10.12% 1,442 146 10.12% 
2009 1,687 166 9.84% 1,687 166 9.84% 
2010 1,924 8 0.42% 1,924 8 0.42% 
This table presents the sample distribution by industry (Fama–French 12 industry groups), country, and 






Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CSR 56.465  29.045  6.480  28.850  59.988  84.715  97.780  
EP 57.672  31.201  9.210  23.870  64.790  88.950  97.180  
SP 55.257  31.301  3.350  24.340  59.635  85.620  98.940  
PRIVATIZED 0.074  0.262  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  
SIZE 8.949  1.733  1.687  7.775  8.762  9.977  14.937  
AGE 2.578  0.531  0.000  2.303  2.773  2.944  3.135  
LEV 0.182  0.151  0.000  0.058  0.157  0.269  0.669  
ROA 0.043  0.067  -0.251  0.010  0.036  0.071  0.276  
RDS 0.013  0.032  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.281  
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CSR (1) 1.000          
EP (2) 0.929*** 1.000         
SP (3) 0.930*** 0.728*** 1.000        
PRIVATIZED (4) 0.106*** 0.077*** 0.120*** 1.000       
SIZE (5) 0.386*** 0.345*** 0.372*** 0.120*** 1.000      
AGE (6) 0.218*** 0.252*** 0.152*** -0.084*** 0.222*** 1.000     
LEV (7) 0.056*** 0.041*** 0.063*** 0.082*** 0.059*** -0.083*** 1.000    
ROA (8) -0.012  -0.038*** 0.016  0.028** -0.219*** -0.097*** -0.167*** 1.000   
RDS (9) 0.123*** 0.145*** 0.084*** -0.026** -0.100*** 0.056*** -0.151*** -0.060*** 1.000  
This table reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients (Panel B) for the regression variables. The full sample comprises 10,502 
observations representing 2,075 unique firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in 







Table 3.3 Univariate Tests 
 All Firms Privatized Firms Other Publicly Listed Firms Privatized vs. Other 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD Mean(t-statistics) 
CSR 10,502  56.465  29.045  781  67.365  25.583  9,721  55.589  29.130  10.963*** 
EP 10,502  57.672  31.201  781  66.182  27.492  9,721  56.989  31.381  7.946*** 
SP 10,502  55.257  31.301  781  68.549  27.354  9721  54.189  31.355  12.424*** 
SIZE 10,502  8.949  1.733  781  9.685  1.591  9,721  8.890  1.730  12.419*** 
AGE 10,502  2.578  0.531  781  2.420  0.508  9,721  2.590  0.531  -8.628*** 
LEV 10,502  0.182  0.151  781  0.226  0.156  9,721  0.179  0.150  8.460*** 
ROA 10,502  0.043  0.067  781  0.050  0.058  9,721  0.043  0.068  2.854*** 
RDS 10,502  0.013  0.032  781  0.010  0.035  9,721  0.013  0.032  -2.660*** 
This table presents univariate tests results for differences between privatized firms and other publicly listed firms. The full sample comprises 10,502 observations 
representing 2,075 unique firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.4 CSR Performance of NPFs: Main Evidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSR EP SP CSR EP SP 
PRIVATIZED 5.012*** 5.614*** 4.410*** 4.736*** 3.329 6.143*** 
 (3.383) (3.313) (2.792) (2.731) (1.579) (3.544) 
SIZE 9.620*** 9.197*** 10.043*** 8.615*** 8.231*** 9.000*** 
 (25.249) (22.884) (24.940) (19.998) (19.515) (18.220) 
AGE 4.108*** 4.766*** 3.450*** 4.379*** 6.648*** 2.110 
 (4.502) (4.848) (3.517) (3.237) (4.723) (1.509) 
LEV 2.896 5.660 0.133 15.512*** 15.279*** 15.746*** 
 (0.904) (1.621) (0.041) (4.397) (3.931) (4.289) 
ROA 21.312*** 18.626** 23.999*** 33.933*** 20.011* 47.854*** 
 (2.980) (2.010) (3.760) (3.606) (1.829) (5.557) 
RDS 51.511*** 45.150** 57.872*** 66.796*** 62.479*** 71.113*** 
 (3.041) (2.396) (3.146) (3.779) (3.166) (3.609) 
Constant -45.041*** -45.424*** -44.659*** -28.814*** -28.000*** -29.628*** 
 (-6.618) (-11.198) (-4.786) (-5.930) (-5.765) (-5.195) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 
Adjusted R2 0.444 0.406 0.417 0.331 0.335 0.259 
This table reports regressions results of CSR performance on privatization. The full sample comprises 
10,502 observations representing 2,075 unique firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. 
Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-level control variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Columns 1 to 3 include country, year, and industry fixed 
effects. Columns 4 to 6 include year and industry fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering 
by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 





Table 3.5.1 Propensity Score Matching by All Control Variables 
Panel A: PSM Results 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched 67.365 55.589 11.776 1.074 10.96 
ATT 67.365 62.481 4.884 1.378 3.55 
Panel B: PSM Sample 
  Privatized Firms Matched Firms Privatized vs. Matched 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD Mean(t-statistics) 
CSR 781 67.365 25.583 781 62.481 28.771 3.545*** 
EP 781 66.182 27.492 781 61.4 31.35 3.205*** 
SP 781 68.549 27.354 781 63.563 29.736 3.449*** 
SIZE 781 9.685 1.591 781 9.633 1.686 0.618 
AGE 781 2.42 0.508 781 2.431 0.539 -0.401 
LEV 781 0.226 0.156 781 0.222 0.158 0.537 
ROA 781 0.05 0.058 781 0.049 0.06 0.418 
RDS 781 0.01 0.035 781 0.011 0.034 -0.745 
 
Panel C: Privatization and CSR - PSM Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CSR EP SP CSR EP SP 
PRIVATIZED 5.074*** 4.997*** 5.151*** 4.532*** 4.510** 4.554** 
 (3.564) (3.120) (3.341) (2.725) (2.418) (2.579) 
SIZE 9.562*** 9.512*** 9.612*** 9.342*** 9.406*** 9.277*** 
 (12.503) (12.045) (11.751) (13.264) (12.407) (12.066) 
AGE 3.862** 3.317* 4.408** 8.277*** 8.681*** 7.874*** 
 (2.134) (1.660) (2.257) (3.016) (2.908) (2.921) 
LEV -8.042 -5.849 -10.235 7.445 8.439 6.451 
 (-1.209) (-0.862) (-1.368) (0.988) (1.006) (0.862) 
ROA 38.806*** 24.194* 53.418*** 18.443 2.132 34.754* 
 (2.721) (1.768) (3.049) (1.034) (0.107) (1.842) 
RDS -45.650** -57.276** -34.023 -43.810 -47.272 -40.348 
 (-2.210) (-2.338) (-1.344) (-1.269) (-1.257) (-1.014) 
Constant -95.400*** -100.302*** -90.499*** -46.660*** -49.687*** -43.632*** 
 (-10.935) (-11.651) (-8.400) (-5.175) (-5.454) (-4.509) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.495 0.436 0.377 0.38 0.302 
This table reports propensity score matching results (Panel A), univariate tests using a matched sample 
(Panel B), and regression results using a matched sample (Panel C). The full sample comprises 10,502 
observations representing 2,075 unique firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. The matched 
sample consists of 1,562 observations. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in 
Appendix C. All firm-level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and* denote 





Table 3.5.2 Propensity Score Matching by Size and Industry 
Panel A: PSM Results 
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched 67.365  55.589  11.776  1.074  10.960  
ATT 67.365  59.862  7.504  1.376  5.450  
Panel B: PSM Sample 
  Privatized Firms Matched Firms Privatized vs. Matched 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD Mean(t-statistics) 
CSR 781  67.365  25.583  781  59.862  28.693  5.455*** 
EP 781  66.182  27.492  781  60.760  30.732  3.675*** 
SP 781  68.549  27.354  781  58.963  31.241  6.451*** 
SIZE 781  9.685  1.591  781  9.576  1.657  1.316 
AGE 781  2.420  0.508  781  2.581  0.543  -6.048*** 
LEV 781  0.226  0.156  781  0.217  0.160  1.089 
ROA 781  0.050  0.058  781  0.042  0.058   2.808*** 
RDS 781  0.010  0.035  781  0.008  0.023  1.309 
 
Panel C: Privatization and CSR - PSM Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CSR EP SP CSR EP SP 
PRIVATIZED 8.219*** 8.694*** 7.743*** 7.696*** 5.621*** 9.771*** 
 (4.734) (4.742) (3.558) (4.472) (2.912) (5.021) 
SIZE 9.481*** 9.547*** 9.415*** 8.848*** 8.989*** 8.707*** 
 (18.168) (19.740) (13.881) (14.929) (16.497) (11.081) 
AGE 2.831 2.429 3.233 6.096** 7.297** 4.895* 
 (1.299) (1.014) (1.435) (2.115) (2.312) (1.735) 
LEV -6.859 -5.694 -8.024 8.906 9.154 8.659 
 (-0.868) (-0.702) (-0.970) (0.977) (0.952) (0.945) 
ROA 33.105** 27.007* 39.203*** 23.706 5.668 41.744*** 
 (2.515) (1.820) (2.769) (1.562) (0.321) (2.710) 
RDS 10.344 -5.570 26.258 28.297 17.283 39.312 
 (0.328) (-0.132) (0.856) (0.712) (0.329) (1.046) 
Constant -36.637*** -45.323*** -27.950*** -28.344*** -23.453*** -33.236** 
 (-4.948) (-6.179) (-3.166) (-2.783) (-2.793) (-2.435) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,562 
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.495 0.436 0.377 0.38 0.302 
This table reports propensity score matching results (Panel A), univariate tests using a matched sample 
(Panel B), and regression results using a matched sample (Panel C). Propensity scores are estimated using 
Probit regressions of treatment status on firm size and industry fixed effects. The full sample comprises 
10,502 observations representing 2,075 unique firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. The 
matched sample consists of 1,562 observations. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided 
in Appendix C. All firm-level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 






Table 3.6 Ownership Structure, Country-level Institutions, and CSR in NPFs 
  
Panel A: State Ownership and CSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE OF LAW CORRUPTION COMPETITION STOCK MARKET INDIVIDUALISM PRESS 
STATE -0.233*** -0.225*** -1.102*** -0.802*** -0.475*** -0.349* 
 (-3.154) (-3.609) (-4.145) (-4.223) (-4.201) (-1.945) 
INSTITUTIONS 4.385 1.967 -1.740 -0.911 0.076 0.388*** 
 (1.301) (0.786) (-0.805) (-0.663) (0.886) (3.234) 
INSTITUTIONS*STATE 0.195*** 0.191*** 0.181*** 0.136*** 0.009*** 0.005* 
 (3.305) (4.484) (4.082) (4.420) (4.284) (1.901) 
SIZE 8.725*** 8.728*** 8.115*** 7.807*** 7.602*** 8.762*** 
 (11.271) (11.811) (9.299) (10.493) (9.280) (11.162) 
AGE 2.818 3.362 6.592** 7.475*** 5.109** 2.971 
 (1.114) (1.391) (2.563) (2.865) (2.007) (1.120) 
LEV 2.950 1.867 3.025 5.244 -0.090 -2.452 
 (0.331) (0.205) (0.311) (0.516) (-0.010) (-0.310) 
ROA -7.102 -10.131 -13.621 -14.763 -14.335 5.376 
 (-0.386) (-0.528) (-0.655) (-0.705) (-0.713) (0.327) 
RDS -29.135 -25.937 -18.640 -22.909 -54.892* -37.509 
 (-0.931) (-0.821) (-0.594) (-0.714) (-1.935) (-1.366) 
Constant -5.883 -3.489 7.774 3.029 -33.543*** -41.793*** 
 (-0.490) (-0.288) (0.381) (0.201) (-4.228) (-3.486) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 707 707 703 703 704 702 
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.397 0.362 0.354 0.384 0.44 
This table reports regression results of CSR performance on ownership, institutions, and interactions between ownership and institutions in NPFs. Panels A to 
E presents results for state ownership, state control, political connections, foreign ownership, and employee ownership, respectively. The dependent variable is 
CSR performance. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 







Panel B: State Control and CSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE OF LAW CORRUPTION COMPETITION STOCK 
MARKET 
INDIVIDUALISM PRESS 
CONTROL -15.354*** -14.445*** -54.593*** -38.084*** -38.530*** -20.558** 
 (-3.173) (-3.485) (-2.671) (-2.982) (-4.761) (-2.006) 
INSTITUTIONS 6.653** 4.038* 0.631 0.540 0.112 0.445*** 
 (2.378) (1.859) (0.349) (0.424) (1.367) (4.235) 
INSTITUTIONS*CONTROL 10.778*** 10.377*** 8.612** 5.997*** 0.633*** 0.243* 
 (2.941) (3.548) (2.522) (2.944) (4.568) (1.767) 
SIZE 8.712*** 8.719*** 7.948*** 7.762*** 7.910*** 8.719*** 
 (11.085) (11.857) (9.332) (9.533) (9.208) (10.867) 
AGE 2.534 3.193 6.198** 6.754** 4.182 2.920 
 (0.988) (1.298) (2.367) (2.427) (1.510) (1.072) 
LEV 3.761 2.951 4.892 6.991 -0.878 -2.666 
 (0.414) (0.316) (0.484) (0.661) (-0.092) (-0.331) 
ROA -9.332 -12.552 -16.650 -16.998 -13.341 6.085 
 (-0.500) (-0.641) (-0.779) (-0.809) (-0.704) (0.374) 
RDS -37.538 -34.805 -34.540 -32.904 -51.908** -40.333 
 (-1.260) (-1.162) (-1.109) (-1.064) (-1.990) (-1.507) 
Constant -8.077 -5.830 -4.766 -4.116 -35.241*** -45.231*** 
 (-0.725) (-0.519) (-0.272) (-0.281) (-4.603) (-3.978) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 707 707 703 703 704 702 









Panel C: Political Connections and CSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE OF LAW CORRUPTION COMPETITION STOCK MARKET INDIVIDUALISM PRESS 
CONNECTED 0.205** 0.159** 0.651* 0.508*** 0.331** 0.663** 
 (2.181) (2.028) (1.911) (2.722) (2.120) (2.482) 
INSTITUTIONS 14.592*** 10.815*** 4.423** 3.291** 0.315*** 0.702*** 
 (5.061) (4.480) (2.232) (2.336) (3.605) (6.471) 
INSTITUTIONS*CONNECTED -0.225*** -0.183*** -0.116* -0.094** -0.006** -0.010*** 
 (-2.874) (-2.973) (-1.891) (-2.573) (-2.131) (-2.643) 
SIZE 8.441*** 8.494*** 7.630*** 7.533*** 7.050*** 8.095*** 
 (10.511) (11.209) (9.239) (9.207) (8.084) (9.780) 
AGE 3.622 3.924 7.664** 8.035** 7.648*** 4.971** 
 (1.336) (1.407) (2.579) (2.379) (2.618) (2.037) 
LEV 9.908 9.837 12.132 12.769 4.311 -1.480 
 (0.982) (0.931) (1.052) (1.072) (0.405) (-0.172) 
ROA -6.332 -9.314 -15.423 -17.132 -8.549 3.192 
 (-0.333) (-0.455) (-0.693) (-0.760) (-0.418) (0.194) 
RDS -38.113 -31.697 -34.259 -29.729 -70.350*** -41.535 
 (-1.196) (-0.996) (-1.011) (-0.952) (-2.767) (-1.567) 
Constant -20.822** -16.661 -31.438* -21.752 -45.667*** -59.560*** 
 (-2.094) (-1.521) (-1.778) (-1.477) (-5.416) (-4.839) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 707 707 703 703 704 702 









Panel D: Foreign Ownership and CSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE OF LAW CORRUPTION COMPETITION STOCK MARKET INDIVIDUALISM PRESS 
CONNECTED -14.711*** -13.584*** -51.293** -38.555*** -36.468*** -20.933** 
 (-3.052) (-3.177) (-2.336) (-2.948) (-4.589) (-2.014) 
INSTITUTIONS 6.314** 3.839* 0.225 0.401 0.109 0.455*** 
 (2.240) (1.744) (0.123) (0.310) (1.264) (4.045) 
INSTITUTIONS* FOREIGN 11.092*** 10.439*** 8.306** 6.315*** 0.621*** 0.254* 
 (3.156) (3.545) (2.299) (3.042) (4.652) (1.814) 
SIZE 8.647*** 8.646*** 7.807*** 7.688*** 7.871*** 8.697*** 
 (10.987) (11.664) (9.116) (9.593) (8.998) (10.547) 
AGE 3.025 3.721 7.027*** 7.340*** 5.135* 3.102 
 (1.156) (1.490) (2.624) (2.691) (1.831) (1.105) 
LEV 2.537 1.761 3.446 5.613 -2.474 -5.009 
 (0.293) (0.197) (0.361) (0.566) (-0.276) (-0.664) 
ROA -5.532 -8.504 -12.086 -12.588 -9.262 12.301 
 (-0.304) (-0.450) (-0.599) (-0.643) (-0.521) (0.833) 
RDS -35.917 -33.076 -32.756 -31.102 -49.700* -39.291 
 (-1.201) (-1.101) (-1.053) (-0.995) (-1.908) (-1.467) 
Constant -8.805 -6.802 -1.932 -2.028 -4.346 -40.956*** 
 (-0.778) (-0.596) (-0.254) (-0.306) (-1.138) (-4.411) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 699 699 695 695 696 694 









Panel E: Employee Ownership and CSR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RULE OF LAW CORRUPTION COMPETITION STOCK MARKET INDIVIDUALISM PRESS 
CONNECTED 3.694** 2.359* 10.143*** 6.276*** 1.013 3.933** 
 (2.251) (1.767) (2.830) (2.605) (0.527) (2.429) 
INSTITUTIONS 10.623*** 7.100*** 2.649* 1.764 0.212** 0.534*** 
 (4.956) (3.891) (1.713) (1.457) (2.350) (5.805) 
INSTITUTIONS* EMPLOYEES -2.619** -1.630* -1.571*** -1.065*** -0.018 -0.055** 
 (-2.515) (-1.922) (-2.870) (-2.646) (-0.598) (-2.376) 
SIZE 8.322*** 8.360*** 7.427*** 7.677*** 7.344*** 8.459*** 
 (10.912) (11.360) (9.477) (8.626) (7.935) (10.864) 
AGE 3.547 4.073 6.985** 7.716** 6.869** 4.492* 
 (1.417) (1.618) (2.481) (2.205) (2.265) (1.764) 
LEV 7.060 8.021 10.233 12.182 4.984 -0.879 
 (0.704) (0.756) (0.880) (1.083) (0.476) (-0.103) 
ROA -8.482 -11.320 -19.037 -18.209 -6.852 10.169 
 (-0.430) (-0.545) (-0.840) (-0.826) (-0.345) (0.636) 
RDS -36.544 -31.590 -32.838 -30.783 -62.862** -39.231 
 (-1.189) (-1.028) (-1.025) (-0.995) (-2.534) (-1.494) 
Constant -42.579*** -38.401*** -44.025*** -43.689*** -9.691 -47.568*** 
 (-5.592) (-4.954) (-3.513) (-4.323) (-0.839) (-3.719) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 704 704 700 700 701 699 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.376 0.347 0.339 0.357 0.436 
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Table 3.7 Financial Outcomes of CSR in NPFs 
Panel A: Firm Value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 STATE CONTROL CONNECTED FOREIGN EMPLOYEES 
OWNERSHIP -0.010*** -0.292 -0.372 -0.000 -0.064* 
 (-2.988) (-1.049) (-1.346) (-0.043) (-1.681) 
PCSR 0.014** 0.272* 0.232 0.119 0.056 
 (2.040) (1.724) (1.293) (0.940) (0.482) 
OWNERSHIP *PCSR 0.140*** 6.656** 7.159** -0.040 0.935* 
 (3.022) (1.981) (2.141) (-0.399) (1.813) 
SIZE -0.205*** -2.332* -2.005 -1.050 -0.540 
 (-3.479) (-1.782) (-1.341) (-1.000) (-0.559) 
AGE -0.279*** -1.320** -1.152 -0.710 -0.437 
 (-3.233) (-1.971) (-1.608) (-1.239) (-0.846) 
LEV 0.105 -1.922 -1.617 -0.706 -0.219 
 (0.446) (-1.519) (-1.077) (-0.745) (-0.244) 
ROA 6.292*** 7.555*** 7.477*** 6.815*** 6.564*** 
 (4.155) (4.553) (5.219) (4.039) (4.067) 
RDS 2.300 10.985* 9.660 5.662 3.734 
 (1.507) (1.855) (1.449) (1.209) (0.833) 
RULE OF LAW -0.198** -2.681* -2.304 -1.151 -0.573 
 (-2.127) (-1.769) (-1.321) (-0.957) (-0.518) 
Constant 3.409*** 11.751** 10.429* 6.568 4.496 
 (8.868) (2.175) (1.735) (1.458) (1.111) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 707 707 699 704 704 
Adjusted R2 0.555 0.553 0.559 0.553 0.549 
This table reports regression results of firm performance on ownership, predicted CSR (PCSR), and the 
interaction between ownership and predicted CSR in NPFs. The sample comprises 781 observations 
representing 175 unique privatized firms from 41 countries over the period 2002-2010. The dependent 
variable is MTB in Panel A, and COE in Panel B. PCSR is predicted using the control variables and fixed 
effects in Table 3.4. OWNERSHIP *PCSR is divided by 1000. Definitions and data sources for the 
variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering 
by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 






Panel B: Cost of Equity Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 STATE CONTROL CONNECTED FOREIGN EMPLOYEES 
OWNERSHIP 0.001*** 0.031* 0.034** 0.000 -0.000 
 (3.050) (1.941) (2.275) (0.263) (-0.018) 
PCSR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.650) (0.778) (0.669) (0.262) (0.176) 
OWNERSHIP *PCSR -0.008*** -0.365* -0.444** 0.001 0.018 
 (-3.302) (-1.783) (-2.195) (0.137) (0.286) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.146) (-0.375) (-0.272) (0.049) (-0.021) 
LEV -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
 (-0.472) (-0.583) (-0.599) (-0.649) (-0.701) 
ROA -0.075** -0.076** -0.078** -0.075** -0.079** 
 (-2.493) (-2.584) (-2.469) (-2.269) (-2.567) 
LTG 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.668) (4.524) (4.595) (5.428) (5.030) 
DISP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.346) (1.268) (1.233) (1.225) (1.252) 
RULE OF LAW 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.111) (-0.151) (-0.049) (0.032) (0.151) 
Constant 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.100*** 
 (4.084) (4.812) (4.409) (4.263) (4.497) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 591 591 584 589 589 







Table 3.8 Social Performance of NPFs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 













PRIVATIZED 3.211* 2.686 5.644*** 2.638 1.733 4.523** 2.007 
 (1.858) (1.580) (3.406) (1.549) (1.118) (2.267) (1.343) 
SIZE 8.487*** 8.748*** 6.074*** 8.128*** 6.849*** 6.698*** 7.966*** 
 (20.348) (18.601) (16.631) (21.009) (18.606) (15.947) (20.620) 
AGE 3.211*** 3.387*** 2.230*** 2.120** 3.875*** 1.830* 2.103** 
 (3.498) (3.678) (2.680) (2.136) (3.506) (1.684) (2.266) 
LEV -5.722* 0.121 2.083 1.067 1.953 -0.627 -1.217 
 (-1.860) (0.036) (0.736) (0.286) (0.627) (-0.168) (-0.384) 
ROA 15.367** 26.929*** 31.056*** 12.366** 24.919*** 6.487 20.402*** 
 (2.090) (4.033) (5.803) (1.981) (4.319) (1.059) (2.734) 
RDS 43.608** 61.692*** 53.020*** 58.861*** 20.009 23.996 47.802*** 
 (2.411) (3.697) (3.772) (3.214) (1.147) (1.445) (2.673) 
Constant -22.423** -43.452*** -13.381 -26.805*** -17.056** -18.389 -17.366** 
 (-2.400) (-8.426) (-0.720) (-3.771) (-2.112) (-1.093) (-1.972) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 10,502 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.294 0.320 0.342 0.368 0.217 0.335 
This table reports regression results of social performance on privatization. The dependent variables are the following components of social performance: (1) 
COMMUNITY, (2) DIVERSITY & OPPORTUNITY, (3) EMPLOYMENT QUALITY, (4) HUMAN RIGHTS, (5) HEALTH & SAFETY, (6) PRODUCT 
RESPONSIBILITY, and (7) TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-level control 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions control firm-level variables and country, industry and year fixed effects. Robust t-










Table 3.9 Privatization and CSR: Fully versus Partially Privatized Firms 
Panel A: Univariate Tests 




Partially NPFs 0-50 Partially NPFs >=50 Other Publicly Listed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















































































































































 (2) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) (2) vs. (5) (4) vs. (5) (2) vs. (6) 
Mean(t-statistics) 
CSR -3.202*** -3.767*** -1.038 1.923* 6.626*** 
EP -2.495*** -2.741*** -1.031 1.177 5.088*** 
SP -3.441*** -4.221*** -0.904 2.396** 7.218*** 
SIZE -4.621*** -3.594*** -3.880*** -0.831 5.154*** 
AGE 0.62 -2.854*** 5.048*** 7.932*** -5.424*** 
LEV  4.552*** 4.063*** 3.044*** -0.189 8.770*** 
ROA 0.067 0.554 -0.6882 -1.033 3.006*** 





Panel B: Regressions Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CSR EP SP 
PARTIALLY PRIVATIZED 5.338** 4.283* 6.393** 
 (2.077) (1.690) (2.123) 
SIZE 7.813*** 7.716*** 7.910*** 
 (8.209) (8.628) (6.354) 
AGE 1.874 -2.567 6.316* 
 (0.645) (-0.832) (1.711) 
LEV -13.746* -13.279 -14.213 
 (-1.716) (-1.510) (-1.585) 
ROA 6.464 -9.556 22.484 
 (0.330) (-0.593) (0.821) 
RDS -37.906** -47.934* -27.878 
 (-1.988) (-1.698) (-0.984) 
Constant 41.064*** 41.306*** 40.822*** 
 (3.763) (5.209) (2.647) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 707 707 707 
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.532 0.440 
This table compares CSR performance between fully privatized firms and partial privatized firms. Panel 
A presents univariate tests of differences across fully privatized firms, partial privatized firms, partially 
privatized firms with state ownership between 0 and 50%, partially privatized firms with the state 
ownership larger than 50%, and other publicly listed firms. Panel B presents regression results of CSR 
performance on partial privatization. PARTIALLY PRIVATIZED is a dummy variable equal to 1 if state 
ownership is not zero. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-
level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 3.10 Privatization and CSR: The Role of Industry 
  





 Sin Stocks 
 Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
PRIVATIZED 6.956*** 2.338  -3.472 6.309***  5.681 5.078*** 
 (2.669) (1.416)  (-1.112) (3.790)  (0.699) (3.427) 
SIZE 8.886*** 10.938***  9.061*** 9.540***  11.723*** 9.589*** 
 (19.171) (21.871)  (5.314) (25.018)  (3.813) (25.260) 
AGE 4.258*** 3.573***  -0.179 4.414***  -4.493 4.230*** 
 (3.472) (2.906)  (-0.059) (4.594)  (-0.627) (4.749) 
LEV 1.722 -1.408  14.407 2.593  -5.652 3.072 
 (0.419) (-0.316)  (0.821) (0.769)  (-0.467) (0.945) 
ROA 32.196*** 8.638  9.632 21.483***  73.844** 19.523*** 
 (3.579) (1.119)  (0.375) (3.086)  (2.182) (2.757) 
RDS 96.096** 48.211***  -4.909 47.598***  464.347 48.144*** 
 (2.042) (2.917)  (-0.090) (2.765)  (1.074) (2.870) 
Constant -43.156*** -78.930***  -26.494* -50.682***  -58.243** -62.857*** 
 (-5.436) (-9.291)  (-1.715) (-12.973)  (-2.540) (-9.179) 
Country FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,652 4,850  734 9,768  234 10,268 
Adjusted R2 0.475 0.421  0.370 0.448  0.674 0.446 
This table reports the regression results of privatization and CSR by industry groups. The dependent 
variable is CSR performance. High consumer-sensitivity industries are consumer goods and financial 
services industries; other industries are classified as low consumer-sensitivity industries. Pollution-
intensive industries include: iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial chemical, petroleum refineries, 
nonmetallic mineral production, and pulp and paper. Sin stocks include alcohol, tobacco, and gaming 
stocks. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-level control 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions control for country, industry, and 
year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.11 Privatization and CSR: Endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 First Stage 2SLS Heckman 
PRIVATIZED  16.427*** 18.671** 
  (3.442) (2.108) 
LEFT POWER 0.780***   
 (9.717)   
SIZE 0.208*** 5.308*** 8.299*** 
 (15.689) (5.420) (18.689) 
AGE -0.271*** 9.722*** 4.918*** 
 (-7.878) (8.001) (4.206) 
LEV 0.553*** 5.741 14.895*** 
 (3.853) (1.107) (4.028) 
ROA 1.678*** 1.223 31.305*** 
 (4.699) (0.107) (3.420) 
RDS 3.187*** 17.835 62.628*** 
 (3.261) (0.847) (3.559) 
λ   -7.659* 
   (-1.667) 
Constant -4.416*** 52.067*** -31.195*** 
 (-20.490) (2.663) (-7.158) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,502 10,502 10,502 
Adjusted R2 0.2218 0.341 0.331 
This table reports results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and Heckman sample selection analyses that 
address endogeneity of privatization decisions. Column 1 reports results from the first-stage regression. 
The instrument is LEFT POWER. Columns 2 and 3 present second-stage results of the 2SLS and Heckman 
models, respectively. Definitions and data sources for the variables are provided in Appendix C. All firm-
level control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions control for industry 
and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in 




CROSS-LISTING AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
4.1. Introduction 
An extensive literature documents the benefits that non-US firms derive from cross-listing 
in U.S. stock markets. 30  Compared with their domestic peers, cross-listed firms have 
increased access to capital (e.g., Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 2005), a broader shareholder 
base and greater stock liquidity (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999), a more transparent 
information environment (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004), and better corporate 
governance (e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002). However, no study to date explores the 
social impact of cross-listing. As Karolyi (2012) notes, “This is surprising given the 
preponderance of evidence of the broader consequences from improved governance 
practices available in the Finance literature”. In this essay we address this void in the 
literature by examining the dynamics of cross-listing and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Particularly, we investigate whether and how cross-listing influences firms’ CSR 
performance. 
CSR is corporate social or environmental behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirements faced by the company (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). CSR 
has become an important business practice in recent years. For instance, a recent survey by 
consulting firm EPG (2015) shows that the annual average spent on CSR by Fortune Global 
                                                          
30 See Karolyi (2012) for a recent survey of cross-listing studies. 
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500 companies is over $19.9 billion in 2011-2013, and a study by KPMG (2013) 
documents that 93 percent of the world’s largest 250 companies now report their CSR 
investments either in standalone reports or as part of their annual financial reports. Further, 
Nielsen’s 2014 global survey on CSR shows that more than two-thirds (67%) of 
respondents prefer to work for a socially responsible company, and more than half (55%) 
are willing to pay extra for products and services from companies that are committed to a 
positive social and environmental impact.  
There are two views of CSR in the literature. The negative view holds that CSR 
investment signals the presence of agency problems in a firm (Friedman, 1970). The 
rationale behind this view is that insiders (managers or controlling shareholders) invest in 
CSR activities only to enhance their reputation and careers at the expense of shareholders 
(Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). The negative view of CSR therefore 
suggests that CSR performance is likely to be lower in cross-listed companies, because the 
increase in monitoring after cross-listing (e.g., Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999; Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004) decreases the private benefits that 
insiders can derive from CSR activities.  
The positive view of CSR, in contrast, considers CSR as a strategic tool that can be 
used to address stakeholder concerns and maximize shareholder wealth (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2010). In line with this view, prior work shows that superior CSR performance is 
associated with larger abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakaş and Li, 2014), lower 
idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009), a lower likelihood of financial distress (e.g., 
Goss, 2009), reduced cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ng and Rezaee, 2015), 
higher levels of government subsidies (Lin et al., 2015) and greater access to finance (e.g., 
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Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014). Based on this view of CSR, the tighter corporate 
governance that follows cross-listing induces managers to boost CSR investment to 
increase the firm’s competitive advantage (Jo and Harjoto, 2012) and decrease its 
regulatory and litigation risk (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, 2002; Koh, Qian, and Wang, 
2014; Hong and Liskovich, 2015), all of which suggest that CSR performance is higher in 
cross-listed companies compared to their domestic counter-parts. 
To investigate the dynamics between cross-listing and CSR, we collect cross-listing 
data from the websites of the major depositaries of American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 
and we gather CSR data from Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4. Our sample comprises 11,594 
firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002-2011. Consistent with the 
positive view of CSR, we find that cross-listing is positively associated with CSR 
performance – i.e., foreign firms listed on U.S. stock markets have higher CSR 
performance than their non-cross-listed domestic counterparts. This positive relation holds 
for both components of CSR performance, namely, environmental performance and social 
performance,31 and for all four ADR program types.32  
A possible concern with our main analysis above is potential endogeneity of cross-
listing decisions, as socially responsible firms may be more likely to cross-list. It is also 
possible that the cross-listing decision and CSR engagement are both affected by common 
(omitted) firm characteristics. To address these concerns, we employ two-stage least 
                                                          
31 The environmental performance component of CSR measures a company’s impact on living and non-living 
natural systems including air, land, and water, as well as complete eco-systems. The social performance 
component of CSR measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, 
customers, and society through the use of best management practices (ASSET4, Thomson Reuters). 
32 Foreign firms cross-list in the U.S. through one of four ADR programs (Level I, Level II, Level III, and 
Rule144A), which are associated with different regulatory requirements and capital-raising capacity. We 
explore the differences between these programs in more detail below. 
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squares (2SLS) estimation, a Heckman selection model, and propensity score matching 
(PSM). The results using all three approaches provide additional evidence of a positive 
relation between cross-listing and CSR. To further ensure that the increase in CSR 
performance is indeed due to cross-listing, and to mitigate self-selection concerns, we 
examine the dynamics (change) in CSR performance around cross-listing and delisting 
events for the sub-sample of cross-listed firms. We find that CSR increases (decreases) 
significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) the U.S. market. We also observe that 
CSR performance increases with the number of years since cross-listing. These findings 
enhance our confidence that the increase in foreign firms’ CSR performance is indeed due 
to cross-listing in the U.S. 
To deepen our analysis, we next examine several factors likely to condition the 
relation between cross-listing and CSR. We first investigate the effect of home country 
institutions on the CSR performance of cross-listed firms. We find that the positive impact 
of cross-listing on CSR performance is larger for firms from countries with weaker 
institutions. This result is consistent with the bonding theory of cross-listing, holding that 
firms from countries with weak institutions benefit more from cross-listing in the U.S. 
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). We also investigate the 
effect of cross-listing in venues other than the U.S. and find no significant impact of these 
cross-listings on CSR performance, suggesting that U.S. markets subject cross-listed firms 
to a relatively stronger regulatory and monitoring environment (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2009). To directly test the litigation risk explanation, we investigate the CSR performance 
of cross-listed foreign firms that operate in industries with higher litigation risk. If these 
firms invest in CSR to reduce the costs of litigation (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014; Hong 
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and Liskovich, 2015), we expect to observe higher CSR performance in industries that face 
higher litigation risk. The results are in line with our expectation.  
Finally, we examine the value implications of the CSR performance improvement 
associated with cross-listing. Providing further support for the positive view of CSR, we 
find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher valuation. In other 
words, a channel that allows cross-listed firms to achieve higher valuation is through 
improved CSR performance post- cross-listing.  
This essay contributes to three strands of literature using a unified framework. First, 
our results add to the literature on cross-listing by providing the first evidence, to the best 
of our knowledge, on the social impact33 of listing on foreign markets and the dynamics of 
cross-listing and CSR. In particular, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR 
performance than their non-cross-listed domestic peers. This result extends prior literature 
providing evidence that cross-listing improves firms’ financial performance by showing 
that cross-listing also improves firms’ social performance. Our results also contribute to 
this literature by providing support for the bonding hypothesis (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004), which posits that cross-listing increases CSR 
performance through improved corporate governance, and by showing that firms’ social 
performance is larger for cross-listed firms in industries with higher litigation risk and from 
countries with weaker institutions. Second, we add to the literature on CSR by providing 
support for the positive view of CSR in an international setting as we focus on foreign 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. We document that investors place higher value on cross-listed 
firms with higher CSR performance. Third, we provide additional insights on the link 
                                                          
33 It is captured here by the social responsibility of cross-listed firms. 
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between firm-level CSR performance and country-level institutions (Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) by showing that a change in the 
institutional setting (rather than the prevailing state) can materially affect firms’ CSR 
performance. This result suggests that convergence in corporate governance as well as CSR 
practices can be made possible by cross-listing in U.S. markets.  
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related 
literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data and variables, and 
provides the descriptive sample statistics. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 
concludes the essay.  
 
4.2. Related Literature and Hypotheses  
4.2.1. Cross-listing and bonding theory 
The bonding theory of cross-listing (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999) holds that 
cross-listing “bonds” managers and controlling shareholders, as it subjects them to a stricter 
legal and regulatory environment and thus makes it harder for them to extract private 
benefits.34 This in turn is likely to ease firms’ access to external financing. Coffee (2002) 
highlights three mechanisms through which cross-listing can enhance investor protection: 
(1) the enforcement powers of the SEC, (2) the threat of shareholder litigation, and (3) the 
information disclosure requirements of the SEC as well as the reconciliation of financial 
statements with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (for exchange 
listings).  
                                                          
34 The theoretical literature on cross-listing proposes numerous explanations for why firms choose to cross-
list in U.S. stock markets. However, as we discuss below, the bonding theory has received empirical support 




Several empirical studies find support for the bonding hypothesis. For instance, 
Reese and Weisbach (2002) show that foreign firms listing in the U.S. increase equity 
issues after cross-listing, especially firms originating from countries with weak investor 
protection. Similarly, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find that cross-listed firms enjoy 
a premium of 16.5% compared to their domestic peers, with this premium higher for firms 
that list on major U.S. exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor rights. 
Doidge (2004) further shows that the voting premiums of dual-class shares in cross-listed 
firms decline substantially following cross-listing. More recently, King and Segal (2009) 
show that better investor protection is the main driver of firms’ value premium in the long 
run. Taken together, this evidence suggests that controlling shareholders and managers in 
cross-listed firms face increased monitoring and are less likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders after listing in U.S. markets. As a result, these firms exhibit better corporate 
governance and are valued more highly by investors. 
The implications of the bonding theory of cross-listing on CSR performance 
depends on whether CSR is taken to be value-increasing (the positive view of CSR) or a 
signal of agency problems (the negative view of CSR), as we discuss below. 
4.2.2. The negative view of CSR 
From an agency perspective, CSR reflects agency problems in the firm (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2010). In his famous article in the New York Times, Friedman (1970) argues 
that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits”. Consistent with this view, Barnea and 
Rubin (2010) find that insider ownership is negatively related to a firm’s CSR rating, 
hinting that insiders overinvest in CSR to extract private benefits at the cost of shareholder 
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wealth. Similarly, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) observe negative relations between 
insider ownership and “firm goodness” and between improved governance and firm 
goodness, suggesting that the latter is an outcome of agency problems. Using an event 
study, Kruger (2015) shows that investors respond negatively to positive CSR news likely 
because CSR results from agency problems.  
The negative view of CSR suggests that foreign firms are likely to reduce CSR 
investment after cross-listing in the U.S., since the increase in monitoring associated with 
cross-listing will reduce insiders’ ability to expropriate minority shareholders through CSR 
investment. More formally: 
Hypothesis 1: Cross-listing is negatively associated with firms’ CSR performance. 
4.2.3. The positive view of CSR 
Although the direction of the relation between CSR and financial performance 
remains an open question (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein and 
Walsh, 2009), existing empirical studies generally find a positive impact of CSR on firm 
value.35 For instance, better CSR performance is shown to be related to larger abnormal 
stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakaş and Li, 2014), lower idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and 
Faff, 2009), reduced risk of financial distress (e.g., Goss, 2009), lower cost of capital (e.g., 
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ng and Rezaee, 2015), greater government subsidies (Lin et al., 
2015) and improved access to finance (e.g., Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014). 
According to this “doing well by doing good” view of CSR, the strategic use of CSR can 
serve stakeholders’ interests and maximize shareholder wealth.  
                                                          
35 See Malik (2015) for a literature review on the value-increasing role of CSR. 
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This positive view of CSR suggests that cross-listing may increase CSR 
performance through two mechanisms: (i) improved corporate governance and (ii) greater 
exposure to litigation risk. First, recent empirical evidence shows that reduced agency 
problems (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2014) and better corporate governance (Harjoto 
and Jo, 2011) lead to better CSR performance. Since cross-listed firms’ corporate 
governance tends to improve after listing in the U.S. (i.e., the bonding theory), we expect 
them to have higher CSR performance. Second, foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. face 
increased litigation risk because the U.S. has a much more litigious environment than other 
countries (Coffee 2002; Lowry and Shu, 2002). As argued by Koh, Qian and Wang (2014), 
CSR can be used as a risk management tool to reduce this litigation risk. Indeed, Hong and 
Liskovich (2015) argue for instance that CSR can even help insure against unfavorable 
regulation through a halo effect, whereby one’s judgment of another character is influenced 
by one’s overall (and usually first) impression. Accordingly, we expect cross-listed firms 
to increase CSR activities to mitigate their increased exposure to litigation risk in U.S. 
markets. 
In sum, the above arguments suggest that cross-listing is positively associated with 
CSR performance. More formally: 




To construct our sample, we start by collecting data from several sources. We 
obtain cross-listing information (type of ADR, effective issuance date, termination date, 
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underlying share, and country of origin) from the websites36 of the major depositaries of 
ADRs: the Bank of New York, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and J.P. Morgan. A firm may 
appear in the dataset several times because of name changes, upgrades, or downgrades. We 
consider each of these firms only once, manually checking the cross-listing dates. We 
exclude firms that have more than one type of ADR (Level I, Level II, Level III, and Rule 
144a), which allows us to compare CSR performance across ADR types. CSR data come 
from Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4, which provides environmental, social, and governance 
information on over 3,400 firms around the world as of 2002. This information is collected 
from publicly available sources (e.g., annual reports, NGO websites, CSR reports) and is 
updated biweekly. Firm-level financial data come from the Compustat Global database. 
After collecting the above data, we merge our sample of cross-listed firms with the 
CSR data, and then match the resulting dataset with the financial data. After eliminating 
cross-listed firms with missing CSR and financial information, our final sample consists of 
11,594 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002-2011.  
4.3.2. Variables 
4.3.2.1. CSR variables 
Following Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), we construct our primary measure of a 
firm’s CSR performance, CSR, as the average of the firm’s environmental performance 
(EP) and social performance (SP) scores. A firm’s environmental performance score 
captures the company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, 
land, and water, and is based on the firm’s energy use, CO2 emissions, waste recycling, etc. 
A firm’s social performance score measures the company’s capacity to generate trust and 
                                                          
36  The respective websites are as follows: http://www.adrbnymellon.com/, https://wwss.citissb.com/adr, 
https://www.adr.db.com/, and https://www.adr.com/. 
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loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society and is based on factors such as employee 
turnover, injury rate, training hours, percentage of female employees, and the amount 
donated to charitable organizations. 
4.3.2.2. Cross-listing variables 
Based on cross-listing effective and termination dates, we construct the dummy 
variable CROSS-LISTING to indicate whether a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in a given 
year. To compare the impacts of different ADR types, we also construct dummy variables 
for each ADR type. Rule 144a ADRs are initially sold as a private placement and traded 
through Automated Linkages (PORTAL) among Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs). 
Level I ADRs are traded over the counter (OTC). Level II and Level III ADRs can be 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), or the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX). The four programs are quite distinct. In terms of governance and disclosure 
requirements, Level II and Level III ADRs are more restrictive than Level I and Rule 144a 
ADRs. With respect to capital raising, Level III and Rule 144a ADRs offer access to 
primary U.S. capital markets, while Level I and Level II ADRs only provide access to 
secondary U.S. capital markets. In addition, Level I, II, and III ADRs are open to public 
and private investors, while Rule 144a ADRs are mainly available to private institutional 
investors.  
4.3.2.3. Firm-level control variables 
We include a number of firm-level variables in our analyses to control for various 
factors that may affect CSR performance. In particular, we include proxies for firm size 
(SIZE), the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US, firm age (AGE), is the logarithm 
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of the difference between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available 
accounting data, sales growth (SGR), the annual growth in sales, return on assets (ROA), 
the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets, leverage (LEV), the ratio 
of total debt to total assets, and R&D expenditures (RDS), the ratio of research and 
development expenses to total sales. To mitigate the impact of outliers, we winsorize all 
financial variables at the 1% and 99% levels. In addition to these firm-level variables, we 
control for country, industry, and year fixed effects in all of our regressions. 
4.3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 summarizes the sample composition. Of the full sample of 11,594 firm-
year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002-2011, there are 5,084 ADR 
observations, of which 4,010 are Level I, 547 are Level II, 302 are Level III, and 224 are 
Rule 144a ADRs. Panel A breaks this composition down by country. We find that the 
number of observations varies considerably across countries. For instance, Hungary, 
Panama, and Sri Lanka have the fewest observations at 2, while Japan has the most at 
2,513. The number of ADR observations also shows considerable variation across 
countries. Six of our sample countries (Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
and UAE) do not have firms listed in the U.S. that meet our data requirements, while five 
of the sample countries (Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Kazakhstan, and Peru) lack 
observations on non-cross-listed firms. Panel B summarizes the sample distribution by 
industry using Fama and French’s (1997) 12-industry classification. Apart from Others, 
Finance has the fewest ADR observations at 10 while Manufacturing has the most at 911. 
Panel C summarizes the sample composition by fiscal year. In general, the number of 
observations in each category is increasing every year. 
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Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics (and a correlation matrix for our main 
regression variables. In Panel A we see that CSR performance (CSR) ranges between 6.555 
and 97.815, with an average of 56.333 and a standard deviation of 29.063, which points to 
considerable variation in CSR performance. The mean CROSS-LISTING is 0.439, implying 
that 43.9% of observations correspond to cross-listings. In Panel B we see that CSR 
performance is positively related to the cross-listing indicator, which means that cross-
listed firms tend to have higher CSR performance. Since the correlation coefficients 
between the key variables of interest are low, multicollinearity is not likely to be driving 
our regression results. 
Table 4.3 presents results on differences in means and medians between cross-
listing and non-cross-listing observations. We find that mean and median CSR 
performance are higher for cross-listing than non-cross-listing observations. These results 
support the preliminary evidence in Table 4.2 that cross-listed firms tend to have better 
CSR performance. However, these tests do not control for other variables that could affect 
CSR. We conduct multivariate analysis next.  
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Cross-listing vs. non-cross-listing 
To test our hypotheses, we start by examining the following specification: 
𝐶𝑆𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑅0𝑆𝑆_𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀,        (1) 
where CSR is a firm’s CSR performance, CROSS-LISTING is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in a given year, Controls is a vector that 
contains the firm-level control variables (SIZE, AGE, SGR, ROA, LEV, and RDS), and 
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Fixed Effects is a vector that includes the country, industry, and year fixed effects. In each 
regression, we follow Petersen (2009) and cluster standard errors by firm and year.  
The regression results for specification (1) are reported in Table 4.4. In the first 
column of Table 4.4, the dependent variable is CSR, the average of a firm’s environmental 
and social performance scores. The estimated coefficient on CROSS_LISTING is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that in line with the positive view of CSR 
(Hypothesis 1), cross-listed firms have greater CSR performance than non-cross-listed 
firms. This result is also economically significant: the coefficient on CROSS_LISTING is 
7.980, which together with the average CSR score of 56.333 (Table 4.2, Panel A) implies 
that on average CSR performance is 14.2% higher (from 56.333 to 64.313) for cross-listed 
firms than non-cross-listed firms. Turning to the firm-level control variables, the results 
show that firm size, age, return on assets, and R&D expenses are positively associated with 
CSR performance, while sales growth and leverage are negatively related to CSR 
performance. 
In Columns 2 to 4 of Table 4.4, we address potential endogeneity of the cross-listing 
decision. Firms with better CSR performance could be more likely to cross-list, which 
would introduce selection bias in our estimate of the cross-listing-CSR relation. It is also 
possible that cross-listing and CSR performance are both driven by omitted firm 
characteristics, which would drive the documented relation. We address these concerns 
using three approaches.  
We first employ two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the first-stage estimation, we 
specify a Probit model to estimate a firm’s decision to cross-list as a function of firm 
characteristics and country characteristics. Following prior literature (Doidge, Karolyi, and 
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Stulz, 2004; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), we include the disclosure requirements index 
and the anti-self-dealing index as instrumental variables, along with all firm-level control 
variables in our main regression. The disclosure requirements index comes from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006), while the anti-self-dealing index comes from 
Djankov et al. (2008). The F-test in the first stage is positive and significant (F=368.268, 
p<0.001), indicating that the instrumental variables are significantly related to the cross-
listing decision and hence are not weak instrument. 37  The overidentificantion test 
(χ2=0.195, p=0.6588) also suggests that the instruments are valid. In the second stage, we 
estimate our main regression specification (1), that is, we regress CSR on CROSS-LISTING 
and the full set of control variables. Column 2 reports the second-stage regression results. 
The coefficient on CROSS_LISTING is positive and significant at the 1% level, which 
confirms our finding above that cross-listed firms are associated with higher CSR 
performance.  
Next, we employ the Heckman (1979) selection model. In the first stage of the 
Heckman model, we conduct the same estimation as the 2SLS approach. We then use the 
estimated cross-listing probabilities to construct the inverse Mills’ ratio (λ), a correction 
for self-selection. Finally, in the second stage of the Heckman model, we regress CSR 
performance on λ, the estimated cross-listing probabilities, and the full set of control 
variables. The results are presented in Column 3 of Table 4.4. We continue to observe that 
cross-listed firms have better CSR performance. 
Our third approach to addressing potential endogeneity is the propensity score 
matching (PSM) procedure proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We start by 
                                                          
37 Results of the first-stage Probit model are available upon request. 
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estimating propensity scores using a Probit model, where the dependent variable is cross-
listing and the explanatory variables are the usual firm-level control variables in addition 
to the disclosure requirements index and the anti-self-dealing index. We then match each 
cross-listed firm with the non-cross-listed firm that has the closet score to the cross-listed 
firm, and we conduct the regression analysis using the matched sample. The results, 
reported in Column 4 of Table 4.4, show that the impact of cross-listing on CSR 
performance remains significantly positive. Thus, even when we focus on non-cross-listed 
firms that have similar characteristics as cross-listed firms, we continue to find that cross-
listing is positively and significantly related to CSR performance at the 1% level. In sum, 
the results using all three approaches consistently suggest that the positive relation between 
cross-listing and CSR performance is robust to endogeneity concerns.  
We next examine whether our main result continues to hold when we separately 
consider the environmental and social components of CSR. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.4 
report results of regressing the environmental performance (EP) and social performance 
(SP) components of CSR, respectively, on cross-listing and the control variables. The 
coefficients on cross-listing are both positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent 
with our findings using overall CSR. Economically, on average cross-listed firms have 
10.1% higher environmental performance and 18.4% higher social performance than non-
cross-listed firms.38  
In additional analysis, we also examine whether the relation between cross-listing 
and CSR performance varies with the type of ADR program. As we discuss earlier, there 
are four types of ADRs: Level I, Level II, Level III, and Rule 144a. Rule 144a ADRs are 
                                                          
38 The average of EP is 57.522, and the average of SP is 55.145. 
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initially sold as a private placement, Level I ADRs are traded over the counter, and Level 
II and Level III ADRs can be traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. Column 7 of Table 
4.4 reports results of regressing CSR performance on proxies for the four types of ADRs 
in addition to the usual controls. In terms of overall CSR performance, all four types of 
ADRs take positive and significant coefficients.  
Taken together, the results in Table 4.4 support the positive view of CSR 
(Hypothesis 2). In particular, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance 
than non-cross-listed firms, and that this positive relation is robust to considering 
endogeneity concerns, the components of CSR, and ADR program types.  
4.4.2. Change in CSR performance around listing and delisting  
So far we compare the CSR performance of cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed 
firms. In this subsection, we focus on the dynamic effects of cross-listing on CSR 
performance in cross-listed firms. Analyzing the dynamics of this relation can further 
mitigate concerns that our results are driven by self-selection bias. If CSR performance 
changes because of improved corporate governance and greater exposure to litigation risk 
after cross-listing, we should observe an increase in CSR performance after cross-listing. 
To do so, we first analyze CSR performance in cross-listed firms before cross-
listing, after cross-listing, and after delisting (if any). Panel A of Table 4.5 reports the 
univariate results. The first six columns present results for the periods before and after 
cross-listing. Average (median) CSR performance increases by almost 25% (40%) from 
54.731 to 68.041 (56.358 to 78.875) after cross-listing, significant at the 1% level. The next 
three columns report results for the period after delisting (if any). Comparing the periods 
after cross-listing and delisting, we observe a decrease in CSR performance, significant at 
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the 1% level, with average (median) CSR performance decreasing from 68.041 (78.875) 
after cross-listing to 57.806 (55.665) after delisting. These results support the view that 
cross-listing in the U.S. helps improve CSR performance. 
We next examine the dynamic impacts of cross-listing through regression analysis. 
Specifically, for the sample of cross-listed firms, we regress the overall CSR variable on 
the cross-listing dummies Years 1-2 before cross-listing, Year of cross-listing, Years 1-2 
after cross-listing, …, and Years 9+ after cross-listing along with the usual control 
variables. The regression results are reported in the first column of Panel B of Table 4.5. 
The coefficient on Years 1-2 before cross-listing is insignificant, implying that our results 
are not driven by a pre-listing trend. In contrast, the cross-listing year and post-cross-listing 
year dummies are all significantly positive, suggesting that CSR performance is increasing 
after cross-listing. Notably, the magnitude of the performance increase rises over time, 
except for the period 5 to 6 years after cross-listing. To present further evidence on this 
result, we allow the effect of cross-listing on CSR performance to grow linearly over time 
by regressing CSR performance on the variable Years since cross-listing, which equals 
zero before cross-listing and the number of years after cross-listing otherwise, and the 
controls. The results, reported in the second column of Panel B of Table 4.5, reveal a 
positive and significant effect on CSR performance, which suggests that the effect of cross-
listing on firms’ CSR performance is indeed increasing over time. 
In summary, we find that firms’ CSR performance increases following cross-
listing, which alleviates concerns about potential self-selection bias. Moreover, we find 





4.4.3. Do home country institutions matter? 
In this subsection, we examine whether home country institutions influence the 
improvements in CSR performance for cross-listed firms. If the increase in CSR 
performance comes from improved corporate governance through U.S. cross-listing, the 
effect of U.S cross-listing should be larger for firms that originate from countries with 
weaker institutions. To investigate this conjecture, we employ three proxies for home 
country institutions: COMMON, a dummy variable derived from La Porta et al. (1998) that 
indicates whether the home country is a common law country; ANTI-SELF-DEALING, the 
anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008); and FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, a proxy 
for financial system development that is defined as stock market capitalization to GDP 
divided by bank credit to GDP (Beck and Levine, 2002) and is constructed using the 
Financial Development and Structure Dataset from the World Bank. 
Table 4.6 reports results of regressing overall CSR performance on cross-listing, 
one of the three proxies for home country institutions, the interaction between cross-listing 
and the proxy for home country institutions, and the control variables. The coefficients on 
cross-listing are positive and significant in each specification, consistent with our main 
results. The coefficients on all of the home country institution proxies are also positive and 
significant, suggesting that stronger home country institutions lead to better CSR 
performance. More importantly for our purposes, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
are all negative and significant at the 1% level. This result implies that for firms from 
countries with weaker institutions, U.S cross-listing offers a stricter institutional 
environment and hence improvements in corporate governance and in turn CSR 
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performance are larger. These results are consistent with prior literature showing that firms 
from countries with weak institutions benefit more from U.S. cross-listing (Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004).   
4.4.4. Does the listing venue matter? 
Prior literature suggests that the U.S. provides a stronger institutional environment 
than other cross-listing destinations (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2009). To shed more light 
on our results above, we examine whether the effect of cross-listing on CSR performance 
varies with the listing venue. To do so, we first collect international exchange information 
from Compustat. Some firms are cross-listing both in the U.S. and other destinations. We 
only consider firms that are not simultaneously cross-listed in the U.S. We then merge 
these firms with our current sample. Panel A of Table 4.7 summarizes the sample of firms 
cross-listed in destinations other than the U.S. that meet our data requirements. As can be 
seen, we have 453 firm-year observations cross-listed in 19 countries. Next, we create the 
dummy variable CL_NUS, which equals one if a firm is cross-listed outside the U.S., and 
zero otherwise. Finally, we regress the overall CSR variable on CL_NUS and the control 
variables. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.7. Column 1 reports regression 
results for the whole sample and Column 2 reports results after excluding firms 
simultaneously cross-listed in the U.S. In both columns the coefficients on CL_NUS are 
insignificant, suggesting that firms cross-listed in other countries do not observe better CSR 
performance than their domestic counterparts. This finding is consistent with prior cross-
listing literature showing that the U.S. provides the strongest monitoring environment and 
hence leads to the greatest performance improvements.  
4.4.5. Litigation risk and CSR performance 
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Cross-listing in the U.S. not only implies better monitoring and a lower cost of 
capital, but also an increased exposure to lawsuits given that the U.S. has a much more 
litigious environment than other countries (Lowry and Shu, 2002). However, to the extent 
that CSR serves an insurance mechanism that reduces litigation risk, CSR investment 
should be higher in firms that face greater litigation risk (Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014). To 
operationalize this conjecture in our context, we test whether CSR performance is higher 
for cross-listed firms operating in industries that face greater litigation risk. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Francis, Philbrick and Schipper, 1994; Koh, Qian, and Wang, 2014), we 
define LITIGATION RISK as a dummy that equals one for the following high litigation risk 
industries39: biotechnology, computer, electronics, and retailing. Table 4.8 reports results 
of regressing CSR on cross-listing, the industry dummy, the interaction between these two 
variables, and the controls. Consistent with our main results, the coefficients on cross-
listing remain positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on LITIGATION 
RISK is not significant, but its interaction with cross-listing (CROSS-LISTING * 
LITIGATION RISK) is positive and significant. This result is consistent with our 
expectation that cross-listed firms in high litigation risk industries are more likely to invest 
in CSR to reduce their exposure to a costly lawsuit.  
4.4.6. Investors’ valuation of CSR in cross-listed firms 
The analyses above consistently show that cross-listed firms have better CSR 
performance. Prior research suggests that firms with better CSR performance are valued 
more by investors, as CSR helps reduce firms’ risk (Lee and Faff, 2009; Koh, Qian, and 
Wang, 2014) and improve information quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Gao and Zhang, 
                                                          




2015; Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012). In this subsection, we empirically test whether cross-
listed firms observe a value benefit from better CSR performance. In Table 4.9, we examine 
the impact of CSR and cross-listing on firm value, as measured by the market-to book ratio 
(MTB). First, we examine the impact of cross-listing on firm value. The results are 
presented in the first column of Table 4.9. The coefficient on cross-listing is positive and 
significant, consistent with literature showing that there is a value premium to cross-listing. 
Second, we regress firm value on cross-listing, lagged CSR, their interaction, and the 
controls. The coefficients on cross-listing and CSR are insignificant, but the interaction 
between cross-listing and CSR is positive and significant at the 5% level, implying that 
cross-listed firms with better CSR performance are valued more highly by investors. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Despite a large literature on cross-listing, few studies investigate the social impact 
of cross-listing. Using 11,594 firm-year observations from 54 economies over the period 
2002-2011, we shed light on this relation using CSR performance as a proxy for the firm’s 
social impact. Consistent with the positive view of CSR, we find that cross-listing is 
positively associated with CSR performance. This positive relation is robust to endogeneity 
tests and holds across different types of ADRs. To further mitigate self-selection concerns, 
we examine changes in CSR performance among cross-listed firms and find that CSR 
increases significantly following cross-listing in, and decreases significantly after delisting 
from, the U.S. In addition, analysis of the dynamic effects of cross-listing on CSR 
performance suggest that our results are not driven by a pre-listing trend and that the 
improvement in CSR performance increases with the number of years since cross-listing.  
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We further find that the positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is 
larger for firms from countries with weaker institutions, consistent with bonding theory, 
which holds that firms from countries with weak institutions benefit more from cross-
listing in the U.S. (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). When 
we examine the effect of cross-listing in other destinations, we observe no significant 
impact on CSR performance, confirming that U.S. markets provide the strongest 
monitoring environment for cross-listed firms (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2009). 
Moreover, we find that cross-listed firms in high litigation risk industries are more likely 
to invest in CSR, in line with our argument that cross-listed firms may use CSR to reduce 
their exposure to litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR 
performance are valued more by investors.  
Overall, this essay contributes to different strands of the literatures on cross-listing, 
CSR, and the impact of country-level institutions. With respect to the first line of research, 
we provide the first study to our knowledge to assess the social responsibility of cross-
listed firms. We find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than their peers. 
We thus add to this line of literature by showing that not only financial performance but 
also social performance can be improved by cross-listing. With respect to the second line 
of research, we provide support for the positive view of CSR. We show that improved 
corporate governance increases CSR performance, and that investors value CSR 
investments in cross-listed firms. With respect to the third line of research, we show that 




Table 4.1 Sample Composition 
 All ADR Type of ADR 
  0 1 Level I Level II Level III Rule 144A 
Full Sample 11,594 6,510 5,08
4 
4,010 547 302 224 
Panel A By Country 
Australia 791  489  302  257  20  10  15  
Austria 96  33  63  63  0  0  0  
Belgium 156  81  75  62  13  0  0  
Brazil 99  26  73  15  48  10  0  
Canada 1,178  1,177  1  0  1  0  0  
Chile 27  15  12  0  0  12  0  
China 107  54  53  37  0  14  2  
Colombia 3  0  3  0  3  0  0  
Cyprus 10  6  4  4  0  0  0  
Czech Republic 9  5  4  0  0  0  4  
Denmark 139  68  71  51  10  10  0  
Egypt 3  0  3  0  0  0  3  
Finland 201  93  108  96  0  10  2  
France 595  255  340  286  27  27  0  
Germany 495  222  273  239  34  0  0  
Greece 107  60  47  26  0  0  21  
Hong Kong 335  85  250  228  0  22  0  
Hungary 2  0  2  2  0  0  0  
India 111  69  42  0  7  8  27  
Indonesia 29  3  26  26  0  0  0  
Ireland 106  34  72  41  21  10  0  
Israel 32  7  25  11  4  10  0  
Italy 237  98  139  91  0  29  19  
Japan 2,513  1,408  1,10
5  
1,006  82  17  0  
Kazakhstan 3  0  3  0  0  0  3  
Korea 136  85  51  4  4  13  30  
Kuwait 3  3  0  0  0  0  0  
Luxembourg 48  22  26  10  16  0  0  
Malaysia 66  54  12  12  0  0  0  
Mexico 53  13  40  12  18  10  0  
Morocco 3  3  0  0  0  0  0  
Netherlands 215  80  135  105  10  20  0  
New Zealand 72  37  35  35  0  0  0  
Norway 152  52  100  93  0  7  0  
Panama 2  2  0  0  0  0  0  
Papua New Guinea 4  0  4  3  1  0  0  
Peru 3  0  3  0  0  3  0  
Philippines 13  6  7  4  3  0  0  
Poland 24  15  9  6  0  0  3  
Portugal 70  23  47  40  0  7  0  
Qatar 4  4  0  0  0  0  0  
Russia 76  9  67  18  0  3  46  
Saudi Arabia 15  15  0  0  0  0  0  
Singapore 171  68  103  99  4  0  0  
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South Africa 79  8  71  60  9  2  0  
Spain 288  170  118  106  2  10  0  
Sri Lanka 2  2  0  0  0  0  0  
Sweden 321  165  156  146  10  0  0  
Switzerland 371  222  149  101  33  15  0  
Taiwan 97  47  50  0  0  13  37  
Thailand 29  20  9  9  0  0  0  
Turkey 28  5  23  8  0  3  12  
UAE 14  14  0  0  0  0  0  
UK 1,851  1,078  773  598  167  7  0  
Panel B By Industry 
Business Equipment 1,020  553  467  317  78  43  29  
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
628 348 280 246 18 10 6 
Consumer Durables 489  200  289  227  28  10  24  
Consumer Non Durables 919 471 448 387 44 5 12 
Energy 785  461  324  196  33  51  44  
Finance 267  257  10  5  5  0  0  
Healthcare 564  274  290  172  68  47  3  
Manufacturing 1,844  933  911  779  80  24  28  
Telephone and 
Television Transmission 
650 287 363 205 59 79 20 
Utilities 579  295  284  217  32  14  21  
Wholesale, Retail, and 
Some Services 
1,189 742 447 416 15 2 14 
Others 2,660  1,689  971  843  87  17  23  
Panel C By Year 
2002 372  229  143  89  33  17  4  
2003 375  227  148  93  33  18  4  
2004 861  602  259  186  45  20  8  
2005 1,121  801  320  233  53  24  10  
2006 1,133  811  322  236  52  24  10  
2007 1,264  906  358  255  61  26  16  
2008 1,468  671  797  647  67  42  40  
2009 1,714  806  908  736  72  50  50  
2010 1,886  887  999  815  74  51  59  
2011 1,400  570  830  720  57  30  23  
This table shows the composition of the whole sample by country, industry, and year. The sample is 
composed of 11,594 firm-year observations from 54 economies over the period 2002-2011. The industry 







Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CSR 11,594  56.333  29.063  6.555  28.145  60.028  84.710  97.815  
CROSS_LISTING 11,594  0.439  0.496  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  
SIZE 11,594  8.529  1.483  1.687  7.540  8.447  9.476  13.537  
AGE 11,594  2.614  0.549  0.000  2.303  2.773  2.996  4.111  
SGR 11,594  0.105  0.273  -0.500  -0.014  0.062  0.170  1.568  
ROA 11,594  0.052  0.070  -0.198  0.019  0.045  0.081  0.288  
LEV 11,594  0.178  0.147  0.000  0.056  0.157  0.261  0.632  
RDS 11,594  0.018  0.041  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.019  0.232  
Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CSR (1) 1.000         
CROSS_LISTING (2) 0.356*** 1.000        
SIZE (3) 0.513*** 0.340*** 1.000       
AGE (4) 0.224*** 0.131*** 0.274*** 1.000      
SGR (5) -0.147*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.216*** 1.000     
ROA (6) -0.038*** -0.005  -0.138*** -0.101*** 0.183*** 1.000    
LEV (7) 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.166*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.200*** 1.000   
RDS (8) 0.106*** 0.135*** -0.027** 0.054*** -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.179*** 1.000  
This table provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the main regression variables. The sample comprises 11,594 firm-year observations from 54 
economies over the period 2002-2011. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental performance and social performance 
scores. CROSS-LISTING is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in a given year, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of total 
assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual 
sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the 
ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ***, **, and * denote statistical 









Table 4.3 Univariate Tests: Cross-listing versus Non-cross-listing Observations 
 All firms Cross-listing Non-cross-listing Differences 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean               
(t-statistics) 
Median                     
(z-statistics) 
CSR 11,594  56.333  60.028  5,084  68.041  78.875  6,510  47.190  43.873  41.020*** 39.076*** 
SIZE 11,594  8.529  8.447  5,084  9.100  9.055  6,510  8.082  8.011  38.976*** 37.951*** 
AGE 11,594  2.614  2.773  5,084  2.695  2.833  6,510  2.550  2.708  14.211*** 13.797*** 
SGR 11,594  0.105  0.062  5,084  0.076  0.050  6,510  0.128  0.077   -10.130*** -11.135*** 
ROA 11,594  0.052  0.045  5,084  0.052  0.045  6,510  0.052  0.045  -0.565 -0.442 
LEV 11,594  0.178  0.157  5,084  0.184  0.168  6,510  0.172  0.147  4.271***  7.291*** 
RDS 11,594  0.018  0.000  5,084  0.025  0.003  6,510  0.014  0.000  14.670*** 21.954*** 
This table reports results of univariate tests of differences between cross-listing and non-cross-listing observations. The sample comprises 11,594 firm-year 
observations from 54 economies over the period 2002-2011. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental performance 
and social performance scores. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year 
and the first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV 
is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are 









Table 4.4 Cross-listing and CSR: Cross-listing versus Non-cross-listing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 
Baseline 
Endogeneity  Components of CSR 
ADR Types  2SLS Heckman PSM  EP SP 
CROSS_LISTING 7.980*** 9.371*** 7.705*** 8.613***  5.788*** 10.172***  
 (6.991) (7.821) (6.441) (6.548)  (4.834) (8.527)  
LEVEL I        8.382*** 
        (7.541) 
LEVEL II        4.277** 
        (2.315) 
LEVEL III        7.627*** 
        (3.177) 
RULE 144A        7.969** 
        (2.417) 
SIZE 9.831*** 6.320*** 9.988*** 9.303***  10.252*** 9.410*** 9.973*** 
 (22.851) (9.918) (24.531) (23.282)  (20.113) (22.879) (22.430) 
AGE 2.475*** 1.238 0.240 1.552  2.650*** 2.300** 2.418*** 
 (2.663) (1.166) (0.235) (1.413)  (2.621) (2.330) (2.588) 
SGR -6.921*** -5.481*** -7.686*** -9.217***  -6.436*** -7.405*** -6.908*** 
 (-5.676) (-4.639) (-5.957) (-6.843)  (-4.489) (-6.173) (-5.757) 
ROA 18.939*** 12.887* 29.403*** 27.905***  13.474** 24.403*** 19.548*** 
 (3.615) (1.950) (4.747) (4.369)  (2.159) (4.781) (3.718) 
LEV -7.406** -0.203 -0.640 1.774  -8.765*** -6.046* -7.654** 
 (-2.450) (-0.060) (-0.191) (0.470)  (-2.774) (-1.885) (-2.524) 
RDS 45.244*** 7.961 50.743*** 45.576***  39.786*** 50.701*** 47.444*** 
 (3.623) (0.506) (3.772) (3.183)  (2.836) (3.924) (3.731) 
λ   4.588***      
   (5.333)      
Constant -24.773*** 0.014 -31.928*** -30.372***  -33.073*** -16.473*** -25.776*** 
 (-5.350) (0.002) (-9.423) (-8.952)  (-7.450) (-2.801) (-5.421) 
Country FE Yes No No No  Yes Yes Yes 







Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,594 11,270 10,806 9,824  11,594 11,594 11,594 
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.390 0.419 0.336  0.477 0.436 0.491 
This table reports results of regressing CSR performance on cross-listing. The sample comprises 11,594 firm-year observations from 54 economies over the period 
2002-2011. CSR is the firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental performance and social performance scores. CROSS-LISTING 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in a given year, and zero otherwise. LEVEL I, LEVEL II, LEVEL III, and RULE 144A are 
dummy variables for each type of ADR. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal 
year and the first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV 
is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. In Columns 2-4, we use two-stage 
least squares (2SLS), the Heckman selection model, and propensity score matching (PSM) to address endogeneity concerns. λ is the inverse Mills’ ratio produced 
by the Heckman model. Columns 5 and 6 report regression results for the two components of CSR performance: EP, environmental performance, which measures 
a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems, and SP, social performance, which 
measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society through its use of best management practices. Column 7 
reports regression results of CSR performance on each ADR type. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. All 









Table 4.5 Cross-listing and CSR: Changes in CSR Performance 
Panel A. Changes in CSR Performance in Cross-Listed Firms 
 Before cross-listing After cross-listing Delisting Before vs. After After vs. Delisting 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Mean               
(t-statistics) 
Median                     
(z-statistics) 
Mean               
(t-statistics) 
Median                     
(z-statistics) 
CSR 2,362  54.731  56.358  5,084  68.041  78.875  41  57.806  55.665  20.215*** 21.066*** -2.4695*** -2.915*** 
SIZE 2,362  8.197  8.137  5,084  9.100  9.055  41  8.993  9.078  26.585*** 25.752*** -0.4891 -0.648 
AGE 2,362  2.409  2.639  5,084  2.695  2.833  41  2.909  2.996  22.982*** 23.095*** 3.1305*** 3.890*** 
SGR 2,362  0.134  0.086  5,084  0.076  0.050  41  0.085  0.071  -9.759*** -12.550*** 0.2446 0.897 
ROA 2,362  0.063  0.052  5,084  0.052  0.045  41  0.034  0.030  -6.910***  -6.860*** -1.7303* -1.856* 
LEV 2,362  0.177  0.155  5,084  0.184  0.168  41  0.207  0.203  1.894* 3.639*** 1.0740 0.662 
RDS 2,362  0.017  0.000  5,084  0.025  0.003  41  0.016  0.003  6.740*** 10.383*** -1.1867 -0.569 
Panel A reports mean and median changes in CSR performance in cross-listed firms before cross-listing, after cross-listing, and after delisting. Panel B reports 
dynamic effects of cross-listing on CSR performance. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental performance and 
social performance scores. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the 
first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV is leverage, 
defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B. Dynamic effects 
 (1) (2) 
 Time dummies Linear treatment effects 
Years 1-2 before cross-listing 1.467  
 (1.414)  
Year of cross-listing 2.639**  
 (2.097)  
Years 1-2 after cross-listing 5.111***  
 (3.760)  
Years 3-4 after cross-listing 5.517***  
 (3.543)  
Years 5-6 after cross-listing 3.563*  
 (1.900)  
Years 7-8 after cross-listing 6.173***  
 (3.218)  
Years 9+ after cross-listing 6.492***  
 (3.662)  
Years since cross-listing  0.486*** 
  (2.967) 
SIZE 9.046*** 9.139*** 
 (20.922) (21.205) 
AGE 2.996*** 2.907** 
 (2.635) (2.561) 
SGR -8.718*** -8.856*** 
 (-7.650) (-7.762) 
ROA 22.839*** 23.225*** 
 (3.541) (3.607) 
LEV 0.142 0.330 
 (0.034) (0.079) 
RDS 32.911** 34.696** 
 (2.110) (2.222) 
Constant -20.226*** -17.807*** 
 (-3.822) (-3.382) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 7,487 7,487 
Adjusted R2 0.461 0.460 
Panel A reports mean and median changes in CSR performance in cross-listed firms before cross-listing, 
after cross-listing, and after delisting. Panel B reports dynamic effects of cross-listing on CSR 
performance. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental 
performance and social performance scores. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE 
is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available 
accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to 
total assets. LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research 
and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for 
clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 




Table 4.6 Cross-listing and CSR: The Role of Home Country Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 COMMON ANTI-SELF-DEALING 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURE 
CROSS_LISTING 11.142*** 16.376*** 17.556*** 
 (6.263) (5.563) (11.586) 
INSTITUTIONS 4.828*** 8.061*** 5.632*** 
 (3.747) (2.743) (2.619) 
CROSS_LISTING*INSTITUTIONS -4.763*** -12.925*** -10.065*** 
 (-2.746) (-3.472) (-6.029) 
SIZE 9.224*** 9.132*** 8.700*** 
 (19.817) (19.497) (16.795) 
AGE 2.187 2.096 2.459* 
 (1.475) (1.460) (1.904) 
SGR -8.989*** -8.708*** -8.795*** 
 (-6.488) (-6.887) (-6.887) 
ROA 22.698*** 24.893*** 24.388*** 
 (3.823) (4.263) (4.145) 
LEV 1.886 2.434 5.981 
 (0.566) (0.736) (1.611) 
RDS 52.982*** 51.867*** 52.860*** 
 (3.878) (3.816) (3.671) 
Constant -34.535*** -35.651*** -34.032*** 
 (-8.785) (-7.973) (-10.157) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,580 11,544 10,648 
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.386 0.383 
This table reports results of regressing CSR performance on cross-listing and difference proxies for home 
country institutions. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its 
environmental performance and social performance scores. COMMON is the common law dummy from 
La Porta et al. (1998). ANTI-SELF-DEALING is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE equals stock market capitalization to GDP divided by bank credit to GDP, and 
comes from the World Bank. CROSS-LISTING is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed 
in the U.S. in a given year, and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. 
AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available 
accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to 
total assets. LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research 
and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by 
firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 





Table 4.7 Cross-listing and CSR: The Role of Listing Venue 






Hong Kong 49 
Luxembourg 12 
Netherlands 9 
New Zealand 19 
Poland 2 
Portugal 6 
Saudi Arabia 4 
Singapore 18 








Panel B. Non-U.S. cross-listing and CSR  
 (1) (2) 
 Full sample Exclude U.S. cross-listing 
CL_NUS 2.106 3.477 
 (1.201) (1.376) 
SIZE 10.872*** 10.441*** 
 (28.127) (21.117) 
AGE 2.823*** 2.342** 
 (2.977) (2.271) 
SGR -7.427*** -5.753*** 
 (-5.793) (-4.827) 
ROA 22.055*** 21.784*** 
 (4.172) (3.439) 
LEV -7.203** -16.712*** 
 (-2.265) (-4.829) 
RDS 59.065*** 68.626*** 
 (4.596) (4.044) 
Constant -27.775*** -25.456*** 
 (-6.048) (-4.483) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 11,594 6,510 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.416 
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Panel A summarizes the sample of non-U.S. cross-listings by host country. Panel B reports the results of 
regressing CSR performance on non-U.S. cross-listing. CSR is a firm’s overall CSR performance, 
measured as the average of its environmental performance and social performance scores. CL_NUS is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed outside the U.S., and zero otherwise. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current 
fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the 
ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. All financial 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions control for country, industry, and year 
fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, 









LITIGATION RISK -2.384 
 (-1.349) 
















Country FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Observations 11,594 
Adjusted R2 0.491 
This table reports results of regressing CSR performance on cross-listing and litigation risk. CSR is a firm’s 
overall CSR performance, measured as the average of its environmental performance and social 
performance scores. CROSS-LISTING is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed in the 
U.S. in a given year, and zero otherwise. LITIGATION RISK equals one for high litigation risk industries 
(biotechnology, computer, electronics, and retailing). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of 
$US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of 
available accounting data. SGR is annual sales growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary 
items to total assets. LEV is leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of 
research and development expenses to total sales. All financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. All regressions control for country, industry and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics adjusted 
for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 





Table 4.9 Investors’ Valuation of CSR in Cross-listed Firms 
 (1) (2) 
CROSS_LISTING 15.555*** 2.289 
 (6.842) (0.417) 
LCSR  0.050 
  (0.785) 
CROSS_LISTING*LCSR  0.205** 
  (2.540) 
SIZE -20.520*** -21.929*** 
 (-9.646) (-9.964) 
AGE -5.771** -6.179** 
 (-1.986) (-2.122) 
SGR 16.503*** 17.485*** 
 (2.616) (2.826) 
ROA 636.048*** 633.576*** 
 (9.896) (9.969) 
LEV -1.774 -1.152 
 (-0.155) (-0.100) 
RDS 246.366*** 233.008*** 
 (4.402) (4.149) 
GLOBAL INDUSTRY Q 48.534*** 50.223*** 
 (3.905) (4.102) 
Constant 251.299*** 257.584*** 
 (8.891) (9.126) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 9,506 9,506 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.480 
This table reports results of regressing market-to-book (MTB) on CSR and cross-listing. MTB is the ratio 
of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. LCSR is lagged CSR performance. CROSS-
LISTING is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. in a given year, and zero 
otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. AGE is the logarithm of the difference 
between the current fiscal year and the first fiscal year of available accounting data. SGR is annual sales 
growth. ROA is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. LEV is leverage, defined 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets. RDS is the ratio of research and development expenses to total 
sales. GLOBAL INDUSTRY Q is the median market-to-book in each industry group. All financial variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. Robust 
t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 





This dissertation investigates corporate governance and CSR in three related essays. The 
first and second essays examine the CSR performance from the internal corporate 
governance aspects. Specifically, the first one investigates how family control influences 
CSR performance. The second one assesses how ownership change in privatized firms 
impacts CSR performance. The third essay, from external corporate governance aspects, 
looks at the CSR performance of foreign firms cross-listed in U.S. markets and examines 
how cross-listing changes the CSR performance. The robust findings of three essays add 
to the literature of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance. 
The first essay in Chapter 2 investigates the impact of family control on CSR 
performance. A large ownership stake may create agency conflicts between controlling 
families and minority shareholders if controlling families can use their voting rights to 
divert firm resources from CSR projects to other projects that benefit themselves. This 
expropriation view suggests that family firms have lower CSR performance than non-
family firms. However, family firms have greater reputation concerns than non-family 
firms (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Zellweger et al., 2011), which may lead family firms to 
invest more in CSR activities. Family firms’ longer horizon (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005) may further lead family firms to invest more in CSR to help support long-term 
relationships with stakeholders. The reputation/long-term horizon view thus suggests that 
family firms have higher CSR performance than non-family firms.
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In this essay, we find support for the expropriation view of family firms. In 
particular, we find a significantly negative impact of family control on CSR after 
controlling for firm, industry, and country characteristics. This negative relationship is 
robust to separately examining the components of our primary CSR measure, as well as to 
endogeneity tests, sample composition tests, alternative estimation methods, alternative 
definition of family firms, comparisons with other large shareholders, and comparisons 
with family firms from other countries. To shed further light on our main finding, we first 
examine whether the CSR underperformance of family firms is more pronounced in firms 
with greater agency problems as indicated by proxies for firms’ agency costs, ownership 
structure, and board structure. The results show that family firms underperform on CSR 
when they have greater agency problems, when monitoring by outside shareholders is less 
effective, or when monitoring by board members is less efficient. These findings are 
consistent with the expropriation view and support our main results. Next, we investigate 
whether country-level institutions affect families’ incentives to invest in CSR. We find that 
family firms are less likely to invest in CSR in countries with low freedom of the press, 
more political connections, and weaker investor protection. Thus, while family firms have 
more incentives to augment their reputation through CSR activities, a weak institutional 
environment may reduce these incentives. Differences in institutional environment might 
also explain why family firms perform differently on CSR in the U.S. and East Asia.  
This essay contributes to the literature on the determinants of CSR, the literature on 
the impact of family control, and the literature on the impact of country-level institutions. 
With respect to the first line of research, we highlight the importance of understanding 
ownership structure when studying the determinants of CSR. We further show that in East 
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Asia, only the family ownership structure has a significant impact on CSR. With respect to 
the second line of research, we confirm prior evidence on the expropriation effects of 
family control in East Asia and suggest that lower CSR performance could be one 
consequence of expropriation. With respect to the third line of research, we show that 
country-level institutions may alter controlling families’ incentives to invest in CSR. 
The second essay, in Chapter 3, investigates the impact of privatization on CSR 
performance. The privatization setting is interesting in that it allows examining CSR 
adoption/ change around a change in the objective function of the firm rather than resulting 
from global or domestic forces as is often done in the literature. In addition, it allows 
exploiting the particular post divestiture ownership structure to test the link between 
government ownership, foreign and employee ownership on CSR performance. Using a 
large sample of 10,502 firm-year observations from 41 countries over the period 2002-
2010, we find that CSR is significantly higher for NPFs in comparison to other matching 
publicly listed firms. This finding is robust to addressing endogeneity through propensity 
score matching, and confirms our main hypothesis that NPFs either adopt CSR as an 
investment strategy to increase competitiveness with privately-owned companies, or are 
coerced to do so by the government that transfers the cost of CSR to private owners. To 
disentangle these two explanations, we compare partially and fully privatized firms and 
observe that partially privatized firms have significantly higher CSR performance, which 
supports the conjecture that CSR activities are likely to be forced upon the firms by the 




In a second step, we examine the impact of ownership structure and country-level 
institutions on CSR performance of NPFs. We find that state ownership (alternatively 
captured by state control or political connections) is negatively associated with CSR 
performance in NPFs, while foreign ownership and employee ownership are positively 
associated with CSR performance. Country-level institutions play a moderating role in the 
relationship between ownership structure and CSR performance. Finally, we investigate 
the firm-level outcomes of CSR activities in NPFs. We find that CSR performance helps 
to mitigate the negative impact of state ownership on firm financial performance in NPFs. 
More specifically, better CSR performance in NPFs with state residual ownership yields 
higher firm value and lower equity financing costs. 
This essay contributes to the privatization literature by examining the social impact 
of privatization. To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess the social responsibility 
of NPFs. SOEs do not typically engage in the additional costs of CSR, and therefore the 
reform could be used to transfer the cost of CSR to private investors. Or, alternatively, CSR 
awareness becomes part of corporate decision-making of NPFs since they are under private 
ownership and seek profit and value maximization. We find support for this hypothesis by 
showing that NPFs have better performance on social dimensions. Also, this essay 
contributes to the literature on determinants of CSR. Specifically, we link this corporate 
decision to a macroeconomic policy that is politically driven. We show that CSR is 
dependent on political will and therefore government support and political institutions are 
important determinants of CSR activities. Finally, our essay is related to corporate finance 
literature because it examines the impact of CSR on firm financial performance in NPFs. 
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We find that better CSR performance helps to mitigate the adverse effect of state ownership 
on firm performance. 
The third essay, in Chapter 4, investigates the impact of cross-listing on firms’ 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Using 11,594 firm-year observations 
from 54 economies over the period 2002-2011, this essay studies the dynamics of cross-
listing and CSR. Consistent with the positive view of CSR, we find that cross-listing is 
positively associated with CSR performance. This positive relation holds for ndogeneity, 
both components of CSR performance, namely, environmental performance and social 
performance, and for all four ADR program types. To further mitigate the self-selection 
concern, we look into the change of CSR performance within cross-listed firms and find 
that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) the U.S. 
market.  
To deepen our analysis, we next examine several factors likely to condition the 
relation between cross-listing and CSR. We first investigate the effect of home country 
institutions on the CSR performance of cross-listed firms. We find that the positive impact 
of cross-listing on CSR performance is larger for firms from countries with weaker 
institutions. This result is consistent with the bonding theory of cross-listing, holding that 
firms from countries with weak institutions benefit more from cross-listing in the U.S. 
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). We also investigate the 
effect of cross-listing in venues other than the U.S. and find no significant impact of these 
cross-listings on CSR performance, suggesting that U.S. markets subject cross-listed firms 
to a relatively stronger regulatory and monitoring environment (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2009). To directly test the litigation risk explanation, we investigate the CSR performance 
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of cross-listed foreign firms that operate in industries with higher litigation risk. We find 
that cross-listed firms in high litigation risk industries are more likely to invest in CSR, in 
line with our argument that cross-listed firms may use CSR to reduce their exposure to 
litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance are 
valued more by investors. 
This essay contributes to different strands of literatures on cross-listing, CSR, and 
the impact of country-level institutions. With respect to the first line of research, we 
provide the first study to our knowledge to assess the social responsibility of cross-listed 
firms. We find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than their peers. We 
thus add to this line of literature by showing that not only financial performance but also 
social performance can be improved by cross-listing. With respect to the second line of 
research, we provide support for the positive view of CSR. We show that improved 
corporate governance increases CSR performance, and that investors value CSR 
investments in cross-listed firms. With respect to the third line of research, we show that 
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APPENDIX A –CHAPTER 2 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A: CSR Variables 
CSR The overall CSR performance is equal to the average of environmental performance and social 
performance. 
Authors' calculation based on 
ASSET4 
ENVIRONMENT The environmental performance measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural 
systems, including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. 
ASSET4 
SOCIAL The social performance measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers, and society through its use of best management practices. 
ASSET4 
Panel B: Family Control Variables 
FAM_DUM A dummy variable equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a family, 0 otherwise. Authors' calculation based on 
Carney and Child (2013) 
FAM_CONT The percentage of voting rights shares held by the controlling family. As above 
FAM_MAN A dummy variable equals 1 if the controlling family is also the CEO, the Board Chairman, or 
Vice-Chairman, 0 otherwise. 
As above 
Panel C: Firm-level Controls 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. Authors' calculation based on 
Compustat data 
AGE Fiscal year minus the year of establishment. Authors' calculation based on 
Carney and Child (2013) 
MTB The ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. The market value of assets is total 
assets plus market capitalization minus book equity. 
Authors' calculation based on 
Compustat data 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. As above 
ROA The ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. As above 
RDS Ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. Missing research and development 
expenses are set to zero. 
As above 
Panel D: Other Types of Ownership 
STATE A dummy variable equals 1 if the largest shareholder is the state or a foreign government. Authors' calculation based on 
Carney and Child (2013) 
WIDELY_HELD A dummy variable equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a widely-held company or a widely-held 
financial institution. 
As above 







FREE CASH FLOW (EBITDA-Capital expenditures)/Assets. Authors' calculation based on 
Compustat data 
CASH HOLDINGS The ratio of cash to total assets.  As above 
MULTIPLE LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has a second controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise. Authors' calculation based on 
Carney and Child (2013) 
DISPERSION OF 
CONTROL 
Adjusted Herfindhal index of difference between the voting rights of the five largest 
shareholders. 1/((Cont1-Cont2)2+(Cont2-Cont3)2+(Cont3-Cont4)2+(Cont4-Cont5)2). The lower 
the measure, the higher the concentration of control. 
As above 
BOARD SIZE Adjusted score of total number of board numbers that are in excess of ten or below eight. Higher 
score reflects better efficiency of the board. 
ASSET4 
BOARD EXPERTISE Perc ntage of oard members who have either an industry specific background or a strong 
financial background.  
As above 
Panel F: Country-level Institutions 
PRESS FREEDOM Adjusted score of Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press index. Higher score indicates more 




Percentage of firms connected with a minister or a member of parliament, or a close relationship. Faccio (2006) 
INVESTOR 
PROTECTION 
An index aggregating three indices: corruption, risk of contract repudiation, and risk of 
expropriation. 




APPENDIX B –CHAPTER 3 COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL MODELS 
Common variables and assumptions 
𝐾𝐺𝐿𝑆 = implied cost of equity from the Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) model; 
𝐾𝐶𝑇 = implied cost of equity from the Claus and Thomas (2001) model; 
𝐾𝑂𝐽𝑁 = implied cost of equity from the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model; 
𝐾𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  = implied cost of equity from the Easton (2004) model; 
𝑃𝑡= stock price measured ten months after the fiscal year end; 
𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+𝜏= forecasted return on equity for year 𝑡 + 𝜏; 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏= forecasted earnings for year 𝑡 + 𝜏; 
𝐵𝑡= current (beginning of period) book value per share; 
𝑘𝑡 = expected dividend payout at time t; 
𝐵𝑡+𝜏 =forecasted book value per share for year 𝑡 + 𝜏, measured using the clean surplus 
relationship; i.e., 𝐵𝑡+𝜏 = 𝐵𝑡+𝜏−1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏(1 − 𝑘𝑡+𝜏); 
𝑎𝑒𝑡+𝜏 = forecasted abnormal earnings for year 𝑡 + 𝜏; 
𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑡 = forecasted long-term earnings growth at time t; and 
𝑖𝑡 = expected perpetual earnings growth at time t. 
We require firms to have positive one-year-ahead (𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1) and two-year-ahead 
(𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2) earnings forecasts, and either a three-year-ahead forecast (𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+3) or a long-
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term growth forecast (𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑡). If a three-, four-, or five-year-ahead forecast is not available 
in I/B/E/S, we impute it from the previous year forecast and the long-term growth forecast, 
i.e., 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏 = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏−1 ∙ (1 + 𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑡). Similarly, if the long-term growth forecast is 
missing, we impute it from the growth rate implied by the three- and two-year-ahead 




We estimate the expected dividend payout (kt) using the average dividend payout 
over the previous three years. If this ratio is missing or outside [0, 1], we replace it with 
the country-year median. We estimate the expected perpetual earnings growth (𝑖𝑡) using 
next year’s realized inflation rate. 
Model description  
Model 1: Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) 
This model assumes clean surplus accounting, allowing current share price to be 
expressed in terms of the cost of equity, current book value, and forecasted ROE and book 
values. The explicit forecast horizon is set to three years, beyond which forecasted ROE 
decays to a target ROE by the 12th year, and remains constant afterward. The valuation 
equation is given by:  







𝐾𝐺𝐿𝑆 ⋅ (1 + 𝐾𝐺𝐿𝑆)11
𝐵𝑡+11 
(A.1) 
For the first three years, FROEt+τ is set equal to 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏
𝐵𝑡+𝜏−1
. Beyond the third year, 
FROEt+τ fades linearly to a target ROE by the 12
th year. To determine the target ROE, we 
compute, for each firm in each year, the average ROE over the previous three years. The 
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target ROE is the country-industry-year median. We define industries according to 
Campbell’s (1996) classification. Negative target ROEs are replaced by country-industry 
medians and, if still negative, by country-year medians.  
Model 2: Claus and Thomas (2001) 
This model also assumes clean surplus accounting, allowing current share price to 
be expressed in terms of the cost of equity, current book value, forecasted abnormal 
earnings, and a perpetual abnormal earnings growth. Forecasted abnormal earnings is 
forecasted earnings minus a charge for the cost of equity. The explicit forecast horizon is 
set to five years, beyond which forecasted residual earnings grow at the expected inflation 
rate. The valuation equation is given by: 







(𝐾𝐶𝑇 − 𝑖𝑡)(1 + 𝐾𝐶𝑇)5
 
(A.2) 
where 𝑎𝑒𝑡+𝜏 = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏 − 𝐾𝐶𝑇 ⋅ 𝐵𝑡+𝜏−1. 
Model 3: Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
This model is an extension of the Gordon constant growth model. It allows share 
price to be expressed in terms of the cost of equity, one-year-ahead earnings forecast, and 
near-term and perpetual growth forecasts. The explicit forecast horizon is set to one year, 
after which forecasted earnings grow at a near-term rate that decays to a perpetual rate. The 
near-term earnings growth is the average of: (i) the growth rate of FEPS from year t+1 to 
year t+2; and (ii) the I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast (LTG). The perpetual growth rate 















The model requires that 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 > 0 and 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 > 0 to yield a positive root.  
Model 4: Easton (2004) 
This model is a generalization of the Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) model based on Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). It allows share price to be expressed in terms of the cost of 
equity, expected dividend payout, and one-year- and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
The explicit forecast horizon is set to two years, after which forecasted abnormal earnings 
grow in perpetuity at a constant rate. The valuation equation is given by:  
𝑃𝑡 =













APPENDIX C –CHAPTER 3 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A: CSR Variables 
CSR Overall CSR performance. Computed as the average of its environmental performance and social 
performance scores. 
Authors' calculation based 
on ASSET4 data 
EP Environmental performance score. Captures a company’s effect on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company avoids 
environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in generating shareholder value. 
ASSET4 
SP Social performance score. Captures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers, and society. It reflects the company's reputation and the health of its license to 
operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to generate shareholder value. 
As above 
COMMUNITY Community component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards maintaining a good company 
reputation within the community (local, national, and global). It reflects a company's capacity to maintain 
its license to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods, staff time, etc.), protecting public 





Diversity and opportunity component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards maintaining 
diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company's capacity to increase workforce 
loyalty and productivity by promoting life-work balance, a family-friendly environment, and equal 




Employment quality component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards providing high-
quality employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company's capacity to increase workforce 
loyalty and productivity by distributing rewards and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on long-
term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding lay-offs, and maintaining 
relations with trade unions. 
As above 
HUMAN RIGHTS Human rights component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards respecting fundamental 
human rights conventions. It reflects a company's capacity to maintain its license to operate by 




Health and safety component of SCR. Captures managerial commitment towards providing a healthy 
and safe workplace. It reflects a company's capacity to increase workforce loyalty and productivity by 
integrating into its day-to-day operations a concern for the physical and mental health, well-being, and 










Product responsibility component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards creating value-
added products and services and upholding the customer's safety. It reflects a company's capacity to 
maintain its license to operate by producing quality goods and services that preserve the customer's 




Training and development component of CSR. Captures managerial commitment towards providing 
developing workforce talent (education). It reflects a company's capacity to increase intellectual capital, 
workforce loyalty, and productivity by developing employees’ skills, competencies, employability, and 
careers. 
As above 
Panel B: Privatization and Ownership Variables 
PRIVATIZED A dummy variable equal to 1 for privatized firms, 0 otherwise. Firms' annual reports and 
offering prospectuses 
STATE Percentage of shares held by a government. As above 
CONTROL A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in which the state retains control following privatization, 0 
otherwise. 
As above 
FOREIGN Percentage of shares held by foreign investors. As above 
EMPLOYEES Percentage of shares held by employees. As above 
CONNECTED A dummy variable equal to 1 for politically connected firms, 0 otherwise. Faccio (2006) 
Panel C: Firm-level Control Variables 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets in millions of $US. Authors' calculation based 
on Compustat data 
AGE Fiscal year minus the year of establishment. As above 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. As above 
ROA The ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets. As above 
RDS Ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. Missing research and development expenses 
are set to zero. 
As above 
LTG Average long-term growth forecast reported in June of each year. Authors' calculation based 
on I/B/E/S data 
DISP Dispersion of analyst forecasts defined as the coefficient of variation of one-year-ahead analyst 









Panel D: Performance Variables 
MTB The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is 
total assets plus market capitalization minus book equity. 
Authors' calculation based 
on Compustat data 
COE Implied cost of equity premium= (KGLS+ KCT+KOJN+KMPEG)/4. KGLS follows the Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
model, KCT follows the Claus and Thomas (2001) model, KOJN follows the Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) model, and KMPEG follows the Easton (2004) model. 
Authors' calculation based 
on I/B/E/S and Compustat 
data 
Panel E: Country-level Institutions 
RULE OF LAW Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators(WGI) 
CORRUPTION Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
As above 
COMPETITION Captures whether competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition. World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY) 
STOCK MARKET Captures whether stock markets provide companies adequate financing. As above 
INDIVIDUALISM Hofstede's index individualism of national culture. Hofstede (2001) 
PRESS Captures the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom. We transform this index such that a 
higher score indicates more freedom. 
Freedom House 
 
 
